Functionalism and Qualia

The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 381-395

  Van Gulick, Robert ^a  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Biological organisms; Diversity; Functionalism; Qualia; Qualitative similarity

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951736685     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470751466.ch31     Document Type: Chapter

References (41)

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