Agents for stability or chaos: Conceptualizing intelligence "relevance" in counterinsurgency

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 212-227

  Michaels, Jeffrey H ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 79952010743     PISSN: 1057610X     EISSN: 15210731     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.545936     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. Despite the rhetoric of "intelligence-led operations," which would presume that themilitary was subordinate to intelligence, this only holds true to a degree at the tactical, rather than strategic, level. In purely military terms, apart from exceptional cases, the notion of the J2 (Intelligence) being supported by, rather than supporting, the J3 (Operations), is a far-fetched one to say the least, although as will be shown, this was the case with Syria in Lebanon. From a broader whole-of-government perspective, an intelligence-led strategy would most likely be one in which the U.S. military was subordinate to the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. The costs of the IraqWar have received a good deal of attention, but perhaps the classic work in this area is: Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War-The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (London:W.W. Norton & Company, 2008). As of February 2010, President Obama was seeking about $160 billion for Afghanistan and Iraq, and was expecting to ask for a similar amount in fiscal 2011.
3. See: Susan Cornwell, "Big War Spending Continues Under Obama," Reuters, 1 February 2010. By contrast, Max Boot has noted the costs of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines: "In Iraq there are 140,000 troops. In Afghanistan 35,000. In the Philippines 600. The Iraq war costs over $100 billion a year, Afghanistan over $30 billion. The Philippines costs $52 million a year."
4. See: Max Boot and Richard Bennett, "Treading Softly in the Philippines; Why a Low-Intensity Counterinsurgency Strategy Seems to beWorking There," The Weekly Standard 14(16) (2009).
5. For references to the CIA's "Blue Sky"memo describing a plan to counter the Taliban andAl Qaeda in Afghanistan without a large U.S. military intervention, see: George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), pp. 130-131, 143-144, 186. It was this plan that served as the basis for the U.S. intervention in 2001 in which the CIA initially took the lead by supporting the Northern Alliance. Interestingly, one of the key assumptions underpinning the "Blue Sky" memo was that the United States should not repeat perceived Soviet mistakes, and therefore a large-scale U.S. military intervention was to be avoided.
6. Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, Center for a New American Security (January 2010);
7. Adam Entous, "Gates Backs Critique of Spy Agencies in Afghanistan," Reuters, 7 January 2010.
8. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, p. 7.
9. Despite later attempts by Defense Department (DoD) officials to note that the report was only intended to refer to those intelligence agencies run by the DoD, and therefore not a criticism of non-DoD agencies, such as the CIA (Entous, "Gates Backs Critique of Spy Agencies in Afghanistan,"), there are at least two reasons to be suspicious of this explanation. First, as noted, are the explicit references in the report to "US intelligence community," nor do the authors seek to differentiate the intelligence units that are underMcChrystal's command from those that are not under his command. Moreover, several references are made throughout the document of senior political leaders in Washington, DC not getting the information they need to make crucial decisions, and also makes reference to intelligence analysts in the Washington, DC area beyond those in the Pentagon (p. 9). Second, as it is implicit in the report that the military-led "population-centric" approach is being supported by other agencies, it can be assumed that the approach to intelligence Flynn suggests would carryover to supporting agencies as well.
10. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, p. 7.
11. See for instance ibid., p. 13.
12. Additional evidence of the focus on the tactical level of counterinsurgency can be found in discussions held at the 23 September 2009 U.S. Marine Corps University sponsored symposium "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond." For transcript, see http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/Pages/Coin%20Symposium.aspx
13. Julian E. Barnes, "US Intelligence Chief in Afghanistan Wages Battle for Resources," Los Angeles Times, 25 November 2009.
14. For a discussion of FM 3-24's approach to intelligence, see General David H. Petraeus, Lt. General James F. Amos, LTC John A. Nagl, and Sarah Sewall, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 79-135.
15. For reference to the Autumn 2009 White House strategy review on Afghanistan, see: Anne E. Kornblut, Scott Wilson, and Karen De Young, "Obama Pressed for Faster Surge," Washington Post, 6 December 2009;
16. Peter Baker, "How Obama Came to Plan for 'Surge' in Afghanistan," The New York Times, 6 December 2009;
17. Christi Parsons and Julian E. Barnes, "Obama Homed in on an Afghanistan Pullout Date," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 2009.
18. Also, see cables prepared by U.S. Ambassador to Kabul Karl Eikenberry in November 2009 dealing with U.S. strategy options in Afghanistan. Available at http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afgha nistan#p=1
19. For a documented explication of McChrystal's approach, see his "Commander's Guidance."Available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official texts/counterinsurgency guidance.pdf.
20. Also see his leaked "Initial Assessment" of August 2009. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/21/AR2009092 100110.html
21. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, Fixing Intel, p. 4.
22. The range of debate within Obama's Afghan strategy review was essentially limited to maintaining the status quo, or to increase force levels by smaller or larger numbers. There was no significant opposition to the assumptions underlying the requirement to maintain a large U.S. military force. The only "dissident" argument, which was essentially dismissed out of hand, was that made by U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan General Karl Eickenberry, who suggested a greater emphasis on diplomacy and aid agencies relative to the military.
23. Two critical accounts of CIA analysis in Vietnam, both written by former CIA analysts, describe the bureaucratic politics associated with the production of intelligence analysis, and demonstrate the pressures analysts faced to provide positive analysis highlighting progress. Such practices negated the value of producing more analysis since the purpose of analysis became not to inform policymakers, but rather to validate their policies.
24. See: Sam Adams, War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (Vermont: Steerforth Press, 1994);
25. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: The American Debacle in Vietnam and the Fall of Saigon (New York: Penguin Books, 1980).
26. For a more recent account written by a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst detailing similar problems in the case of analysis of the Iraq insurgency, see: A. J. Rossmiller, Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, From Baghdad to the Pentagon (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008).
27. As of 1962, the National Security Council's Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) was monitoring eleven countries. According to one memo: "At the time of its establishment, the President assigned three countries (Viet-Nam, Laos, and Thailand) to the cognizance of the Special Group (CI). Subsequently, eight other countries (Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Iran) have been added because of the potential counterinsurgency situation within them." See Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Maxwell Taylor) to President Kennedy, SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency Activities of the United States Government, 30 July 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 102. Within a few years, a number of other countries would receive counterinsurgency assistance, such as Bolivia and Peru.
28. This is not to say that the unwillingness to commit to a large-scale military intervention was simply due to finite resources. Other obvious structural limitations such as domestic and international public opinion no doubt also played an important role.
29. See for instance: William Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order (New York: Routledge, 2005).
30. An account of Lansdale's actions in the Philippines and his views on the importance of the CIA in waging the Cold War generally, and counterinsurgency specifically, can be found in: Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1998), pp. 78-133, 218-219, 259-282.
31. Memorandum by the Chief, Far Eastern Division, Directorate for Plans (William Colby) and the Assistant Deputy Director for Policy Support, Directorate for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Chester Cooper), SUBJECT:A Program for Laos and South Vietnam, May 21, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos, Document 55.
32. An examination of the relationship between the Special Forces and the CIA in Vietnam during this period, and in the course of the CIDG program in particular, can be found in: Christopher K. Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: Military Innovation and Institutional Failure, 1961-1963 (New York: Routledge, 2007).
33. William Colby, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), p. 165.
34. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p. 362.
35. William Rosenau and Austin Long, The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), p. 13.
36. Petraeus, Amos, Nagl, and Sewall, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pp. 73-75.
37. This sort of CIA-led operation outside the main operational theater can also be seen today in the case of AFPAK, where Afghanistan is a military-led operation, while operations in Pakistan are mainly CIA-led.
38. Thomas L. Ahern Jr., Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961-1973 (CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2006);
39. William M. Leary, "The CIA and the 'Secret War' in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge, 1971-1972," The Journal of Military History 59(3) (1995), pp. 505-517.
40. Prados, Safe for Democracy, p. 352;
41. see also Shackley's autobiography in which he details his tenure as Station Chief in Vientiane: Ted Shackley, Spymaster: My Life in the CIA (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), pp. 104-231.
42. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 207.
43. For Keane reference, see Petraeus, Amos, Nagl, and Sewall, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, p. xiv.
44. For instance, see: Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Pocket Books, 1988);
45. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, ed., Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York, Pantheon Books, 1988).
46. Although the term "Global War on Terrorism" has fallen out of favor since President Obama assumed office, the United States is still running a number of programs that continue to be referred to as either "counterterrorism" or "counterinsurgency."
47. Galula cited in Stephen T.Hosmer and Sibylle O. Crane, Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1962), p. 3.
48. During this period, this service was known as "KHAD," but its name was later changed to "WAD." In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion in 2001, a new service was established, and is now called the National Directorate of Security, or NDS. To avoid confusion, this article will simply refer to "Afghan intelligence service."
49. Christian F. Ostermann and Odd Arne Westad, ed., "The KGB in Afghanistan-English Edition-Vasiliy Mitrokhin," Working Paper No. 40, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, February 2002, p. 183. In 1988, while intelligence personnel numbered some 35,000 full-time staff, not including informers, the combined size of the Afghan Army and Air Force was some 55,000 (Urban 310-311).
50. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 408-409;
51. Lally Weymouth, "Inside Najibullah's Regime: An Afghan Defector's Tales of Intrigue and Deceit," Washington Post, 12 November 1989;
52. Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990), pp. 112-113.
53. The KGB also ran a number of its own operations, such as the KASKAD (Cascade) units that were "set up to locate, penetrate, and destabilize the mujahideen," including by forming bogus mujahideen groups. In these efforts, the KGB were quite successful in turning a number of mujahideen toward the government side (Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, pp. 408-409).
54. At this time, the combined population of the Territories was approximately 1 million. The total strength of Shin Bet, whose main activity up to this point had been counterintelligence, was only 500.
55. These operations are discussed in detail in: Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel's Secret Wars: The Untold History of Israeli Intelligence (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991), pp. 236-281;
56. Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community (London: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), pp. 163-194. Admittedly the root causes that would spark the Intifada in the 1980s and so on were not addressed.
57. Robin Wright, "Syrian Intelligence Still in Lebanon," Washington Post, 27 April 2005. For a description of the activities of two former heads of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, see: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designation Targets Individuals Leading Syria's Military Presence in Lebanon, JS-2617, Press Room, 30 June 2005. Available at https://ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2617.htm.
58. See also: Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595 (2005). This report, also known as the Mehlis report, is available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/docs/ mehlisreport/pdf/mehlisreport.pdf
59. Rosenau, US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam, pp. 111-113. As Rosenau highlights, the emphasis on building up and funding the South Vietnamese military meant that the police force was not able to attract the highest quality recruits.
60. Keith Jeffery, "Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British Experience," Intelligence and National Security 2(1) (1987) pp. 118-149;
61. James S. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), pp. 22-24.
62. Evidence of the emphasis the British placed on the police, and specifically police intelligence, can be found in abundance in: David M. Anderson and David Killingray, ed., Policing and Decolonisation: Nationalism, Politics and the Police, 1917-65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).
63. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency, pp. 24-34.
64. Two recent works that examine the Dhofar campaign are: Geraint Hughes, "A 'Model Campaign' Reappraised: The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1975," Journal of Strategic Studies 32(2) (2009), pp. 271-305;
65. Walter C. Ladwig III, "Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency: Britain and the Dhofar Rebellion," Small Wars & Insurgencies 19(1) (2008), pp. 62-88. U.K. counterinsurgency-led efforts in this campaign also reportedly included raids into Yemen.
66. See: General Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 (New York: Enigma Books, 2002);
67. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006);
68. Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 358-403. One could say that the French grasped defeat from the jaws of victory because of blatant use of heavy-handed methods.
69. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, p. 419.
70. William E. LeGro, "Intelligence in Vietnam after the Cease-Fire," INSCOM Journal 20(2) (1992). Colonel Legro notes that when he was ordered to set up a new intelligence organization, Military Assistance Command Vietnam was in the process of transitioning to the Defense Attach́e Office of the U.S. embassy. According to Legro, there was no continuity with the earlier intelligence organization, nor had any thought been given as to what this new organization's purpose would be. By 1973, the new organization consisted of only 12 officers and non-commissioned officers and 1,000 civilians.
71. Snepp, Decent Interval. The CIA had reduced its presence from 600 staff at its height in the late 1960s to about 300 by 1972, with declining numbers thereafter. A good deal of the CIA's intelligence activities at this time were directed at the South Vietnamese government, rather than against North Vietnam, with significant effort placed on bolstering the image of President Thieu, while undermining his opponents.
72. For information of U.S. efforts to develop stay-behind networks in 1956, see: Excerpts from memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor on "Resources for UnconventionalWarfare, SE. Asia," July 1961, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 643-649;
73. For a more general account of stay-behind networks, see: Leopoldo Nuti and Olav Riste, "Introduction-Strategy of 'Stay-Behind,"' Journal of Strategic Studies 30(6) (2007), pp. 929-935.
74. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972), p. 84.
75. Neil MacFarquhar, "Heavy Hand of the Secret Police Impeding Reform in the ArabWorld," The New York Times, 14 November 2005.
76. See also the forthcoming study: Owen L. Sirrs, A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910-2009 (London: Routledge, 2010).
77. Frederic Grare, Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan's Transitional Democracy (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).
78. Apart from the case of France in Algeria mentioned earlier, there is also recent evidence of this phenomenon in relation to Afghanistan, where allegations of the Afghan NDS torturing suspects has caused a political storm in Canada.
79. See: Julian Borger, "Canadian Diplomat Alleges Troops in Afghanistan were Complicit in Torture," The Guardian, 20 November 2009.
80. Ibrahim al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," Middle East Review Of International Affairs 6(3) (2002);
81. Julian Coman, "CIA Plans New Secret Police to Fight Iraq Terrorism," Daily Telegraph, 4 January 2004;
82. Ned Parker, "Divided Iraq has Two Spy Agencies," Los Angeles Times, 15 April 2007;
83. David Ignatius, "A Sectarian Spy Duel in Baghdad," Washington Post, 14 June 2007;
84. Borzou Daragahi, "Baghdad Spies Live on Edge," Los Angeles Times, 18 September 2005;
85. David Ignatius, "Behind the Carnage in Baghdad," Washington Post, 25 August 2009.
86. See Endnote #10 for references.