Congressional oversight of intelligence: Is the solution part of the problem?

Intelligence and National Security

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 24-49

  Kibbe, Jennifer ^a  

^a FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952870740     PISSN: 02684527     EISSN: 17439019     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02684521003588104     Document Type: Article

References (96)

1. Harry Howe Ransom, 'Congress and the Intelligence Agencies', Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 32/1 (1975) p.162.
2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton 2004) p.419.
3. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1885) p.297.
4. Suzanne E. Spaulding, 'Building Checks and Balances for National Security Policy: The Role of Congress', Advance: The Journal of the American Constitution Society Issue Groups 2/2 (2008) p.76.
5. Rep. Pete Hoekstra, 'Intelligence Reform and Oversight: The View From Congress', Council on Foreign Relations Meeting, 26 June 2008.
6. Loch K. Johnson, 'Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies: Intelligence Accountability in the United States', Presidential Studies Quarterly 34/4 (2004) p.832.
7. Dana Priest, 'Congressional oversight of Intelligence criticized', Washington Post, 27 April 2004, p. A1.
8. L. Britt Snider, former SSCI General Counsel and CIA Inspector General, author telephone interview, 11 August 2009.
9. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science 28/1 (1984) pp.165-79.
10. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science 28/1 (1984), p.168.
11. Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1990).
12. Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1990), p.191-3.
13. Loch K. Johnson, 'A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence' in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Handbook of Intelligence Studies (New York: Routledge 2007) pp.343-60.
14. Amy Zegart, Prepared Statement, US Congress, 110th Congress, 1st session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Activities, S. Hrg. 110-794, 13 November 2007, p.47 (hereafter Senate Hearing 110-794).
15. Eric Lichtblau, 'Complaints signal tension between FBI and Congress', New York Times, 15 August 2005, p. A13.
16. Anne Joseph O'Connell, 'The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World', California Law Review 94 (2006) pp.1693-4.
17. Jonathan Weisman, 'Democrats reject key 9/11 panel suggestion', Washington Post, 30 November 2006, p. A07.
18. The 10-12 percent depends on which of many possible figures one uses for the defense budget. Steven Aftergood, 'DNI announces $75 billion intelligence budget', Secrecy News, 16 September 2009, (5 November 2009).
19. Author telephone interview with former senior HPSCI staffer, 31 July 2009.
20. Lee Hamilton, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.28.
21. Rep. Larry Combest, Congressional Record, 3 August 1993, p. H5678.
22. 50 USC 414(a)(1).
23. See, for example, Section 8152 of Public Law 103-39, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, 11 November 1993.
24. Author interview, former HPSCI senior staffer, 13 August 2009, Washington, DC.
25. Sen. Christopher Bond, Opening Statement, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.9. Although Sen. Bond did not identify the classified program, longtime intelligence analysts have speculated that he was referring to the MISTY stealth satellite program.
26. See Steven Aftergood, 'Intelligence oversight deflected by appropriators', Secrecy News, Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy, 26 November 2007.
27. US Congress, 108th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, H. Rept. 108-163, 18 June 2003, p.22.
28. Minority views, US Congress, 108th Congress, 2nd session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, H. Rept. 108-558, 21 June 2004, p.69.
29. Denis McDonough, Mara Rudman and Peter Rundlet, 'No Mere Oversight: Congressional Oversight of Intelligence is Broken', Center for American Progress, June 2006, p.17.
30. Lee Hamilton, author telephone interview, 3 July 2006.
31. 50 USC 413 (a)(1).
32. L. Britt Snider, 'Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers', Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, February 1997, pp.17-8.
33. Panetta told the committees that he had just learned of the program, which had begun soon after September 11, 2001, and that he had already formally ended it. The program encountered several difficulties and was repeatedly shelved, although never ended, by several of Panetta's predecessors, apparently without ever becoming operational. David Ignatius, 'The CIA's "hit team" miss', Washington Post, 22 July 2009.
34. Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, 'CIA had plan to assassinate Qaeda leaders', New York Times, 14 July 2009, p. A1.
35. For information on the extent of the classification of information, see Secrecy Report Card 2008, by OpenTheGovernment. org.
36. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.35.
37. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.35.
38. US Congress, 107th Congress, 2nd session, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003 for Intelligence, S. Rpt. 107-149, 13 May 2002, p.7.
39. Sen. John Rockefeller, Opening Statement, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.4.
40. US Congress, 110th Congress, 2nd session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, H. Rept. 110-665, 21 May 2008, p.36.
41. 50 USC 413b(c)(2).
42. Author interview, former senior HPSCI staffer, 13 August 2009.
43. Alfred Cumming, 'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications, Congressional Research Service, R40698, 14 July 2009.
44. Presumably, a similar logic underlies their acceptance of the informal Gang of Four.
45. L. Britt Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA 2008) p.283.
46. Author interview, senior HPSCI staffer, 13 August 2009.
47. Bob Graham, former SSCI chair, author telephone interview, 8 August 2009.
48. L. Britt Snider, author telephone interview, 11 August 2009.
49. Author telephone interview, former intelligence official, 29 July 2009.
50. Vicki Divoll, 'Congress's torture bubble', New York Times, 12 May 2009, p. A31.
51. Author interview, former senior SSCI staffer, 31 July 2009.
52. At time of writing, it is as yet unclear which were Gang of Four or Eight, and whether they were appropriately such.
53. Sen. Rockefeller, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.26.
54. Statement for the Record of Leon Panetta Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, 5 February 2009, p.4.
55. Marvin C. Ott, 'Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16/1 (2003) pp.69-94.
56. Matthew B. Walker, 'Reforming Congressional Oversight of U.S. Intelligence', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19/4 (2006) pp.702-20.
57. Snider, The Agency and the Hill.
58. See, for example, Snider, The Agency and the Hill.
59. Loch Johnson, 'Ostriches, Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians: Role Selection by Congressional Intelligence Overseers', SAIS Review 28/1 (2008) pp.93-108.
60. Ott, 'Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight', p.82.
61. Johnson, 'Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies', p.831.
62. Melvin A. Goodman, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 2008) pp.287-8.
63. Gregory C. McCarthy, 'GOP Oversight of Intelligence in the Clinton Era', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15/1 (2002) pp.34-38.
64. John Prados, Safe for Democracy (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee 2006) p.619.
65. Quoted in Snider, The Agency and the Hill, p.86.
66. Johnson, 'Presidents, Lawmakers, and Spies', p.831.
67. Ott, 'Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight', p.84.
68. Snider, The Agency and the Hill, p.89.
69. Snider, The Agency and the Hill, p.89.
70. Snider, The Agency and the Hill, p.90.
71. Loch K. Johnson, 'Governing in the Absence of Angels: On the Practice of Intelligence Accountability in the U.S. Congress', Woodrow Wilson Center Congress Project, 9 May 2003, p.18.
72. Matt Korade, 'Intelligence oversight gets a fresh look as panel takes up authorization bill', CQ Politics, 29 April 2008, (15 October 2008).
73. 9/11 Public Discourse Project, Report on the Status of 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Part II: Reforming the Institutions of Government, 20 October 2005, p.8.
74. Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism (New York: Vintage 2008) p.90. The NIP funds those agencies that provide intelligence to support national policy makers, and the MIP supports military operations and activities. Most past reform proposals do not specify which parts of the budget they would apply to, possibly anticipating pushback from the defense appropriations subcommittees over the MIP.
75. Frederick M. Kaiser, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives, CRS Report RL32525, Congressional Research Service, 16 September 2008, p.18.
76. Paul S. Rundquist and Christopher M. Davis, S. Res. 445: Senate Committee Reorganization for Homeland Security and Intelligence Matters, CRS Report RS21955, Congressional Research Service, 14 October 2004, p.2.
77. The intelligence budget is broken into two categories: the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which supports those agencies that provide intelligence to support national policy makers; and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which supports military operations and activities. Under Resolution 445, appropriations for the MIP would remain the purview of the defense subcommittee.
78. David Grannis, Majority Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, author telephone interview, 7 August 2009.
79. Sen. Christopher Bond, US Congress, 110th Congress, 2nd session, Senate, 'Senate Resolution 655-To Improve Congressional Oversight of the Intelligence Activities of the United States', Congressional Record, vol. 154, 11 September 2008, pp. S8419.
80. Sen. Thad Cochran and Sen. Robert Byrd, letter to Sen. Harry Reid and Sen. Mitch McConnell, 5 April 2008 (Cochran and Byrd responded to the idea when it was first proposed in March 2008 by Reid and McConnell).
81. Sen. Rockefeller, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.3.
82. Sen. Rockefeller, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.3.
83. Sen. Christopher Bond, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.8.
84. Richard K. Betts, 'Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable', World Politics 31/1 (1978) pp.61-89.
85. Bob Graham with Jeff Nussbaum, Intelligence Matters (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2008) p.266.
86. Johnson, 'Ostriches, Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians'.
87. Snider, The Agency and the Hill.
88. Sen. Hamilton, Senate Hearing 110-794, p.28.
89. Helen Fessenden, 'Sept. 11 Commission's proposals spur urgency, caution in congress', CQ Weekly, 24 July 2004, p.1815.
90. Snider, The Agency and the Hill, p.40.
91. Author interview, senior HPSCI staffer, 13 August 2009, Washington, DC.
92. Pamela Hess, 'Congressman, CIA dispute briefing list accuracy', USA Today, 19May 2009, (accessed 11 August 2009).
93. Bob Graham, author interview, 8 August 2009.
94. Johnson, 'Ostriches, Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians', p.5.
95. Spaulding, 'Building Checks and Balances', p.77.
96. Charles Battaglia, former SSCI Staff Director, author telephone interview, 5 August 2009.