Reflections on the crisis and on its lessons for regulatory reform and for central bank policies

Journal of Financial Stability

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 26-37

  Cukierman, Alex ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Bubbles; Externalities; Institutions; Regulation; Supervision

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551683535     PISSN: 15723089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2010.03.002     Document Type: Article

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