Probably probable cause: The diminishing importance of justification standards

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 94, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 1514-1560

  Ohm, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

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EID: 79251610554     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (281)

1. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21-47 (2007) (arguing for a "reconceptualization" of the Fourth Amendment's justification standards).
2. U. S. Const. amend. IV provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
3. See infra Part I. A.
4. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 30-45 (arguing for a "proportionality principle" that adds justification standards to new situations).
5. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30 (1968) (creating the reasonable suspicion standard for sidewalk stop-and-frisk encounters).
6. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U. S. C.).
7. See Terry, 392 U. S. at 21 ("[T]here is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'"
8. (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U. S. 523, 536-37 (1967)));
9. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 21 ("[A] search or seizure is reasonable if the strength of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of intrusion associated with the police action. ").
10. See New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 346 (1985) ("[T]he requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: 'sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment....'"
11. (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797, 804 (1971))).
12. See U. S. Const. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
13. Id. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....").
14. 392 U. S. at 30 (approving "carefully limited search[es]" for weapons "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous").
15. See id. at 27 ("[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual....").
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 341 (1985) ("[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause....").
18. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709, 724 (1987) ("In our view... a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers.").
19. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 875-76 (1987) ("We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system... justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by 'reasonable grounds'....").
20. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656, 666 (1989) ("[The Government's] substantial interests [in drug testing Customs agents]... present a special need that may justify departure from the ordinary warrant and probable-cause requirements.");
21. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U. S. 602, 620 (1989) ("The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety... 'likewise presents special needs beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.'"
22. (quoting Griffin, 483 U. S. at 873-74)).
23. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U. S. 292, 301 (1991) ("[W]here... a subpoena is challenged on relevancy grounds, the motion to quash must be denied unless the district court determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation. ").
24. Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 183-84 (1984) ("[I]n the case of open fields, the general rights of property protected by the common law of trespass have little or no relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.").
25. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445, 450 (1989) ("[The police] were... free to inspect the yard from the vantage point of an aircraft flying in the navigable airspace as this plane was.");
26. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 215 (1986) ("In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1, 000 feet.");
27. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U. S. 227, 239 (1986) ("We hold that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.").
28. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35, 40 (1988) ("[W]e conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection. ").
29. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 745 (1979) ("We... conclude that petitioner in all probability entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not 'legitimate.'"). Phone number tracking is now regulated by statute.
30. See Pen Register and Trap and Trace Act, 18 U. S. C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
31. United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 445-46 (1976) (holding that documents produced pursuant to subpoenas duces tecum directed against banks were not in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
32. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U. S. at 736 n. 1, 745 (concluding that the installation of a pen register-"a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone"-does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
33. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U. S. C.). (governing government access to information transiting or stored on computer networks).
34. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (3) (2006). The Wiretap Act requires the police to meet a series of other obligations before conducting a court-ordered wiretap.
35. See id. § 2518 (1).
36. 50 U. S. C. § 1805 (a) (3) (2006).
37. 18 U. S. C. §§ 2701-2711.
38. Id. §§ 3121-3127.
39. See id. § 2703 (describing the procedures a governmental entity must abide by to require the disclosure of a wire or electronic communication).
40. See id. § 2703 (a).
41. See id. § 2703 (b).
42. See id. § 2703 (a). The text is arguably ambiguous about which e-mail messages receive this protected treatment, and the question is under debate in the courts.
43. See infra Part II. B.2.
44. See 18 U. S. C. § 2703 (b) (1) (B);
45. see also In re Gimbel, 77 F.3d 593, 598 (2d Cir. 1996)
46. (extending the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652 (1950), that administrative subpoenas for corporate records need only be "reasonably relevant" to individual financial records).
47. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1219 (2004) (discussing the "d-order" under § 2703 (d)).
48. 18 U. S. C. § 2703 (d).
49. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968).
50. ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 515-16 (2006).
51. See Kerr, supra note 35, at 1233-35 (arguing the subpoena requirements should be dropped as "surprisingly low" in favor of a d-order requirement).
52. But see Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L. J. 139, 161-62 (2005) (arguing that the d-order requires only relevance and materiality, both low standards under evidence law).
53. 18 U. S. C. §§ 3121-3127;
54. see also id. § 3127 (defining "pen register" and "trap and trace device").
55. See id. § 3127 (3).
56. Id. § 3123 (a) (1).
57. Id. § 3122 (b) (2).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The judicial role in approving use of trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.").
59. H. R. Rep. No. 103-827, at 31 (1994)
60. reprinted in 1994 U. S. C. C. A. N. 3489, 3511.
61. See infra Part II. C.1.
62. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1436 (2004);
63. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1299 (2004).
64. Solove, supra note 47.
65. Bellia, supra note 47.
66. Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1592 (2004).
67. See Kerr, supra note 35, at 1242 ("I would give the current SCA a 'B.'").
68. Id. at 1233.
69. Id. at 1234-35.
70. Solove, supra note 47, at 1266.
71. Id. at 1299.
72. See id.
73. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, LIBERTY AND SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 184-90 (2008), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Liberty%20and%20Security% 20Transition%20Report.pdf.
74. See id. at 184.
75. See United and Strengthening America Act of 2001, S. 1510, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001);
76. Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1199 (2004) (commenting on Senator Leahy's proposal to modify the Pen Register Act).
77. Howell, supra note 59, at 1199.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 741-42 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that an IP address attached to an e-mail address is sufficient to establish probable cause).
81. THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. 1993).
82. In Hollywood's imagination, hackers can always process screens full of text (usually green-on-black) scrolling by at a speed no human can process; government agency video specialists can turn the grainiest images into perfectly sharp video with a few clicks of the keyboard (and they never use mice); and every network can be accessed through an elegant, three-dimensional, virtual reality interface.
83. See Matthew Inman, What Code DOESN'T Do in Real Life (That it Does in the Movies), DRIVL, June 12, 2006, http://web.archive.org/web/20070202190507/www. drivl.com/posts/view/494;
84. CRACKED Staff, 5 Things Hollywood Thinks Computers Can Do, CRACKED, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.cracked.com/article-15229-5-things-hollywood-thinks- computers-can-do.html ("#2: A Computer Might Become Self-Aware at any Moment.").
85. Cf. Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case for a "Crazy Quilt" of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1 (discussing the changing procedures and practices of criminal investigations with the advancement of the Internet).
86. There are, of course, exceptions. Sometimes, the hacker is a disgruntled ex-employee, and death threats online often come from people who also know the victim in the real world. But local knowledge like this is much more likely to be irrelevant.
87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 5 (1967) (testifying that "he had been assigned to patrol this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for [thirty] years").
88. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 575 (2009) ("[Third-party internet services] act as remote agents that permit wrongdoers to commit crimes entirely in private.").
89. See, e.g., id. at 562 (explaining that wrongdoers sometimes expose evidence through e-mail, "creat[ing] an important opportunity for criminal investigators").
90. THE FUGITIVE, supra note 64.
91. Id.
92. Cf. Solove, supra note 47, at 1265 (discussing the ease with which email messages and other electronic communications can be discovered).
93. For an example of this investigative process, see Matthew Sedensky, Investigators Followed Digital Trail in Pregnant Woman's Killing, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002 125795-baby21.html.
94. See Will Sturgeon, Federal Agent Raps ISPs Over Cybercrime, CNET NEWS. COM, Jan. 25, 2005, http://news.cnet.com/Federal-agent-raps-ISPs-over- cybercrime/2100-7348-3-5549723.html (recounting FBI official's complaint about how American ISPs respond slowly to requests from UK law enforcement).
95. See Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 274-76 (2008) (discussing how technologies that conceal user identities can "hinder law enforcement").
96. See id. at 274-75 (explaining various techniques criminals can use to evade tracking of their Internet use).
97. To get a bit more technical about things, at the transport layer, Internet Service Providers use routing protocols that adapt to outages and congestion by pushing data along better routes. E.g., 1 DOUGLAS E. COMER, INTERNETWORKING WITH TCP/IP 115 (4th ed. 2000). Perhaps the most important routing protocol is the Border Gateway Protocol, or BGP.
98. See generally THE INTERNET SOCIETY, A BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL 4 (BGP-4) (2006), http://www.tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc4271 (providing an in-depth discussion of the purpose and uses of BGP-4).
99. In an early and influential article on computer crime, Neal Katyal placed far too much emphasis on how packets and shifting Internet routes hinder law enforcement. Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1072 (2001) ("Unlike a criminal who needs to escape down a particular road, a criminal in cyberspace could be on any road, and these roads are not linked together in any meaningful fashion. "). Katyal errs because he focuses too much on the shifting nature at the packet layer, even though almost all criminal investigation online occurs at higher layers.
100. See id.
101. While Point A's importance stems from clues it provides about the wrongdoer, electronic routes can bear on criminal cases in other ways, such as satisfying jurisdictional requirements.
102. See United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an electronic bomb threat sent and received in Utah nevertheless satisfied an interstate commerce requirement because the message passed through a server in Virginia).
103. E.g., Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179-80 (D. Conn. 2005) (describing how police requested user information from an Internet service provider following an electronic threat, but did not inquire as to the route it traveled).
104. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 70 (2006) (discussing the evolution of Internet intermediaries).
105. See id. at 70-71 (noting the pervasiveness of intermediaries).
106. See id. at 70 (calling ISPs, search engines, browsers, the physical network, and financial intermediaries the most important intermediaries).
107. E.g., Freedman, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (discussing how police relied on an ISP's records).
108. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803 (6) (providing an exception to the hearsay rule for business records).
109. See generally Tim O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0?, O'REILLY, Sept. 30, 2005, http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html (recounting a brainstorming session that produced the phrase "Web 2.0").
110. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud-Whatever That May Mean, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1 (discussing the meaning of the phrase "cloud computing").
111. Google Docs, http://docs.google.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
112. Google Calendar, http://calendar.google.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
113. Amazon EC2, http://aws.amazon. com/ec2 (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
114. See Slobogin, supra note 39, at 140 (discussing various kinds of online surveillance).
115. See id. at 145-47 ("In short, even if you stay home and conduct all your business and social life via phone, e-mail and surfing the 'Net, [law enforcement] can construct what one commentator has called 'a complete mosaic' of your characteristics.").
116. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1462-66 (discussing reasons why Internet providers monitor customers).
117. Id. at 1433-34.
118. See, e.g., id. at 1474-77 (describing why web-host customers consent to be monitored by online service providers).
119. See Slobogin, supra note 39, at 149 ("Given the potential that [Internet] surveillance provides the government for... linking people to crime, it could well be even more useful than visual tracking of [a] person's activities... and eavesdropping on or hacking into a person's communications....").
120. E.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 838-40 (2009) (describing the Supreme Court Justices' varied impressions upon viewing the same videotape).
121. ERIC T. PETERSON, WEB SITE MEASUREMENT HACKS 79-83 (2005) (explaining how to interpret web server logfiles).
122. See Slobogin, supra note 39, at 149 (arguing that online electronic surveillance is useful because it provides more precise identifying information than physical evidence).
123. See Rubinstein et al., supra note 76, at 270-74 (using cookies as an example of how precise personal information is collected online).
124. E.g., id. at 272-73 (explaining that the programs capture the "aggregate results of every search ever entered, every result list ever tendered, and every path taken as a result").
125. See id. (quoting the CEO of Google as stating that the future of Google depends on its ability to collect and use personal data).
126. See id. ("Taken together, this information represents a massive clickstream database.... [that] can be subpoenaed and used against litigants....").
127. E.g., Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181-84 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding that law enforcement's discovery of online information was valid not under a theory of probable cause, but because plaintiff lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy).
128. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1073-78 (9th Cir. 2004).
129. 18 U. S. C. § 2703 (b) (2006) (authorizing compelled disclosure of contents originally maintained solely for purposes of "storage or computer processing" with subpoena or court order).
130. Id. § 2708.
131. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109-10 (D. Kan. 2000).
132. The defendant had inadvertently configured his computer to share his files with others on the Internet, and two technicians from his ISP found what they thought was child pornography in the files. Id. at 1106-09 (describing the evidence obtained by police). They delivered these files to the FBI, prompting the application for the d-order.
133. Id.
134. Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126-27 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding defendants liable irrespective of whether they "required" or "requested" information from the ISP).
135. The court described the facts in greater detail in a later opinion. Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179-80 (D. Conn. 2005) (describing an e-mail message sent under the screen name " GoMaryGoAway" stating that "The End is Near" in a case arising out of a local political race).
136. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007)
137. vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
138. Id. at 460.
139. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
140. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Charges Sellers of Avlimil, Rogisen, and Other Dietary Supplements (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/02/avlimil.shtm (describing FTC action against same defendant).
141. E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Elec. Frontier Found. et al. Supporting the Appellant and Urging Acquittal or Order for New Trial at 4-14
142. Warshak v. United States, No. 08-4085 (6th Cir. June 10, 2009) (framing arguments against the government in the context of reasonableness instead of probable cause).
143. 18 U. S. C. § 1030 (2006).
144. Id. §§ 2252-2252A.
145. KERR, supra note 38.
146. E.g., United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1077-79 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government's search of a home computer lacked probable cause because it was based only on defendant's paid membership to a child pornography website);
147. United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the government had probable cause to search a home computer, and reversing the district court's order to suppress);
148. cf. United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 861-63 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding a search of a home computer violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement).
149. Both a research assistant and I reviewed the factual description of the investigation from the full court opinion for every CFAA and child pornography case described in Professor Kerr's casebook.
150. KERR, supra note 38, at 74-83, 211-49. I concluded that none seemed close to lacking in probable cause. See Research Summary Chart Prepared by Paul Ohm, Professor, Univ. of Colorado Law School (on file with author).
151. 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
152. Specifically, under the DOJ's interpretation, when a user opened a piece of e-mail and then left it on the e-mail provider's server, it no longer qualified as in "electronic storage", an important SCA term of art. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 122-27 (3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL], available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf (defining "electronic storage"). Importantly, e-mail stored but not in electronic storage could be accessed by a d-order or subpoena.
153. Id. at 127-34 (outlining the government's means of compelling disclosure).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., id. (including specific cases in its discussion of compelling disclosure with less than probable cause).
156. The case involved a civil suit about a discovery request for e-mail in a prior litigation gone very bad. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1071-72. It was probably not until the Justice Department filed an amicus brief urging reconsideration that the panel realized that it was upsetting years of criminal law investigation practice.
157. Id. at 1076. But even faced with the import of its decision, the panel did not waver, amending its opinion to reject the government's arguments in detail and reassuring the government that it did "not lightly conclude that the government's reading is erroneous."
158. Id. at 1077.
159. In response to the DOJ's argument that Theofel would read out the part of the statute which allowed d-order and subpoena requests, Judge Kozinski explained that ISPs that provide only "storage or computer processing services" would still be amenable to process under the provision.
160. Id. at 1076-77.
161. See CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 124, at 123-25 (discussing the effect of Theofel from the DOJ's perspective).
162. * 3 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2001)
163. rev'd, 310 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002).
164. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 107-273, § 11010, 116 Stat. 1812, 1822 (2002)
165. (codified as amended at 18 U. S. C. § 2703 (g) (2006)).
166. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, § 220, 115 Stat. 272, 291
167. (codified as amended at 18 U. S. C. § § 2703, 2711, 3127 (2006)).
168. E.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) (allowing suppression of voice mail under the Wiretap Act).
169. USA PATRIOT Act § 209.
170. E.g., Fighting Cyber Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 41-48 (2001) (statement of Associate Att'y Gen. Michael Chertoff) (mentioning problems with the Pen Register Act and the Cable Act);
171. Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 4-20 (2000) (statement of Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Kevin V. di Gregory) (asking for changes to ECPA).
172. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Map of the Ninth Circuit, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk-id=0000000135 (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
173. COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 90 (2007) [hereinafter CCIPS PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ccmanual/ ccmanual.pdf;
174. CCIPS Search-and-seizure Manual, supra note 124, at 123-25.
175. CCIPS PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 137, at 81. I worked for the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section when Theofel was decided. This discussion, however, rests only on the public record and my personal interpretations of events.
176. CCIPS SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE MANUAL, supra note 124, at 125 ("[P]rosecutors within the Ninth Circuit are bound by Theofel....").
177. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1067-77 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the government's arguments aimed at maintaining lower justification standards).
178. Posting of Nicole Wong, Associate General Counsel, Google, Inc., to Official Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/response-to-doj- motion.html (Feb. 17, 2006, 15:55 PST) (asserting that the government requested "untold millions of search queries" which would "do nothing to further the Government's case in the underlying action").
179. 47 U. S. C. § 231 (2006).
180. See Hiawatha Bray, Google Faces Order To Give Up Records, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2006, at E1 (discussing the government's requests of major search engine companies in an effort to defend the COPA).
181. See Katie Hafner & Matt Richtel, Google Resists U. S. Subpoena of Search Data, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at A1 (discussing the motion to compel).
182. See, e.g., Posting of Nicole Wong, supra note 141 (responding to the government's motion to compel).
183. See Hafner & Richtel, supra note 144 ("[The government] is trying to establish a profile of Internet use that will help it defend the Child Online Protection Act....").
184. See Verne Kopytoff, Google Must Divulge Data, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 18, 2006, at C1 ("The 21-page opinion by Judge James Ware... puts to bed a high-profile legal battle between the most popular search engine and the Department of Justice....").
185. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, From EFF's Secret Files: Anatomy of a Bogus Subpoena, http://www.eff.org/wp/anatomy-bogus-subpoena-indymedia (last visited Apr. 12, 2010) (reporting on the contents of the subpoena).
186. Id.
187. E.g., United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (describing how information found online about defendant's subscription to a child pornography website led the FBI to real evidence in his home).
188. Cell phone contact lists and webmail address books are replacing the traditional "little black books." Do not be confused by the fact that the storage mechanism is electronic or online. I still put this in the category of a "real world" storage device pointing to online addresses.
189. Compare with Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1067-68, where the FBI had defendant's e-mail address accompanied by evidence he maintained a membership to a child pornography website.
190. See supra Part II. A.3.a.
191. See Anne Barnard, Growing Presence in the Courtroom: Cellphone Data as Witness, N. Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at A16 (discussing the role cell phone tracking now plays in law enforcement investigations).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. (reporting that "wireless carriers receive hundreds of requests a month from law enforcement just for real-time tracking", according to lawyer Albert Gidari Jr.).
195. See M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1416 n. 17 (2007) (listing cases).
196. See id. at 1415-17 (describing the DOJ's record in cases involving EC-PA).
197. See id. at 1418-56 (chronicling these issues).
198. See e.g., Barnard, supra note 154 (noting the use of finding kidnappers, fugitives, and drug traffickers);
199. Ryan Singel, FBI E-Mail Shows Rift Over Warrantless Phone Record Grabs, WIRED, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.wired.com/print/politics/onlinerights/news/ 2007/12/fbi-cell (explaining how cell phone tracking works and is used).
200. See Solove, supra note 47, at 1287 (discussing how applying electronic surveillance to IP addresses and URLs makes things "fuzzy").
201. Compare Christopher Soghoian, Slight Paranoia, 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance Oversight, (Dec. 1, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/ 2009/12/8-million-reasons-for-real-surveillance.html (reporting eight million requests for GPS location information) (quoting Paul Taylor, Electronic Surveillance Manager, Sprint Nextel)
202. with Comment of Matt Sullivan, Sprint Nextel, to id., (Dec. 1, 2009, 23:26) (clarifying that the eight million requests amount to only "[s]everal thousand" instances of surveillance).
203. Solove, supra note 47, at 1301.
204. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U. S. Calls, N. Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2005, at A1.
205. Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, U. S. Secretly Tracks Global Bank Data, L. A. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1.
206. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A.
207. See id. (explaining that most of the information comes from people not suspected of crimes).
208. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 96-97 (2006) (arguing that data mining does not implicate privacy at all unless a human looks at the results);
209. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 435, 487-88 (2008) (endorsing a nine-pronged framework for regulating data mining with no mention of judicial standards);
210. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 337-38 (2008) (arguing for a non-probable cause standard for some types of data mining).
211. E.g., Posting of Jim Harper to Cato@Liberty, Data Mining of the Fourth Amendment?, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2006/08/22/data-mining-or-the-fourth- amendment/ (Aug. 22, 2006, 12:36 PM).
212. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 169, at 330 ("Since virtually all information obtained through data mining comes from third-party record holders-either the government itself, commercial data brokers, or a commercial entity like a bank-its acquisition does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.").
213. See Kerr, supra note 35, at 1218-22 (discussing the disclosure requirements under the SCA).
214. The only federal law that specifically regulates data mining is the Computer Matching and Privacy Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified as amended at 5 U. S. C. § 552a (o) - (r) (2006)). The law is mostly inapposite to this discussion because it imposes no justification standards and it expressly exempts data mining for law enforcement and intelligence purposes.
215. U. S. C. § 552a (a) (8) (B) (iii), (v) - (vi).
216. See supra Part II. C.1.
217. Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 809 (2005).
218. William J. Stuntz, O. J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 864 (2001).
219. See Bray, supra note 143.
220. The SCA permits access to some records with a subpoena. 18 U. S. C. § 2703 (b) (1) (B) (i), (c) (2) (2006).
221. Id. § 3123 (a) (1) - (2).
222. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2004).
223. See Slobogin, supra note 175, at 840 (stating that information obtained through subpoenas is usually secondary information).
224. See Symposium, The Future of Internet Surveillance Law: A Symposium To Discuss Internet Surveillance, Privacy, and the USA Patriot Act, 72 GEO. WASH.
225. See Posting of Paul Ohm to Concurring Opinions, Which is More Confusing: ECPA or the Tax Code?, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/08/which- is-more-c-1.html (Aug. 21, 2008, 12:42 PM).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 85 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (interpreting the Wiretap Act);
227. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 886 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the dismissal of a Wiretap Act claim, but reversing the dismissal of a Stored Communications Act claim).
228. See Kerr, supra note 35, at 1235-38 (urging Congress to simplify EC-PA).
229. McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455 (1948).
230. See 18 U. S. C. § 3121 (2006) (defining the relevance-and- certification standard).
231. See Solove, supra note 47, at 1288-89.
232. Id. at 1288.
233. United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) (calling the judge's role in reviewing Pen Register Act applications "ministerial in nature").
234. 18 U. S. C. § 2703 (d) (2006).
235. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 639 (2003) (explaining that the higher standard would add privacy protection).
236. See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding an injunction for lack of a warrant or notice)
237. rev'd as not ripe by 532 F.3d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
238. See 18 U. S. C. § 2705 (a) (1) - (2) (listing five factors justifying delay including physical safety, possible flight, evidence tampering, and witness intimidation).
239. Notice to the subscriber is not required in parts of the SCA
240. id. § 2703 (b) (1) (A), (c) (1), or in the Pen Register Act, id. § 3123 (d).
241. Id. § 2519 (3).
242. See id. §§ 2702 (d), 3126.
243. See id. § 2519 (describing the reporting requirements for wiretaps).
244. See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How A Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 805, 837-40 (2003).
245. 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1) (c).
246. See Kevin Poulsen, FBI's Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats, WIRED, July 18, 2007, http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/07/ fbi-spyware (describing the FBI's use of spyware in its law enforcement efforts).
247. See Kerr, supra note 69, at 574.
248. See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 93 (2005) (describing the ideas of pervasive computing and ubiquitous access).
249. See U. S. Const. amend IV.
250. This last point is another example of the well-worn "I have nothing to hide" argument, which Daniel Solove refutes.
251. See Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got Nothing To Hide" and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 764-72 (2007).
252. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 528 (2006) (stating that Fourth Amendment law fails to protect against some breaches).
253. See Kerr, supra, note 69, at 587-600.
254. See United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435, 443 (1976).
255. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 745-46 (1976).
256. Kerr, supra note 69, at 564.
257. See id. at 575.
258. Id. at 576.
259. I have other problems with Professor Kerr's argument. Most significantly, I find the approach impossible for courts to apply, because it is positively actuarial: it asks courts to construct a balance sheet measuring how changes in technology upend the constitutionally proper balance between privacy and security. When the balance sheet tips too much in favor of privacy at the cost of security, it allows courts to construct rules to restore balance. This bean-counting approach is too indeterminate to serve the purpose Professor Kerr intends, because it requires courts to quantify changes in technology and crime in ways that courts are ill-equipped to do.
260. See id. at 575-76 (discussing the effects of intermediaries on criminal conduct).
261. See Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 43-44 (1967) (striking down a New York surveillance law as too general).
262. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 350 (1967) (refusing to recognize the Fourth Amendment as granting a general privacy right).
263. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 39, at 153 (analogizing the assumption of risk that the phone company will disclose information to information gained by ISPs);
264. Solove, supra note 47, at 1287 (discussing the expansion of information obtainable by the government resulting from the USA PATRIOT Act);
265. Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2114-15 (2009) (discussing the right to privacy in Internet communications).
266. See Berger, 388 U. S. at 64.
267. Id. at 54-55.
268. Id. at 56
269. (citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 329 n. 2 (1966)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
272. See id. at 58-59.
273. Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 12, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-first- principles.pdf
274. See id. ¶ 9.
275. See id. ¶¶ 51-56. Friewald cites seven silent video opinions from the Courts of Appeals.
276. Id. ¶ 10 n. 20.
277. Id. ¶ 10.
278. See id.
279. See id. ¶ 72.
280. See id. ¶ 54. She also would apply these requirements to real-time interception of e-mail and instant messaging and, perhaps, to surveillance of noncontent information as well.
281. See id. ¶ 73.