Kantian virtue and 'virtue ethics'

Kant's Ethics of Virtue

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 29-59

  Hill, Thomas E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

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EID: 79251603448     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1515/9783110209655     Document Type: Chapter

References (80)

1. The imagery here comes from Isaiah Berlin's lectures at Oxford in the early 1960's
2. Earlier versions of this essay were discussed at the University of Tennessee, the University of Cincinnati, the University of California, Riverside, and the University of California, Los Angeles. A lecture with similar content to a few sections of this present essay was given at The Catholic University of America. (That lecture, entitled "Kant on Weakness of Will," will be published by The Catholic University of America Press in a series of essays on weakness of will, edited by Tobias Kaufmann.) I am grateful to participants in those discussions for their helpful comments. I cannot thank individually all the Kant scholars from whose work I have learned, but among the best accounts of these matters, in my view.
3. Robert Johnson's "Weakness Incorporated", 1998, in: History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 349 - 367.
4. My reflections agree with his excellent discussion on most important matters, though I do not rely in the same way on a distinction between "motivation" and "values". Also at times Johnson seems to treat weakness of will as a kind of inability. For example, "The weak person we are interested in here is not simply a person who drops and adopts principles too easily, but is rather one who cannot live up to those she adopts and does not drop" (p. 360, my italics in the second clause).
5. Serious discussions of virtue representing contemporary versions of a broadly "virtue ethics" approach, as distinct from more popular and implausible representations, can be found in the following: Philippa Foot, 2003, Natural Goodness, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. Stephen Darwall (ed.), 2002, Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
7. Roger Crisp, Michael Slote (eds.), 1997, Virtue Ethics, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press
8. Rosalind Hursthouse, 1999, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press
9. Michael Slote, 1992, From Morality to Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press
10. Christine Swanton, 2005, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press
11. These two tasks of fundamental moral philosophy in the Groundwork were to "seek out" and "establish" the supreme principle of morality
12. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. by Arnulf Zweig and Thomas E. Hill, Jr., 2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press (hereafter abbreviated as G) 193 [4: 390].
13. Consequentialists hold that nothing but consequences, and perhaps a few "side constraints", ultimately matter, and Kant is no consequentialist in this sense. Kantian moral reasoning to particular moral conclusions, however, is complex and consequences are potentially relevant at certain stages though constrained by certain principles and procedures. It should be noted that any substantive moral principle that constrains choice, even if justified by a procedure that takes consequences into account, will exclude in the particular case consideration of facts (including consequences) about anything but the criteria for judging the case as falling under the principle. As an absolute principle "Never lie," whatever its grounds, prohibits considering any facts beyond the criteria for determining what would be a lie in the case (among which, for example, is that my saying certain words now will likely cause the other person to believe what I think is false). Even a qualified principle, such as "Be truthful, except when deception is necessary to save lives and is directed to a person making an immoral threat (and other specified conditions)" says, in effect, "In these circumstances, you must not tell a lie regardless of further consequences." That substantive moral principles exclude (further) consequences in this way is not a radical Kantian thought but a thought that few, if any, who acknowledge genuine moral principles (in contrast with act-consequentialist "rules of thumb") would deny.
14. This interpretation may be controversial because Kant seems to imply (and at times it seems true) that to do what is right from non-moral motives is a moral failing. Consider a teacher who never gives her favorite student (who happens to deserve high marks) a low grade simply because she likes him, with no thought of her duty as a teacher. At least in the case of various negative duties, however, there is no adequate reason to suppose that Kant was committed to the implausible idea that on each occasion on which one satisfies the requirement from a nonmoral motive one is morally deficient. For example, well-contented people who pass up many unwanted opportunities to commit suicide because they want to live need not be considered guilty of anything so long as, with a good will, they stand ready to avoid suicide when tempted and when it would be an escape from responsibilities.
15. G 199-201 [4: 397- 9]
16. At this point Kant's strategy of argument bears some resemblance to the idea in virtue ethics that we need to determine what is right to do by considering what a good or virtuous person would do. A significant difference is that Kant seeks a general principle, not particular judgments, by this strategy. Also his conception of a person with a good will is apparently different from the "thicker" ideas of a virtuous person typical of virtue ethics.
17. G 195-6 [4: 393-4]
18. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor, 1996, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (hereafter abbreviated as MM) 205 [6: 457].
19. G 214-5 [4: 413-14]
20. G 215-18 [4: 413- 417]
21. [222G ] [4: 421]
22. [230G ] [4: 429]
23. [239G ] [4: 439]
24. G 233-35 [4: 433- 4]
25. MM 145- 6 [6: 380], 148- 9 [6: 383- 4], 151 [6: 387], 153 [6: 390], 156 -7 [6: 394- 5], 163- 8 [6: 404- 10], 223 [6: 479- 80]
26. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. by Mary Gregor, 1997, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (hereafter abbreviated as CPrR) 72 [5: 84- 5] and 107 [5: 128].
27. G 215n [4: 414n]
28. CPrR 19- 20 [5: 22- 3]
29. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, 1998, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (hereafter abbreviated R) p. 46 -7 [6: 20 -2] and 57 f [6: 34 -5].
30. [229G ] [4: 428]
31. CPrR 2 -5 [5: 4- 6]
32. CPrR 29 [5: 32]
33. MM 13 [6: 213] and 18 [6: 226]. Gregor translates Willkür as choice and Wille as will.
34. G 247-8 [4: 447-8]
35. CPrR 37 - 44 [5: 42- 50]
36. MM 18 -9 [6: 226 -7]
37. G 202n [4: 402] and 222n [4: 421]
38. MM 17- 18 [6: 225 - 6]
39. [48R ] - 9 [6: 23- 4]
40. [246G ] [4: 446]
41. [246G ] [4: 446], 231 -5 [4: 431-4] and 240 - 1 [4: 440 - 1]
42. G 241-45 [4: 441- 4]
43. G 222-4 [4: 421-3]
44. [45R ] - 60 [6: 19 - 39]
45. CPrR 17- 24 [5: 19- 26]
46. R 52- 4 [6: 29- 31]
47. Kant introduces the terms to describe "propensities" to evil in human nature in contrast to several "predispositions" to what is basically good, R 50 - 2 [6: 26- 28]. I extend the terms to characterize those who have voluntarily incorporated these propensities into their basic, life-governing maxims.
48. [58R ] [6: 35]
49. MM 160 [6: 399- 400] and 208 [6: 461]
50. The incoherence of this position stems from the fact that Kant understands a "moral requirement" (or duty), when fully stated, as an unconditional imperative, expressible as "Do (or avoid) X, regardless of how it affects your contingent interests." Thus the mixed maxim would be, in effect, "I will do what is morally required, regardless of how it affects my interests but only if it does not too much damage my interests." Note, however, that this point is compatible with thinking that sometimes effects on one's own contingent interests are relevant in deciding the specific content of a moral requirement, for example, whether one must give absolutely all of one's goods to the poor.
51. In the Groundwork Kant does not explicitly distinguish a good will and virtue, but it is clear that a "will" (or resolve or firm intention) to act as moral law requires is at least the core of both. At G 196 [4: 394] Kant describes a good will as not "merely a wish but a summoning of every means in our power." This implies that that a person with a good will exerts (or at least intends to to exert) every effort to follow moral requirements. This is characteristic of virtue, but it is unclear at this point whether it necessarily includes the virtuous person's strength or fortitude of will, a developed moral resolve that is persistent and effective over time. At G 253- 4 [4: 454- 5] Kant writes of a "malicious villain" as "conscious of possessing a good will which, on his own admission, constitutes the law for his evil will as a member of the world of sense - a law of whose authority he is conscious even while transgressing it." At this point "a good will" seems to refer to what Kant later identifies as a rational legislative will (Wille) rather than an adoption through a free power of choice (Willk_r) of a basic, life-governing maxim to follow the moral law. A malicious villain might have a "good will" in that sense (Wille) even though morally depraved (as opposed to morally weak or virtuous).
52. [53R ] [6: 29]
53. MM 188- 91 [6: 437- 40]
54. This is entailed by Kant's repeated insistence that we can do what we ought. Even the innate human "propensity" to moral weakness, Kant held, must be seen as chosen, despite any apparent empirical evidence to the contrary. R 52 -55 [6: 29- 32]. Insofar as moral weakness is merely "want of virtue," as evidenced by neglect (rather than principled rejection) of imperfect duties (beneficence, etc.), it is not "vice" but "lack of moral strength" (of "resolution") and assessed as "a deficiency in moral worth."
55. MM 153 [6: 390]
56. G 254-62 [4: 455- 63]
57. [61R ] - 73 [6: 39 - 53]
58. [53R ] [6: 30]
59. Kant implies that, other things equal, the degree of culpability for a wrongdoing is greater when the agent acts deliberately on a fixed bad policy than when giving in to strong inclinations (presumably against a moral disposition). He writes: "Subjectively, the degree to which an action can be imputed (imputabilitas) has to be assessed by the magnitude of the obstacles that had to be overcome. ... [T]he less the natural obstacles ["of sensibility"] and the greater the obstacle from grounds of duty, so much the more is a transgression to be imputed (as culpable). - Hence the state of mind of the subject, whether he committed the deed in a state of agitation or with cool deliberation, makes a difference in imputation, which has results." MM 19- 20 [6: 228]. Note that what mitigates culpability is not that the agent acts in an emotional state, which would not lessen the blame of those passionately committed to their immoral policies. It is the "state of agitation" that reveals a moral commitment in conflict with temptation that shows the weak wrongdoer's deed not as bad as the whole-hearted wrongdoer's otherwise similar deed.
60. MM 165 [6: 407]
61. It is noteworthy that in the troublesome passage where Kant seems to treat virtue as an aptitude "not as a property of choice (Willk_r) but of will (Wille)", he characterizes the latter as "a faculty of desire that, in adopting a rule, also gives itself a universal law (my italics)." Here "will" (Wille) seems to refer to more than merely the aspect of practical reason that rationally legislates moral laws and predisposes even the worst moral agents to follow them.
62. For example, MM 158- 9 [6: 397]
63. MM 23- 34 [6: 229- 242], 89- 120 [6: 311- 351]
64. MM 136- 7 [6: 371] and R 153n [6: 154n]
65. Thomas E. Hill Jr., 1992, Dignity and Practical Reason, Evidence for this is assembled Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 176 - 95.
66. B. Sharon Byrd, 1989, "Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution", in: Law and Philosophy, Some evidence for this controversial thesis is presented, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 151 - 200
67. Donald E. Scheid, 1989, "Kant's Retributivism", in: Ethics, vol. 92, pp. 262 - 82
68. Thomas E. Hill, 2002, "Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment", Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 310- 39.
69. MM 182- 84 [6: 429- 31], 178- 80 [6: 424 - 26], and 95 -100 [6: 318 - 25]
70. MM 198- 218 [6: 448- 74]
71. MM 150- 56 [6: 385- 94]
72. MM 157 [6: 395]
73. MM 205 [6: 457]
74. CPrR 62- 75 [6: 71- 89]
75. MM 15 [6: 221], 151 [6: 387], and 160 [6: 399 - 400]
76. MM 141- 2 [6: 375- 7]
77. MM 198- 203 [6: 448- 53]
78. MM 154- 56 [6: 391- 94]
79. Hursthouse, 1999, especially pp. 17, 18, 28- 31, 49- 52.
80. [243G ] [4: 443], G 208- 10 [4: 406- 9]