Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets

SIAM Journal on Computing

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 92-106

  Ackermann, Heiner ^a   Goldberg, Paul W ^b   Mirrokni, Vahab S ^c   Röglin, Heiko ^d   Vöcking, Berthold ^e  

^a FRAUNHOFER INSTITUTE FOR INDUSTRIAL MATHEMATICS ITWM   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^c GOOGLE INC   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^e RWTH AACHEN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Convergence; Nash equilibrium; Response dynamics; Stable marriage problem

Indexed keywords

BEST RESPONSE; CONVERGENCE; CONVERGENCE TIME; ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS; LOWER BOUNDS; MATCHINGS; MATROIDS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; REAL-LIFE APPLICATIONS; RESPONSE DYNAMICS; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; SOLUTION CONCEPTS; SPECIAL CLASS; STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM; STABLE MATCHING; TWO-SIDED MARKETS;

COMMERCE; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

DYNAMICS;

EID: 79952951480     PISSN: 00975397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/090753498     Document Type: Article

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