A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 351-366

  He, Zhiguo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Capital structure; CARA (exponential) preference; Continuous time contracting; Firm growth; Pay performance sensitivity; Size heterogeneity

Indexed keywords

EID: 79952452781     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.01.005     Document Type: Article

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