Melissus and his opponents: The argument of DK 30 B 8

Phronesis

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 263-288

  Makin, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 79951592698     PISSN: 00318868     EISSN: 15685284     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/156852805774481388     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Simplicius in de Caelo 558.17-559.13. The translation of Simplicius' opening and closing remarks follows Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987) pp. 148-149.
2. The translation of Melissus is as G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield The Presocratic Philosophers §537 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edition 1983), who cite Burnet. Melissus' text is as given by Kirk-Raven-Schofield, with Simplicius' opening and closing comments as Heiberg (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca Volume 7).
3. This is deleted by Kirk-Raven-Schofield, in agreement with Jonathan Barnes The Presocratic Philosophers (Routledge, London, 1982) 622 n. 3.
4. See also the discussion by Barnes The Presocratic Philosophers 298-300.
5. Kirk-Raven-Schofield The Presocratic Philosophers 400.
6. R. D. McKirahan Philosophy Before Socrates (Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1994) 300.
7. P. Curd The Legacy of Parmenides (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1998) 213.
8. The orthodox interpretation is not universal. A recent treatment, which changes the emphasis somewhat, is in John Palmer's 'Melissus and Parmenides' Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004) 19-54. Palmer discusses the B 8 argument at 38-39. His primary concern is to draw out the contrast between Melissus and Parmenides. According to Palmer Melissus at B 8.2-5 argues in the following way. If (P) we perceive things correctly, then [Q] the things people say there are are. Further, if (Q) then (R) each of these things must be such as the One has been shown to be. However (R) things as we perceive them are not as the One has been shown to be. Therefore (Q) the things people say there are are not; and so (P) we do not perceive things correctly. It is because Melissus endorses (P) that he - unlike Parmenides - offers us no 'way of seeming'. In §2 I consider whether the 30 B 8 argument would be a good one on the orthodox interpretation. The same problem I will raise there can be raised about the argument as interpreted by Palmer. Anyone who accepted (P) would be likely to deny that (Q) implies (R). As with the orthodox interpretation we end up with a stand-off between Melissus who argues that (Q) implies (R) and recommends abandoning (P), and his opponent who holds on to (P) and on that basis denies Melissus' claim that (Q) implies (R). The interpretation I will recommend has the same advantage over Palmer's as over orthodox interpretations: according to my interpretation the result of 30 B 8 is not a stand-off, but a victory for Melissus over an opponent who represents a real threat in Melissus' eyes.
9. This contributes to the rehabilitation of Melissus as a philosopher. Melissus has traditionally had a poor reputation, ultimately due to Aristotle (Physics 1.2, 185a9-12; Metaphysics A.5, 986b25-27). Some proponents of the orthodox interpretation of B 8 are also champions of Melissus, most notably Barnes The Presocratic Philosophers 180-182 and 298-33 (and Chapter 11 passim). But my suggestion is that Melissus is even more innovative than they acknowledge.
10. Kirk, Raven and Schofield describe Melissus' strategy as 'simple but ingenious' (The Presocratic Philosophers 400);
11. McKirahan says that Melissus 'produces a clear argument' (Philosophy Before Socrates 300).
12. Aristotle Generation and Corruption 1.8, 325a13-15, 17-20, after the Revised Oxford Translation.