Herding and bank runs

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 163-188

  Gu, Chao ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank runs; Fundamental based bank runs; Herding; Imperfect information; Optimal bank contract; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium; Sequential move game

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751571183     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.06.001     Document Type: Article

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