The dark side of bank wholesale funding

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 248-263

  Huang, Rocco ^a   Ratnovski, Lev ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA   (United States)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951517286     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: 10960473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2010.06.003     Document Type: Article

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