The impact of teacher collective bargaining laws on student achievement: Evidence from a new Mexico natural experiment

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 120, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1130-1191

  Lindy, Benjamin A ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 79952568924     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (304)

1. Ctr. for Union Facts, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A15.
2. reprinted Union Facts, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A15, Appendix A.
3. Union Facts, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A15.
4. Union Facts, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at A15.
5. For anti-union pieces in the popular press, see, for example, Steven Brill, The Rubber Room, NEW YORKER, Aug. 31, 2009, at 30.
6. and Steve Malanga, Unions vs. Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at A17.
7. For an entertaining anti-union segment from a popular television show, see The Simpsons: Waverly Hills 9-0-2-1-D'oh (FOX television broadcast May 3, 2009), in which Bart's teacher earns tenure and, after delegating teaching duties to Ralph, begins reading a magazine behind her desk.
8. See, e.g., Edwin Chen & Maria L. La Ganga, Dole Vows Renewal with Trust, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at A1 ("Dole received some of the most enthusiastic applause when he leveled sharp words at teachers unions, whom he blamed for the state of public education in America.").
9. Walter Shapiro, Scripted Candidates Show Off Their Reading Skills, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 1999, at 2A ("[M]ost... Republicans go out of their way in education speeches to lambaste the teachers unions....").
10. Compare Final Priorities, Requirements, Definitions, and Selection Criteria, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688, 59,697 (Nov. 18, 2009) (requiring states to repeal laws that ban the use of test score data in teacher evaluations in order to be eligible for Race to the Top grants).
11. with Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Legislators Balk at Tying Teacher Tenure to Student Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at B1 (describing earlier union success in getting New York legislators to pass a law that bans "student test scores from being considered when teacher tenure determinations are made").
12. See Final Priorities, Requirements, Definitions, and Selection Criteria, 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,751 ("States, LEAs [local educational agencies], or schools must include multiple measures [of teacher effectiveness], provided that teacher effectiveness is evaluated, in significant part, by student growth (as defined in this notice).").
13. See Nick Anderson, Unions Criticize Obama's School Proposals as 'Bush III,' WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009, at A5.
14. See, e.g., Josh Hafenbrack & Leslie Postal, 'Start Over' on Teacher Pay Bill, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 16, 2010, at A1 (describing a union-led campaign to defeat a bill that would make Florida more competitive in the Race to the Top program by tying teacher compensation to student performance).
15. Jeremy P. Meyer, Legions Line Up for Showdown on School Tenure, DENVER POST, Apr. 18, 2010, at B1 (describing a union-led campaign to defeat a bill that would make Colorado more competitive in the Race to the Top program by changing teacher tenure rules in that state).
16. See Steven Brill, The Teachers' Unions' Last Stand: How Obama's Race to the Top Could Revolutionize Public Education, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (discussing qualifiers inserted into the district-level memoranda of understanding required under Race to the Top).
17. See, e.g., Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION 89, 91-92 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006) (describing the power that teachers' unions can exert on school policy through the collective bargaining process).
18. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, at 7 (describing the growth in teachers' union membership even as overall union membership in the United States has declined).
19. See Teacher Rules, Roles and Rights: Scope of Bargaining, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
20. For a discussion of the state laws that govern teacher collective bargaining, see EMILY COHEN, KATE WALSH & RISHAWN BIDDLE, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16-24 (2008), available at http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq_invsible_ink.pdf, Part I.
21. See EMILY COHEN, KATE WALSH & RISHAWN BIDDLE, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16-24 (2008), available at http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq_invsible_ink.pdf (cataloging many of the governance issues that unions influence through collective bargaining).
22. The primary argument of this report's authors is that unions influence school governance in multiple ways: through state legislatures, through state regulatory agencies, and through state courts. EMILY COHEN, KATE WALSH & RISHAWN BIDDLE, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16-24 (2008), available at http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq_invsible_ink.pdf, at 1-2.
23. They acknowledge, however, that collective bargaining still shapes many important school governance issues. EMILY COHEN, KATE WALSH & RISHAWN BIDDLE, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (2008), available at http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq_invsible_ink.pdf, at 2, 16-24.
24. For example, class-size restrictions and seniority-based salary ladders constrain the spending options of school districts: funding that goes toward hiring additional teachers to keep class sizes down or toward seniority-based pay increases is funding that cannot go toward other priorities like bonuses for highly effective teachers. Alternatively, layoff and transfer policies could protect the interests of senior teachers at the expense of more effective teachers regardless of whether they are more experienced. For further discussion of these (and other) arguments over the potential merits of teacher bargaining, see Sandy Banks, Is This Truly for the Children?, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A2, Part II.
25. See Sandy Banks, Is This Truly for the Children?, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A2 (criticizing civil disobedience demonstrations conducted by the L.A. teachers' unions designed to prevent job cuts).
26. See Jeremy P. Meyer, Teacher Evaluation: After Signing, Factions Dig into Details, DENVER POST, May 21, 2010, at A1 (describing the Colorado Education Association's resistance to a new teacher evaluation bill aimed at making Colorado more competitive for Race to the Top).
27. See Sarah Longwell, Op-Ed., Crist's Mistakes, SUNSENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), June 6, 2010, at 5F.
28. See Steven Brill, The Teachers' Unions' Last Stand: How Obama's Race to the Top Could Revolutionize Public Education, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
29. See, Sam Dillon, A Tentative Contract Deal for Washington Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at A21.
30. For example, despite microeconomic theory that shows why increasing the minimum wage should lead to an increase in unemployment, empirical work has shown that the opposite may sometimes be true. See David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994).
31. In the field of education policy, despite the strong intuition that smaller class sizes should improve student achievement, empirical work has shown that large-scale efforts to reduce class size actually reduce student achievement for minority students. See Christopher Jepsen & Steven Rivkin, What Is the Tradeoff Between Smaller Classes and Teacher Quality? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9205, 2002).
32. See NELSON & ROSEN, INST. FOR WISCONSIN'S FUTURE, ARE TEACHERS' UNIONS HURTING AMERICAN EDUCATION? A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AMONG TEACHERS ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE (1996), Part III.
33. For studies finding a positive impact, see sources cited NELSON & ROSEN, INST. FOR WISCONSIN'S FUTURE, ARE TEACHERS' UNIONS HURTING AMERICAN EDUCATION? A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AMONG TEACHERS ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE (1996).
34. For studies finding a negative impact, see Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996).
35. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION 89, 91-92 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006).
36. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION 89, 91-92 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169(2) (2006).
39. California, for example, has an extensive bargaining regime mirroring the federal system. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543 (Deering 1999) (establishing the right of teachers to be represented by a union and their right to good-faith bargaining from their employers).
40. Cnty. Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. L.A. Cnty. Emps. Ass'n, Local 660, 699 P.2d 835, 850 (Cal. 1985) (establishing the right of public employees to strike in California absent express statutory prohibition or threat of imminent danger to the public).
41. see also Carol A. Vendrillo, Collective Bargaining in California's Public Sector, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 137, 145-47 (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern eds., 2001) (describing California's teacher collective bargaining regime).
42. Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, the federal courts of appeals seem to uphold this proposition uniformly. See, e.g., Conn. State Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1976).
43. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969).
44. McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
45. see also KENNETH H. OSTRANDER, THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, at xiv (1987) ("Teachers came away from the federal courts with a constitutional right to organize.").
46. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-9-1 (LexisNexis 2007) ("It is unlawful for... a school employee... to take part in or assist in a strike against a school employer....").
47. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.202 (West 2001) ("A public employee shall not strike....").
48. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2009) ("Any... contract... between the governing authority of any... institution of the State of North Carolina, and any labor union... as bargaining agent for any public employees... is hereby declared to be against the public policy of the State, illegal, unlawful, void and of no effect.").
49. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 617.002(a) (West 2009) ("An official of the state... may not enter into a collective bargaining contract with a labor organization regarding wages, hours, or conditions of employment of public employees.").
50. This classification follows the National Council on Teacher Quality's website, cited See Teacher Rules, Roles and Rights: Scope of Bargaining, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
51. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.04(B) (LexisNexis 2009), Appendix B (classifying all fifty states and the District of Columbia and providing citations to controlling statutes and case law).
52. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.04(B) (LexisNexis 2009) ("A public employer shall bargain collectively with an exclusive representative designated under [the relevant section of the public employee collective bargaining law].").
53. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.59.060(1) (West 2006) ("Employees shall have the right... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing...."). For a complete list of "mandatory" states.
54. see ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-202(a) (2009), Appendix B.
55. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-202(a) (2009) (referencing the ability of school districts to "choose[] to officially recognize in its policies an organization representing the majority of the teachers of the school district for the purpose of negotiating personnel policies, salaries, and educational matters of mutual concern under a written policy agreement").
56. Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 6, 553 P.2d 793, 796 (Colo. 1976) (approving "[n]egotiations between [a public] employer and [a public] employee organization entered into voluntarily [because they] do not require the employer to agree with the proposals submitted by employees").
57. For a complete list of "permissive" states, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2009), Appendix B.
58. See, e.g., sources cited N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2009).
59. For a complete list of "right-to-work" states, see See Teacher Rules, Roles and Rights: Scope of Bargaining, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope (last visited Nov. 3, 2010), Appendix B.
60. See Teacher Rules, Roles and Rights: Scope of Bargaining, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
61. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543(a) (West 1999).
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-15 (LexisNexis 2004).
63. For a discussion of these provisions, see MYRON LIEBERMAN, UNDERSTANDING THE TEACHER UNION CONTRACT: A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK 15 (2000), which describes district bargaining "with individual employees or any third party without permission of the union" as an unfair labor practice.
64. see also ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION & COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 502-03 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the rationale for exclusive representation in the context of federal labor law).
65. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-816(1) (2004) ("The commission shall require good faith bargaining concerning the terms and conditions of employment of its employees by any employer.").
66. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-17 (2004) ("[P]ublic employers and exclusive representatives... shall bargain in good faith on wages, hours, and all other terms and conditions of employment....").
67. See generally MYRON LIEBERMAN, UNDERSTANDING THE TEACHER UNION CONTRACT: A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK (2000), at 19-22 (describing the duty to bargain in good faith and surveying application of state statutes in various state court cases).
68. See MYRON LIEBERMAN, UNDERSTANDING THE TEACHER UNION CONTRACT: A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK (2000), at 14 (describing the role of state labor boards in "evaluating charges of unfair labor practices").
69. See MYRON LIEBERMAN, UNDERSTANDING THE TEACHER UNION CONTRACT: A CITIZEN'S HANDBOOK (2000), at 15 (describing the penalties that state labor boards can impose as "severe").
70. See, e.g., Joan Parker, Judicial Review and Legislative Response: The New Jersey Public Sector Collective Bargaining Experience, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern eds., 2001), at 21, 32 (describing mediation under New Jersey law).
71. Gregory M. Saltzman & Shlomo Sperka, Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Michigan: Law and Recent Developments, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern eds., 2001), at 106, 115 (describing mediation under Michigan law).
72. Vendrillo 137, 145-47 (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern eds., 2001), at 146 (describing mediation under California law).
73. KENNETH H. OSTRANDER, THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (1987), at 63.
74. See EMILY COHEN, KATE WALSH & RISHAWN BIDDLE, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16-24 (2008), available at http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/docs/nctq_invsible_ink.pdf, and accompanying text.
75. Terry M. Moe, Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 156, 161, 168 (2009).
76. See Terry M. Moe, Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 156, 161, 168 (2009).
77. See Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Within-District Spending Inequities Help Some Schools To Fail, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATION POLICY 201, 204, 216 (Diane Ravitch ed., 2004).
78. See Steven Brill, The Teachers' Unions' Last Stand: How Obama's Race to the Top Could Revolutionize Public Education, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, § 6 (Magazine), at 34.
79. See COHEN ET AL., NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (2008), at 8.
80. See COHEN ET AL., NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, INVISIBLE INK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (2008), at 6.
81. But see Jepsen & Rivkin, What Is the Tradeoff Between Smaller Classes and Teacher Quality? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9205, 2002) (finding that large reductions in class size reduce teacher quality in schools with a high percentage of minority students).
82. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 7, 18 (noting that in Florida, 0.05% of public school teachers were dismissed involuntarily while 7.9% of the general workforce was dismissed involuntarily).
83. see also Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000) (citing academic work arguing that teachers' unions "protect ineffective workers").
84. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 91-92, 94.
85. Steelman, Powell & Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000), at 441 (citing academic work arguing that teachers' unions "unnecessarily drive up costs [for school systems]").
86. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 91-92, 94.
87. Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 94-95, 102-03.
88. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 94-95.
89. see also NAT'L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, BUMPING HR: GIVING PRINCIPALS MORE SAY OVER STAFFING 4-5, 7-8 (2010), available at http://www.nctq.org/tr3/docs/nctq_site_based_hiring.pdf (describing the significant role that seniority plays in districts with collective bargaining agreements, specifically when teachers are "excessed" or when teachers request a transfer between schools).
90. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 94-95.
91. See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 102-03.
92. See, e.g., Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Scapegoat, Albatross, or What? The Status Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 53, 65.
93. Terry M. Moe, Union Power and the Education of Children, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 229, 233.
94. Robert L. Green & Bradley R. Carl, A Reform for Troubled Times: Takeovers of Urban Schools, 569 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 56, 59 (2000).
95. See, e.g., Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Scapegoat, Albatross, or What? The Status Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 53, 65 (noting that management bargains "in a delicate position" because it "works for school board members who have good reason to avoid labormanagement conflict").
96. Ben Fischer, CPS Teacher Transitions to Union Chief, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 10, 2009, at B3 (describing the Cincinnati Federation of Teachers as "kingmaker in school board elections").
97. see also Ben Smith, Teachers Union Helped Unseat Fenty, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2010, 10:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0910/Teachers_union_helped_unseat_Fenty.h tml (describing how the American Federation of Teachers "spent roughly $1 million" to defeat then-Mayor Adrian Fenty in an effort "to put the brakes on his aggressive efforts to shake up the city's schools system").
98. See sources cited Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Scapegoat, Albatross, or What? The Status Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 53, 65.
99. Individual Justices and the Court as a whole have praised local school boards for their ability to reflect community values and ensure democratic accountability in the public school context. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 894 (1982) (Powell J., dissenting) ("School boards are uniquely local and democratic institutions.... [T]he governance of [public schools] traditionally has been placed in the hands of a local board, responsible locally to the parents and citizens of school districts. Through parent-teacher associations [PTAs], and even less formal arrangements that vary with schools, parents are informed and often may influence decisions of the board.").
100. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (basing its holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit corporal punishment in public schools in part on "[t]he openness of the public school and its supervision by the community").
101. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) ("Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs.... No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public education.").
102. Several scholars and practitioners have praised local school boards for similar reasons. See, e.g., DONALD R. MCADAMS, WHAT SCHOOL BOARDS CAN DO 9 (2006) ("[B]oard members are usually expected to pay close attention to parents and other constituents and have the final say on district policies. By design, legislatures have placed school districts as close as possible to the people they serve.").
103. Bernard W. Bell, Marbury v. Madison and the Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 232 (2003) (cataloguing articles where scholars have argued that "the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of government").
104. James C. Denver III, Note, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel School District and Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1164, 1186 ("Once elected, the school board, through parent-teacher organizations, is more informed and aware of the community's values than any other governmental agency.").
105. For further discussion of this argument and for an exposition of the counterargument that teacher collective bargaining actually increases democratic accountability, see Martin H. Malin, Public Employees' Right To Strike: Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 313, 318-20 (1993).
106. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 11 (describing early union leaders' claim that "collective bargaining was essential to getting administrators to treat teachers like true professionals").
107. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 17.
108. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 17.
109. see also Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000), at 442 (citing various sources that make these arguments).
110. See Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000), at 441.
111. See Susan Moore Johnson & Susan M. Kardos, Reform Bargaining and Its Promise for School Improvement, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS? TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 7 (Tom Loveless ed., 2000).
112. Susan Moore Johnson & Susan M. Kardos, Reform Bargaining and Its Promise for School Improvement, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS? TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 7 (Tom Loveless ed., 2000), at 8.
113. See Susan Moore Johnson & Susan M. Kardos, Reform Bargaining and Its Promise for School Improvement, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS? TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 7 (Tom Loveless ed., 2000), at 33.
114. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 20.
115. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 21.
116. See Susan Moore Johnson & Susan M. Kardos, Reform Bargaining and Its Promise for School Improvement, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS? TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 7 (Tom Loveless ed., 2000), at 25.
117. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION, (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006), at 21. It is worth noting that there may be serious legal problems with "reform bargaining" should its advocates push this model too vigorously. State collective bargaining laws typically give properly recognized teachers' unions the right to bargain over "terms and conditions of employment," but state courts recognize that many of the most important decisions that affect a given school system belong, as a matter of public policy, to the publicly elected school board.
118. See Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 885, 913-14 (2007). Such decisions are, according to state courts, outside the scope of what constitutes a "condition of employment."
119. See, e.g., Racine Educ. Ass'n v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 571 N.W.2d 887 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the school calendar was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the state's teacher collective bargaining statute).
120. see also Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 885, 913-14 (2007), at 915-17 (discussing this case and others). Given these limits on the scope of collective bargaining under state law, the prospects for reform bargaining may be rather narrow.
121. Cross-sectional regressions rely on data that have been collected at a single point in time. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 861 (3d ed. 2006).
122. For cross-sectional studies of teacher bargaining, see F. HOWARD NELSON & MICHAEL ROSEN, INST. FOR WISCONSIN'S FUTURE, ARE TEACHERS' UNIONS HURTING AMERICAN EDUCATION? A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AMONG TEACHERS ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE (1996).
123. Randall W. Eberts, Union Effects on Teacher Productivity, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 346 (1984).
124. Paul W. Grimes & Charles A. Register, Teachers' Unions and Student Achievement in High School Economics, 21 J. ECON. EDUC. 297 (1990).
125. and Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000).
126. For my purposes, I treat four additional studies as cross-sectional ones. See Randall W. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 354 (1987).
127. Michael M. Kurth, Teachers' Unions and Excellence in Education: An Analysis of the Decline in SAT Scores, 8 J. LAB. RES. 351 (1987).
128. Martin Milkman, Teachers' Unions, Productivity, and Minority Student Achievement, 18 J. LAB. RES. 137 (1997).
129. Terry M. Moe, Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 156, 161, 168 (2009). Their classification as cross-sectional studies is not immediately apparent because each study uses a dependent variable that captures growth over time.
130. See, e.g., Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (1987), at 356 (measuring change in students' math scores).
131. Michael M. Kurth, Teachers' Unions and Excellence in Education: An Analysis of the Decline in SAT Scores, 8 J. LAB. RES. (1987), at 358 (measuring change in state average SAT scores). Critically, however, these authors only observe their key independent variable (that is, their measure of union activity) at a single point in time.
132. See Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (1987), at 355-57.
133. Michael M. Kurth, Teachers' Unions and Excellence in Education: An Analysis of the Decline in SAT Scores, 8 J. LAB. RES. 351 (1987), at 365.
134. Terry M. Moe, Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. (2009), at 161-62.
135. Milkman does not make this fact explicit in his study, but one can infer it from his consistent references to "union schools" and "nonunion schools." See Martin Milkman, Teachers' Unions, Productivity, and Minority Student Achievement, 18 J. LAB. RES. (1997), at 138, 141 tbl.1, 143.
136. Because they lack variation across time in their independent variable, the authors cannot employ a "fixed effects" model, and they do not attempt an "instrumental variable" model. See Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000), Section III.B. These studies are therefore subject to the common set of endogeneity concerns that this Section develops.
137. Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000).
138. Regression analysis will separate the effect of the key independent variable on the dependent variable from the effects of the control variables on the dependent variable. For an introduction to regressions and control variables, see JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 23-64.
139. The Harvard Educational Review study included controls for the percentage of minority testtakers in each state, parental education, parental income, percentage of students taking the test in each state, and several other factors. Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000), at 446 tbl.1.
140. See Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000), at 449 tbl.2.
141. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 95-98. Note that omitting variables that influence the dependent variable and are not correlated with the independent variable of interest will not lead to biased estimates.
142. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 96. Thus, the Harvard Educational Review study need not have controlled for every possible variable that could affect state SAT scores, but, to eliminate bias, it must have controlled for every possible variable that affects state SAT scores and that is also correlated with the strength of collective bargaining in that state.
143. Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000), at 446 tbl.1.
144. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 13-14 (describing cross-sectional data and the difficulty of making causal inferences).
145. Terry M. Moe, Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. (2009), at 162-63 (noting that "[e]ndogeneity bias is always a concern" in cross-sectional models and noting that his controls are "quite extensive").
146. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 862 (defining "endogenous explanatory variable").
147. See NELSON & ROSEN, INST. FOR WISCONSIN'S FUTURE, ARE TEACHERS' UNIONS HURTING AMERICAN EDUCATION? A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AMONG TEACHERS ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE (1996).
148. Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE 305 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988).
149. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (1987), at 355-57.
150. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (1987), at 356.
151. Paul W. Grimes & Charles A. Register, Teachers' Unions and Student Achievement in High School Economics, 21 J. ECON. EDUC. 297 (1990).
152. Martin Milkman, Teachers' Unions, Productivity, and Minority Student Achievement, 18 J. LAB. RES. (1997), at 138, 141.
153. Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell & Robert M. Carini, Do Teacher Unions Hinder Educational Performance? Lessons Learned from State SAT and ACT Scores, 70 HARV. EDUC. REV. 437, 441 (2000).
154. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996).
155. Michael M. Kurth, Teachers' Unions and Excellence in Education: An Analysis of the Decline in SAT Scores, 8 J. LAB. RES. 351 (1987).
156. Terry M. Moe, Collective Bargaining and the Performance of the Public Schools, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 156, 161, 168 (2009).
157. Sam Peltzman, Political Economy of Public Education: Non-College-Bound Students, 39 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1996). Professor Moe's study in the American Journal of Political Science is the most recent empirical analysis of teacher collective bargaining. Although Professor Moe's study includes many compelling control variables, his study still struggles to rule out all endogeneity concerns. He lacks a control, for example, for the quality of administrators in a given school district: if harsh or micromanaging superintendents tend to lead to strong unions with expansive collective bargaining agreements, and if the same types of administrators are associated with higher (or lower) student test scores, Professor Moe's estimates will be biased.
158. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 448-49 (defining panel data).
159. Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988), at 308 (discussing authors' use of longitudinal data to measure the impact of teachers' unionization).
160. See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1200 (2002) (describing panel data with fixed effects analysis as "the current state-of-the-art technique of micro-econometric evaluation").
161. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 366, 504 (defining a time trend and giving an example of a panel data regression model with a city-specific time trend).
162. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 461-62.
163. The statement assumes that the percentage of teachers operating under a collective bargaining agreement in each state also changes. Without this variation in the independent variable of interest, one cannot use a fixed effects methodology. Note further that a fixed effects design allows the researchers to control for a factor like teacher salaries even though the researchers have no direct measure of this variable. The key advantage of fixed effects is the ability to control for unobserved differences across observations.
164. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 366, 504.
165. Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE 305 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988).
166. Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. Petree, Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988), at 313-14.
167. See Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004).
168. See Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249 (2004).
169. For example, if one wants to measure the effect of skipping class on the final grades of college students, one might use the distance students live from campus as an instrumental variable. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 513-14. The number of days a student misses class is likely endogenous: fewer days in class likely reduces grades for many students, but some students may skip a class because they find that class too easy. Distance from campus may be a helpful instrument (1) because it likely affects the frequency with which students skip class and (2) because distance from campus may have no relationship with the other reasons why students skip class.
170. Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996).
171. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996), at 686.
172. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996), at 688.
173. Return to the skipping-class example, discussed JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 513-14. One might worry that a student's distance from campus is correlated with the student's final grade for a reason other than the number of classes a student misses. It might be the case, for example, that poorer students (who on average earn lower final grades) live farther away from campus (where housing may be less expensive). In this case, the instrument will not be valid.
174. Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996), at 684 tbl.2.
175. Public Employee Bargaining Act § 26, 1992 N.M. Laws 131, 157
176. codified as amended at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-26 (2010).
177. Public Employee Bargaining Act §§ 28, 30, 1992 N.M. Laws 159.
178. See John Dendahl, With Richardson's Help, Unions Regain Foothold, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 6, 2005, at A5 (describing Governor Gary Johnson's veto of the 1999 reauthorization attempt).
179. Public Employee Bargaining Act § 26, 2003 N.M. Laws 38, 69
180. codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-26 (2010).
181. This version of the law became effective on July 1, 2003, and it contains no sunset clause. There is at least one other potentially significant difference between the 1992 law and the 2003 law. The 2003 version of the bargaining statute gives either party the right to request binding arbitration should an impasse occur at the end of mediation. Compare Public Employee Bargaining Act § 18(B)(2), 2003 N.M. Laws at 62 (providing for binding arbitration).
182. with Public Employee Bargaining Act § 18(B), 1992 N.M. Laws at 152 (providing for mediation and factfinding only). This difference does not undermine this Note's analysis for two reasons. First, it is possible that the addition of an arbitration clause in 2003 would simply understate the Note's findings. State legislatures have included arbitration provisions to limit the power of the union to make demands on the public employer.
183. See Gregory M. Saltzman & Shlomo Sperka, Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Michigan: Law and Recent Developments, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (Joyce M. Najita & James L. Stern eds., 2001), at 116-17 (describing how Michigan added a binding arbitration provision to its publicsector bargaining law to limit the power of certain public-sector unions). What my analysis captures in 2003, in other words, is the effect of a "watered-down version" of mandatory collective bargaining. Because I find that even this watered-down version leads to significant impacts on student outcomes, I can be reasonably confident that an "un-watered-down" version of collective bargaining would lead to impacts that are at least that large. Second, as an additional robustness check, I drop the observations from after 2002 and repeat the analysis (thereby estimating the effect of mandatory bargaining using the sunset only and not the reauthorization).
184. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996), at 682-83, 684 tbl.2, Section IV.E. The core results are robust to this change in specification (which removes those years where an arbitration clause was present).
185. Most states passed collective bargaining statutes between 1960 and 1990. See Caroline Minter Hoxby, How Teachers' Unions Affect Education Production, 111 Q.J. ECON. 671 (1996), at 682-83, 684 tbl.2.
186. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 454-60.
187. Bruce D. Meyer, Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, 13 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 151 (1995).
188. For a discussion of the potential endogeneity problems that remain, see David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994), Section IV.E.
189. Consider as an example David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994). In that study, the authors use an increase in New Jersey's minimum wage law as a natural experiment. They compare the difference in employment in fast food restaurants between New Jersey and Pennsylvania before and after the increase in New Jersey's minimum wage. When they subtract fast food employment rates in the two states before the legal change, they get the average difference in employment between the two states. When they subtract the same rates after the legal change, they get the average difference between the two states plus the effect of the legal change. When they subtract the first difference from the second difference, the average differences between the states cancel out, and they are left with the effect of the legal change alone.
190. see also JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 454-60 (describing difference-in-difference methodology and referencing other examples of difference-in-difference studies). 105. The label "natural experiment" is still worthy of independent status because panel data regressions can analyze variation that comes from sources other than legal changes or policy shifts.
191. See, e.g., Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282 (1991) (using panel data to measure the effect of getting married on male wages).
192. David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994).
193. Bruce D. Meyer, W. Kip Viscusi & David L. Durbin, Workers' Compensation and Injury Duration: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 322 (1995).
194. Leslie E. Papke, Tax Policy and Urban Development: Evidence from the Indiana Enterprise Zone Program, 54 J. PUB. ECON. 37 (1994).
195. The College Board's website has made state-year-average SAT scores publicly available. See Archived SAT Data & Reports, C. BOARD, http://professionals.collegeboard.com/data-reports-research/sat/archived (expand any of the year hyperlinks; then follow "Tables & Related Items" hyperlink; then select "Table 3: Mean SAT I Verbal and Math Scores by State, with Changes for Selected Years") (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
196. States measure their graduation rates in different ways, and it is often difficult to make useful comparisons across states. AFGR is the graduation rate measure that the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) recommends for cross-state, cross-time comparisons. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2 USER'S GUIDE TO COMPUTING HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES, at iii (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006605.pdf. According to NCES, a state's AFGR is the number of graduates divided by the estimated count of freshmen 4 years earlier. The estimated averaged freshman enrollment count is the sum of the number of 8th-graders 5 years earlier, the number of 9th-graders 4 years earlier (because this is when current year seniors were freshmen), and the number of 10th-graders 3 years earlier, divided by 3.
197. MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2008, at 133 (2008), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008031.pdf.
198. Data on per-pupil expenditures is available through the Census Bureau. Statistical Abstracts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html (expand any of the year hyperlinks; then follow "Section 4. Education") (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
199. The availability of SAT data in every year makes this dependent variable a stronger candidate than using state scores on the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP). The NAEP is a federally administered test in reading and math that is given to a representative sample of fourth and eighth graders every two years. NAEP Overview, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). Although the NAEP is more representative than the SAT (because only collegebound students take the latter), prior to the 2001 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, NAEP testing was optional for states, and even after the NCLB Act, states take the NAEP every two years.
200. See Catherine M. Hombo, NAEP and No Child Left Behind: Technical Challenges and Practical Solutions, 42 THEORY INTO PRAC. 59 (2003) (describing the changes in NAEP participation that NCLB requires).
201. NAEP History of State Participation, 1990-1998: Public Schools, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/statehistorypublic.asp (last visited Dec. 7, 2010) (showing state participation between 1990 and 1998). Use of SAT scores thus provides more observations than use of the NAEP, and the higher the number of observations, the greater the precision of the analysis.
202. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 101-02.
203. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs, States' Graduation Data Criticized: Independent Study Shows Disparities, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A3. In North Carolina, for example, the state recently boasted of a ninety-seven percent graduation rate when a third of students dropped out of high school and when nearly fifty percent of all African-American students dropped out of high school. How can such a high "graduation rate" coexist with these staggering dropout rates? The state had defined its graduation rate as the percent of high school graduates who received their diplomas in four or fewer years. In other words, the state effectively defined "graduation rate" in a way that ignored actual high school dropouts.
204. JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 101-02.
205. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2 USER'S GUIDE TO COMPUTING HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES, at iii (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006605.pdf.
206. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2 USER'S GUIDE TO COMPUTING HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES, at iii (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006605.pdf.
207. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2 USER'S GUIDE TO COMPUTING HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES, at iii (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006605.pdf.
208. See Common Core of Data (CCD)-State Fiscal Reports, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pub_rev_exp.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
209. See Common Core of Data (CCD)-State Fiscal Reports, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pub_rev_exp.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2010), Section II.A.
210. See Common Core of Data (CCD)-State Fiscal Reports, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pub_rev_exp.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2010), Part I.
211. The website for the National Council on Teacher Quality contains links to the relevant state code provisions and the relevant state cases. See Teacher Rules, Roles and Rights: Scope of Bargaining, NAT'L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
212. For a complete list of states and their bargaining regimes, see Center for Disease Control's Wide-Ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (CDC WONDER). Population Information, CDC WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/population.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010), Appendix B.
213. See Center for Disease Control's Wide-Ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (CDC WONDER). Population Information, CDC WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/population.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010), Section IV.C.
214. Data on demographic composition of states by year are publicly available through the Center for Disease Control's Wide-Ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (CDC WONDER). Population Information, CDC WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/population.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
215. For evidence that race is strongly correlated with student academic performance, see, for example, Jaekyung Lee, Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gap Trends: Reversing the Progress Toward Equity?, 31 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3, 6 fig.3 (2002), which shows persistent gaps between the performance of white and black students over time and persistent gaps between the performance of white and Hispanic students over time. Reports of sudden shifts in ethnic patterns across states are common.
216. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Pa. House Candidates Vie for Agricultural Correctness, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at A6 ("The DNC is focusing on 15 states, most of which have experienced dramatic increases in the growth of their Hispanic populations.").
217. Ian Shapira, Rise in Latino Enrollment Is Slowing, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007, at W1 ("[T]he school system numbers indicate that the dramatic increase in the county's Hispanic population has slowed considerably.").
218. Mark Sundeen, The Big-Sky Dem, N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 8, 2006, § 6 (Magazine) at 36 ("In Nevada, Arizona, and Colorado, a sharp rise in the Hispanic population in the last decade may also have helped tilt the voting base to the left.").
219. The U.S. Census Bureau makes poverty statistics available for all states in most recent years. See Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/county.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (offering data from 1993 through 2008 but missing data on 1994).
220. Poverty is also strongly linked with student achievement and subject to rapid changes over time. See, e.g., Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty on Children, FUTURE CHILD., Summer/Fall 1997, at 55 (1997) ("[H]undreds of studies have documented the association between family poverty and children's health, achievement, and behavior....").
221. Editorial, Focus on Kids, STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 17, 1998, at 28 ("A report by the National Center for Children in Poverty at Columbia University found every region had sharp increases and significant drops [in poverty rates]. In our area, New York saw an increase of more than 20 percent, but New Jersey experienced a decline.").
222. The U.S. Census Bureau has made crime statistics publicly available for each state in most years. See Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html (follow any year hyperlink; then follow "Section 5. Law Enforcement, Courts, and Prisons" hyperlink). Some empirical work suggests that exposure to crime may itself influence student achievement.
223. See Natasha K. Bowen & Gary L. Bowen, Effects of Crime and Violence in Neighborhoods and Schools on the School Behavior and Performance of Adolescents, 14 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 319, 319 (1999) ("Measures of neighborhood and school danger both contributed significantly to the prediction of each school outcome....").
224. See Center for Disease Control's Wide-Ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (CDC WONDER). Population Information, CDC WONDER, http://wonder.cdc.gov/population.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
225. See Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html. The dataset lacks a control for the percentage of students in each state that took the SATs each year.
226. For a discussion of how the lack of such a control does not undermine this Note's analysis, see See Common Core of Data (CCD)-State Fiscal Reports, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pub_rev_exp.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2010), Section IV.E.
227. A final note concerns the number of observations in Table II. The National Council of Education Statistics has only made AFGR measures available between 1996 and 2005. See Common Core of Data (CCD)-State Fiscal Reports, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pub_rev_exp.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
228. Similarly, the U.S. Census Bureau is missing poverty data for the year 1994. See Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/county.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). These missing data should not be a concern because the figures are missing for all states in the relevant years; it would be a different matter if the missing data were systematically related to the legal changes we were trying to measure.
229. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 492-93.
230. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2006), at 500.
231. See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEAD START IMPACT STUDY: FIRST YEAR FINDINGS, at i (2005), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/hs/impact_study/reports/first_yr_fi nds/first_yr_finds.pdf.
232. For further discussion of the size of these impacts, see Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1200 (2002), Section V.B.
233. For examples of empirical work showing how slight changes in model specification with panel data can lead to major changes in results, see Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1200 (2002), at 1206-22.
234. and John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 804-21 (2005).
235. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. (2002), at 1267-68.
236. see also John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. (2005), at 805-06 (finding that small changes in model specification alter the key findings of a major empirical study of the deterrent effect of the death penalty).
237. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. (2002), at 1267-68.
238. One can extend this analysis to include two-and three-year lags. Results for a two-year lag (available upon request) show the same pattern of results that appear in Table IV. Results for a three-year lag lack significant meaning because by 2002 many school officials expected the bargaining law to be reauthorized. See Telephone Interview with John Martinez, Principal Consultant, Mgmt. Assocs. (June 11, 2010). Mr. Martinez has negotiated more than seventy public-sector labor agreements, many for New Mexico public school systems. Telephone Interview with Juan B. Montoya, Exec. Dir., N.M. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd. (June 7, 2010). I address possible endogeneity concerns with the 2003 reauthorization later in this Section.
239. See It's Not Over 'Til It's Over: Collective Bargaining Continues Throughout New Mexico, ADVOCATE'S VOICE (Santa Fe, N.M.), Dec. 1999, at 6 (listing the Deming, Hatch, Las Cruces, and Truth or Consequences school systems as having abandoned bargaining in 1999).
240. See It's Not Over 'Til It's Over: Collective Bargaining Continues Throughout New Mexico, ADVOCATE'S VOICE (Santa Fe, N.M.), Dec. 1999, at 6.
241. See Loie Fecteau, Governor Starts Voucher Road Show, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 22, 1999, at D3 ("Johnson said he is traveling the state to talk about school vouchers to increase public understanding of the issue before he calls lawmakers into a special legislative session, starting May 4.").
242. See Jessica L. Sandham, N.M. Legislature Rejects Governor's Voucher Plan, EDUC. WK., May 19, 1999, at 15 ("New Mexico lawmakers handed a resounding defeat last week to Gov. Gary E. Johnson's plan to provide low-income children with vouchers worth roughly $3,000 to attend any public, private, or religious school in the state.").
243. See The Governor's Year, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 28, 2003, at A6 (describing, among other changes, Governor Richardson's new power to appoint a state level "secretary of education").
244. See The Governor's Year, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 28, 2003, at A6.
245. This shift in focus is inconsistent with the findings of one of the earliest empirical studies of teachers' unions. See Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (1987), at 359-60. In that study, the authors found that collective bargaining increased the test scores of students near the middle of the skill distribution while decreasing the scores of students at the top and at the bottom of that distribution.
246. Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (1987), at 359-60.
247. The authors attribute this finding to union improvements in "the standardization of the workforce, work rules, and production techniques." Eberts & Joe A. Stone, Teacher Unions and the Productivity of Public Schools, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. (1987), at 361. This study's findings suggest instead that union activity leads to a focus on the top of the distribution and not the middle of it.
248. See Telephone Interview with Juan B. Montoya, Exec. Dir., N.M. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd. (June 7, 2010). (stating that the New Mexico Public Employee Relations Board does not keep records of pre-1999 contracts).
249. See Telephone Interview with John F. Kennedy, Partner, Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP (June 8, 2010) (noting that thirty districts operated under collective bargaining agreements prior to 1999).
250. Cuddy & McCarthy represents seventy-five percent of the school districts in New Mexico. Telephone Interview with John F. Kennedy, Partner, Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP (June 8, 2010). The thirty-district figure adds up to less than one hundred percent of New Mexico districts because teachers must vote to join a bargaining unit before collective bargaining can begin, and unions were not able to organize teachers in all of New Mexico's districts.
251. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010) (noting that many school districts have not organized for bargaining).
252. see also Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010), Part I (describing the collective bargaining process).
253. See Telephone Interview with John F. Kennedy, Partner, Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP (June 8, 2010) (noting that thirty districts operated under collective bargaining agreements prior to 1999).
254. The Albuquerque, Gallup-McKinley, Las Cruces, and Santa Fe school districts all engaged in collective bargaining prior to 1999. See It's Not Over 'Til It's Over: Collective Bargaining Continues Throughout New Mexico, ADVOCATE'S VOICE (Santa Fe, N.M.), Dec. 1999, at 6 (Las Cruces and Santa Fe).
255. Telephone Interview with John Martinez, See It's Not Over 'Til It's Over: Collective Bargaining Continues Throughout New Mexico, ADVOCATE'S VOICE (Santa Fe, N.M.), Dec. 1999, at 6 (Gallup-McKinley).
256. Telephone Interview with Charles White, Former Deputy Superintendent of Albuquerque Pub. Sch. (June 8, 2010) (Albuquerque).
257. U.S. Census Bureau data makes it possible to determine the student enrollment in individual New Mexico school districts in 2000. See School District Demographics System, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/ed/index.asp (select "New Mexico" from the state drop-down menu) (last visited June 13, 2010). These four districts have the largest enrollment in New Mexico at that time.
258. See School District Demographics System, NAT'L COUNCIL FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/ed/index.asp (select "New Mexico" from the state drop-down menu) (last visited June 13, 2010). Summing the enrollment of all individual districts, we can find the total number of students enrolled in New Mexico in 2000. When we use that total enrollment figure as the denominator and the student enrollment in these four districts as the numerator, we find that their combined enrollment constitutes just over forty percent of New Mexico's total enrollment.
259. See PUB. EMP. LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPRESENTATION CASES: 2004-2009, at 2 (2009), available at http://www.pelrb.state.nm.us/pdf/case-stats-and-desc/RepresentationCases AsOf_2009Dec31.pdf.
260. Telephone Interview with Juan B. Montoya, Exec. Dir., N.M. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd. (June 7, 2010). (indicating that "incumbent" petitions figure in the Representation Cases document reflects the number of bargaining units that had been in existence in pre-1999 that then lost their bargaining status between 1999 and 2003).
261. See It's Not Over 'Til It's Over: Collective Bargaining Continues Throughout New Mexico, ADVOCATE'S VOICE (Santa Fe, N.M.), Dec. 1999, at 6.
262. Telephone Interview with John Martinez, Principal Consultant, Mgmt. Assocs. (June 11, 2010).
263. Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
264. Telephone Interview with Charles White, Former Deputy Superintendent of Albuquerque Pub. Sch. (June 8, 2010) (Albuquerque).
265. Although the Las Cruces schools initially dropped collective bargaining, the unions successfully backed school board candidates in subsequent elections that brought collective bargaining back. See School Board Election Outcomes, ADVOCATE'S VOICE (Santa Fe, N.M.), May/June 2001, at 7 (describing the National Education Association's school board victory in Las Cruces).
266. See Telephone Interview with John F. Kennedy, Partner, Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP (June 8, 2010).
267. See Telephone Interview with John F. Kennedy, Partner, Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP (June 8, 2010).
268. State statutes and regulations impose restrictions on how districts allocate their resources, but a district that dropped collective bargaining could avoid any additional restrictions that may have come from collective bargaining agreements. See Telephone Interview with John F. Kennedy, Partner, Cuddy & McCarthy, LLP (June 8, 2010).
269. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
270. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
271. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010), Section II.A.
272. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010), Section II.B.
273. Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
274. see also Telephone Interview with John Martinez, Principal Consultant, Mgmt. Assocs. (June 11, 2010) (noting noncontract grievance procedures available to teachers).
275. See Telephone Interview with John Martinez, Principal Consultant, Mgmt. Assocs. (June 11, 2010).
276. Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
277. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
278. See LINDSEY LUEBCHOW, NEW AM. FOUND., EQUITABLE RESOURCES IN LOW INCOME SCHOOLS: TEACHER EQUITY AND THE FEDERAL TITLE I COMPARABILITY REQUIREMENT 5 (2009), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/Equitable_Resources_in_Low_ Income_Schools.pdf.
279. The work of other scholars confirms that large intradistrict disparities in school quality exist in large school districts. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2085 (2002) ("[N]eighborhood schools within large districts are quite segregated by race and income.").
280. See LINDSEY LUEBCHOW, NEW AM. FOUND., EQUITABLE RESOURCES IN LOW INCOME SCHOOLS: TEACHER EQUITY AND THE FEDERAL TITLE I COMPARABILITY REQUIREMENT 5 (2009), at 5. It is worth mentioning that experience is likely an imperfect proxy for teaching quality.
281. See Eric Alan Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, How To Improve the Supply of High-Quality Teachers, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATION POLICY, (Diane Ravitch ed., 2004), at 7.
282. Daniel Aaronson, Lisa Barrow & William Sander, Teachers and Student Achievement in the Chicago Public High Schools 27-29 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2002-28, 2003), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/working_papers/200 2/wp2002-28.pdf.
283. Note that this story remains-at best-suggestive. Absent more extensive survey evidence of New Mexico teachers and administrators, it would be irresponsible to attribute too much to the possible effect of new intradistrict transfer policies.
284. See Telephone Interview with Robert Brown, Former Consultant for N.M. Sch. Dists. (June 6, 2010) (indicating that there was "a lot more cooperation" between districts and unions after the 1999 sunset); Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010) ("At that time, we felt the need to be less confrontational and find areas of common agreement.").
285. See Telephone Interview with John Martinez, Principal Consultant, Mgmt. Assocs. (June 11, 2010).
286. See Telephone Interview with Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
287. See Telephone Interview with Telephone Interview with Sharon Morgan, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n-N.M., (Mar. 21, 2010).
288. Cecilia Elena Rouse, Labor Market Consequences of an Inadequate Education 21, 22, 24 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.literacycooperative.org/documents/TheLaborMarketConsequenceso fanInadequateEd.pdf. These figures are discounted to their 2005 value.
289. Kane and Staiger report figures of $110,000 and $256,000, which are discounted to 2002 dollars. Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures, 16 J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 2002, at 91, 110-11. Using the same three percent discount rate that the authors use, one arrives at about $120,000 and $280,000 in 2005 dollars.
290. Using the year 2005 is arbitrary, but a year must be picked in order to express the Rouse and Kane and Staiger estimates in present value equivalents.
291. See infra Appendix B.
292. I apply the dropout rate to seniors only. Note that this choice understates the true cost of the additional dropouts. A decrease in AFGR should be applied to the freshman class, which is presumably larger than the senior class because students drop out over the course of high school. Unfortunately, the number of freshmen in 2000 is unavailable. By multiplying 1.15% by the smaller number of seniors (instead of the larger number of freshmen), I systematically understate the number (and therefore the cost) of the additional high school dropouts.
293. See Archived SAT Data & Reports, C. BOARD, http://professionals.collegeboard.com/data-reports-research/sat/archived . These data are available only for more recent years and are unavailable for the years at the beginning of the panel.
294. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65 (rev. ed. 1999) ("[T]he higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society.").
295. Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 242 (1980) ("In my view, social institutions... should be used to mitigate the effects of the natural lottery; for the law to intensify them is perverse.").
296. See Stephanie Banchero, Nine States, D.C., Win Race for Aid to Schools, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, at A2.
297. See Ben Smith, Teachers Union Helped Unseat Fenty, POLITICO (Sept. 15, 2010, 10:40 PM),
298. See, e.g., Kristin Ehrgood, With D.C. Teacher Firings, the Students Finally Come First, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2010, at C5.
299. Bill Turque, Teachers' Chief Is in the Hot Seat, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2008, at B1.
300. Bill Turque, Union Contests Layoffs of Teachers in Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2009, at B8.
301. Abby Phillip, 'Race to the Top' Winners Chosen, POLITICO (Aug. 24, 2010, 4:39 PM EDT), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0810/41420.html (noting that Secretary of Education Arne Duncan would like the program to continue).
302. For a discussion of union opposition to the initial Race to the Top program, see Nick Anderson, Unions Criticize Obama's School Proposals as 'Bush III,' WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009, at A5
303. Steven Brill, The Teachers' Unions' Last Stand: How Obama's Race to the Top Could Revolutionize Public Education, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, and accompanying text.
304. David S. Broder, The Next Issue: Education, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2010, at A15 ("So far, the most critical comments [about No Child Left Behind and the reauthorization process] have come from the heads of the two big teachers unions, which could doom these changes in a Democratic Congress.").