Transforming into what? New governance in the EU and the "Managerial sensibility" In modern law

Wisconsin Law Review

Volumn 2010, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 389-440

  Dawson, Mark ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 78650813134     PISSN: 0043650X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (187)

1. See Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 345 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David Trubek eds., 2003);
2. Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998);
3. Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET 289 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002);
4. Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
5. In this way, it arguably avoids falling into the trap of what Michael Zürn has termed "methodological nationalism"-the imposition of outdated statist concepts on a different EU terrain. See Michael Zürn, Globalizing Interests: An Introduction, in GLOBALIZING INTERESTS: PRESSURE GROUPS AND DENATIONALIZATION 2-6 (M. Zürn ed., 2005).
6. For an elaboration, see Paul Magnette, European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?, 51 POL. STUD. 144 (2003).
7. Milena Buchs, How Legitimate is the Open Method of Co-Ordination?, 46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 765 (2008);
8. Michael Greven, The Informalization of Transnational Governance: A Threat to Democratic Government, in COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 261 (Edgar Grande & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2005);
9. Sandra Kroger, The End of Democracy As We Know It? The Legitimacy Deficits of Bureaucratic Social Policy Governance, 29 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 565 (2007).
10. Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in MultiLevel Governance: A Network Approach, EUR. GOVERNANCE PAPERS (EUROGOV) C06-02 (2006), available at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp- connex-C06-02.pdf. On empirical aspects,
11. see Mark Dawson, EU Law "Transformed"? Evaluating Accountability and Subsidiarity in the "Streamlined" OMC for Social Inclusion and Social Protection, 13 EUR. INTEGRATED ONLINE PAPERS (2009), available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2009-008a;
12. Kröger, supra note 4.
13. See Charles F. Sabel & William Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 385 (Gráinne de Burea & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
14. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4-15 (2007) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law];
15. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law: Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education, EUR. J. LEGAL STUD., Apr. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ejls.eu/1/3UK.pdf [hereinafter Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism ].
16. This historical trajectory is aptly mapped by Koskenniemi himself in his history of international law, THE GENTLE CIVILISER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2002).
17. For one proponent of a gradualist approach to global constitutionalization, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Rejoinder to Robert Howse, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 955 (2008);
18. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations "Global Compact" for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621 (2002).
19. Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law, supra note 7, at 3-7. For an official documentation of this phenomenon,
20. see U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1 (May 2, 2006) ( prepared by Martti Koskenniemi).
21. See Anthony Carry, The Yearning for Unity and the Eterna Return of the Tower of Babel, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007), available at http://www.ejls. eu/1/6UK.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003);
23. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Power and Legitimacy of Government Networks, in GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE 24 (Susan Stern & Elisabeth Selgimann eds., 2004).
24. In this sense, critical literature has also of course pointed either to the inevitability or the functional advantages that result from fragmentary and informalizing tendencies in international law. See Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 849 (2004);
25. Sabel & Simon, supra note 6;
26. Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845 (2004).
27. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Van Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999(2004).
28. As Koskenniemi puts it: "To agree to a treaty is to agree on a continued negotiation with the reference to contextual deal-striking stressing the role of technical experts, and lifting functional expertise to a decisive position." Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law, supra note 7, at 11.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 14-15.
31. On this effect of acceleration or "time-space compression" and its impact on traditional understandings of legality, see William Scheuerman, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 81 (2001).
32. It must, of course, be noted that Koskenniemi's ideas have not come without significant criticism and contestation. For two examples of critique, see Pierre M. Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the "Fragmentation" of International Law, EUR. J. LEGAL STUD., Apr. 2007, at 1, available at http://www. ejls.eu/1/4UK.pdf;
33. Oliver Gerstenberg, What International Law Should (Not) Become: A Comment on Koskenniemi, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125 (2005).
34. For applications of proceduralization to the new governance context, see Simon Deakin & Olivier De Schutter, Introduction: Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation, in SOCIAL RIGHTS AND MARKET FORCES: IS THE OPEN COORDINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICIES THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL EUROPE? 1 (Olivier De Schutter & Simon Deakin eds., 2005);
35. Jacques Lenoble & Jean de Munck, Transformations in the Art of Governance, in GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 29 (Olivier De Schutter et al. eds., 2001). Of course, the more general architects of this procedural turn are the normative political and legal theories of perhaps the two greatest political philosophers of the late twentieth century-Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. For examples of this "procedural turn" in their thinking,
36. see Jürgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 13 (Michael Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998);
37. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2005).
38. See Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 645, 648-49 (2002).
39. Jonathan Zeitlin, Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New Constitutional Compromise?, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE STATE: IN SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY 13 (Gráinne de Búrca ed., 2005).
40. Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17 (1993). Notably, this structural fragmentation is only partially addressed through the recent entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, which affords "the same legal value" to both of the prior EC and EU treaties yet still insists that "special rules" should apply in contentious areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy. For an analysis of these changes,
41. see Paul Craig, The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, Architecture and Substance, 33 EUR. L. REV. 137, 141-44 (2008).
42. Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
43. Case C-6/64, Falminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
44. For two important examples of the vast literature on "differentiated integration" in the EU context, see CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY? (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2000);
45. BRUNO DE WITTE ET AL., THE MANY FACES OF DIFFERENTIATION IN EU LAW (2001).
46. While this table only covers five policy areas, a more detailed "mapping" of differences between OMC procedures exists. See CLASSIFYING AND MAPPING OMC IN DIFFERENT POLICY AREAS, NEWGOV: NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE PROJECT 13-14 (2005), available at http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/ DELIV/D02D09-Classifyingand-Mapping-OMC.pdf.
47. The information for this table has been assembled directly by the author through a comparative overview of different OMC procedures. Brief descriptions, as well as links to more detailed preparatory documents, on the structure of the OMC in social policy can be found at European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, EU Coordination to Improve Social Welfare, http://ec.europa.eu/ social/main.jsp?catld=750& langId=en (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
48. These numberings are pre-Lisbon treaty.
49. Chairman of Working Group VI on Economic Governance, Final Report of Working Group VI on Economic Governance, 7-8, CONV 357/02 (Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00357.en02. pdf;
50. Working Group XI, Final Report of Working Group XI on Social Europe, ¶ 42, CONV 516/1/03 REV 1 (Feb. 4, 2003), available at http://register. consilium.europa.eu/pdf/ en/03/cv00/cv00516-re01.en03.pdf. This concern has framed academic commentary as well.
51. See, for example, the recommendation of de Búrea and Zeitlin of a "generic" OMC provision in the draft treaty setting out essential transparency and participation requirements. Gráinne de Burea & Jonathan Zeitlin, Constitutionalising the Open Method of Coordination: What Should the Convention Propose?, 31 CES POL'Y BRIEFS (2003), available at http://www.ceps.be/book/constitutionalising-open-methodcoordination-what-should- convention-propose.
52. See Decision No. 1972/2006/EC, art. 2(1), 2006 O.J. (L 315) 1, 3.
53. Lisbon European Council, Presidency Conclusions, ¶ 5 (Mar. 23, 2000), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1-en.htm.
54. See HIGH LEVEL GROUP, FACING THE CHALLENGE: THE LISBON STRATEGY FOR GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 16 (2004).
55. This review was carried out by the former Dutch premier Wim Kok. See id.
56. Comm'n of the European Communities, Working Together, Working Better: A New Framework for the Open Coordination of Social Protection and Social Inclusion Policies in the European Union, at 3-4, COM (2005) 706 final (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 2005:0706:FIN:EN:HTML.
57. On the failure of "feeding in and out," see Mark Dawson, The Ambiguity of Social Europe in the Open Method of Coordination, 34 EUR. L. REV. 55, 72-78 (2009);
58. Jonathan Zeitlin, Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Lisbon Strategy (La Follette Sch. Pub. Affairs Working Paper Series, Paper No. 022, 2007), available at http://www. lafollette. wise. edu/publications/ workingpapers/zeitlin2007-022 .pdf.
59. See IAIN BEGG & ERIC MARLIER, NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, "FEEDING IN" AND "FEEDING OUT," AND INTEGRATING IMMIGRANTS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 3-5 (2007), available at http://www.peer-review-social- inclusion.eu/ network-of-independent-experts/2006/reports/second-semester-2006/ synthesis-report2006-2;
60. see also Soc. PROT. COMM. WORKING GROUP, REPORT FROM THE SPC WORKING GROUP ON THE MUTUAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COMMON SOCIAL OBJECTIVES AND THE STRATEGIES FOR GROWTH AND JOBS 2-3 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ employment-social/spsi/docs/social-protection-commitee/2007/ spc-en.pdf.
61. See, e.g., Press Release, European Anti-Poverty Network, EAPN Response to the "Renewed Lisbon Strategy:" The Dropping of Social Cohesion is Incomprehensible! (Feb. 17, 2005), http://www.eapn.eu/content/view/517/30/lang. en/;
62. Press Release, Social Platform, Social NGOs Getting Ready for the Post-Lisbon: "Growth and Jobs" Is Not Sufficient to Achieve Social Cohesion (Nov. 26, 2007), http:www.socialplatform.org/News.asp?news=15620.
63. Contrast the response of EAPN to the Lisbon reforms quoted above with that of Business Europe-the main employer's confederation. Press Release, Business Europe, Business Reaction to the EU Summit on 22-23 March, Growth and Jobs: What Europe Needs (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.businesseurope. eu/Doc ShareNoFrame/docs/1/CLFCLHOCGEHDHPHIDHDAPMIOPDB19DB1WN9171KM/ UNICE/docs/DLS/2005-00516-EN.pdf. Structural reform is quickly subsumed under the operative logics of each functional constituency.
64. On this "reflexive" argument in the field of social policy in particular, see Mary Daly, EU Social Policy After Lisbon, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 461 (2006);
65. Dawson, supra note 35, at 61-63.
66. I am referring here particularly to the conflict between social collective action rights and economic rights to freedom of establishment and services arising from the judgments of the ECJ in Laval and Viking.
67. See Lenoble & de Munck, supra note 19, at 40-43;
68. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 569 (2007).
69. Common Objectives for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, European Council (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=755&langId=en.
70. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, PEER REVIEW & ASSESSMENT: AN OPERATIONAL GUIDE (2009), available at http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/peer-reviews.
71. On national differences in the frameworks for constructing NAPs, see Dawson, supra note 5;
72. Caroline de la Porte, The European Level Development and National Level Influence of the Open Method of Coordination: The Cases of Employment and Social Inclusion (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, European University Institute), available at http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/New%200MC% 20links/THESISfinal%20-%20april2008final%5B1%5D.pdf.
73. See also the case studies on the policy and procedural impacts of the OMC at the national level in Zeitlin, infra note 54.
74. Giandomenico Majone, The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation, 38 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 273 (2000) [hereinafter Majone, The Credibility Crisis];
75. Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. POL. 77(1994) [hereinafter Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State].
76. On the importance of soft modes of governance in the setting of fiscal rules under the Pact, see Waltraud Schelkle, EU Fiscal Governance: Hard Law in the Shadow of Soft Law?, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 705 (2007).
77. See Majone, The Credibility Crisis, supra note 45, at 284-90.
78. See Christian Joerges & Florian Rödl, Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the "Social Deficit" of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval, 15 EUR. L.J. 1 (2009);
79. Claus Offe, The European Model of "Social" Capitalism: Can It Survive European Integration?, 11 EUR. J. POL. PHIL. 437 (2003).
80. The SPC thus argued in one of the first reports of its indicators sub-group that "it is important that the portfolio of EU indicators should command general support as a balanced representation of Europe's social concerns." Soc. PROT. COMM., REPORT ON INDICATORS IN THE FIELD OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION 2 (2001), available at http://mdgr.undp.sk/PAPERS/ EU%20Social%20Inclusion%20Indicators.pdf.
81. European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Common Indicators, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=756 &langld=en (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
82. EMPLOYMENT, SOC. AFF. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, SOCIAL PROTECTION SOCIAL INCLUSION, MID-YEAR REPORT FROM THE INDICATORS SUB-GROUP TO THE SPC 6-7 (2003), http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/spsi/spc-indicators-subgroupen.htm.
83. David Kennedy, Remarks for the "New Governance" Workshop at Harvard Law School, at 6-7 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://www.law.harvard. edu/ faculty/dkennedy/speeches/Remarks .pdf [hereinafter Kennedy, Remarks];
84. see also David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, Julius Stone Memorial Address at the Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence, University of Sydney (June 17, 2004), 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (2005).
85. Kennedy, Remarks, supra note 52, at 8.
86. On the issue of (in)transparency in the OMC context, see Kerstin Jacobsson & Asa Vifell, Integration by Deliberation? On the Role of Committees in the Open Method of Co-Ordination, European University Institute, 23-25 (Feb. 7, 2003);
87. Kroger, supra note 4, at 576-78;
88. Elissaveta Radulova, The OMC: An Opaque Method of Consideration or Deliberative Governance in Action?, 29 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 363 (2007);
89. Jonathan Zeitlin, The Open Method of Co-Ordination in Action: Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, Reform Strategy, in THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION IN ACTION: THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL INCLUSION STRATEGIES 447, 484 (Jonathan Zeitlin & Phillip Pochet eds., 2005).
90. Harlow & Rawlings, supra note 5, at 7.
91. The reference here, of course, is to the Weberian "iron cage"-the process under which the attempt for greater levels of rationalization and bureaucratic efficiency leave out precisely the normative reasons and discussions that initially drove the search for efficiency forward. For Weber's original discussion, see MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1965). For an important application to the EU context,
92. see JOHN P. MCCORMICK, WEBER, HABERMAS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL, SOCIAL AND SUPRANATIONAL DEMOCRACY (2007).
93. As a response, a growing body of literature has sought to point to the "hybridity," linkages or "continuity" between new governance and existing forms of EU lawmaking. On variants of this argument, see Mark Dawson, Soft Law and the Rule of Law in the European Union: Revision or Redundancy?, 24 EUI Working Papers (RCSAS) (2009);
94. David Trubek & Louise Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007);
95. David M. Trubek et al., "Soft Law, " "Hard Law" and European Integration, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 65 (Gráinne de Burea & J. Scott eds., 2006).
96. See Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766 (2001).
97. Olivier De Schutter & Simon Deakin, Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation, in SOCIAL RIGHTS AND MARKET FORCES: IS THE OPEN COORDINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICIES THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL EUROPE? 1, 3 (Olivier De Schutter & Simon Deakin eds., 2005).
98. Scott & Sturm, supra note 41. For more traditional examples of proposals to re-integrate the OMC "under the shadow" of conventional Community law,
99. see Vlassilis Hatzopoulos, Why the Open Method of Coordination is Bad for You: A Letter to the EU, 13 EUR. L.J. 309, 337-41 (2007);
100. Scharpf, supra note 20.
101. Scott & Sturm, supra note 41, at 570.
102. Id. at 571-75.
103. Case T-135/96, Union Européean (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union, 1998 E.C.R. 11-2335.
104. Id. ¶ 4-12.
105. Id. ¶ 50.
106. Case T-135/96, Union Européean (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union, 1998 E.C.R. 11-2335, ¶ 90.
107. Id. ¶ 85.
108. Id. ¶ 84.
109. See Report on the Representativeness of European Social Partner Organization, IST/Universite Catholique de Louvain (2001) at 41, http://www. uclouvain.be/en-11476.html.
110. Scott & Sturm, supra note 41, at 578.
111. 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43.
112. Id. at Art. 4(3).
113. Case T-194/94, Carvel v. Council of the European Union, 1995 E.C.R. 11-2765, ¶ 65. For an almost identical piece of reasoning in relation to Council documents,
114. see Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistforbundet v. Council of the European Union, 1998 ECR II-2289, ¶ 13.
115. Article 230 EC (Lisbon Art. 263 TFEU).
116. Notably, this judicial battle has not only driven the process of political integration but been recognized by the Member States through the rights to a judicial remedy enshrined in both the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.
117. Case C-25/62, Plaumann v. Comm'n of the European Econ. Cmty., 1963 E.C.R. 95, ¶ 107.
118. It is notable how doggedly the Court has stuck to this formula, despite resistance, including from some of its own Advocates-General. In a famous failed attempt to change the Court's mind, Advocate-General Jacobs argued in the UPA case for a more liberal test (based on whether or not the contested measure could have a "substantial adverse effect" on individual interests). The Court argued instead that it was bound by the terms of the treaty; as such, "it is for the Member States, if necessary, in accordance with Article 48 EU, to reform the system currently in force." Case C-500/00 P, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, 2002 E.C.R. 6677, ¶ 45. Similarly, in its Jégo Quèrè decision, while the Court of First Instance cited both the provisions of the Charter and the ECHR in support of its proposition that a relaxation of standing rules was necessary to provide individuals with a direct legal remedy, the ECJ itself rejected this reasoning on appeal, claiming that it would render the notion of "direct and individual concern" meaningless.
119. Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quèrè et Cie SA v. Comm 'n of the European Communities, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2365, ¶ 38. They again in the ruling placed the onus for reform not on their own backs, but on that of the Member States-thereby conveniently ignoring that the strictures of Article 263 were not brought by the treaty itself, but by the Court's own interpretation of its provisions.
120. Case C-321/95 P, Stichtung Greenpeace Council v. Comm'n of the European Union, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1651. Indeed in the Greenpeace case, the Court held that a group would carry "individual concern" only if this test could be met by all of the group's members (the exception being where the group had already been consulted under the process leading to the decision's adoption).
121. Id. ¶ 60.
122. For two general discussions, see DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS 429-36 (4th ed. 2006);
123. Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment Since Cordorniu, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 7 (2001).
124. Case T-135/96, Union Europeéan (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union, 1998 E.C.R. 11-2335, ¶¶ 72-80.
125. Id. ¶ 89.
126. On the former criticism, see Nick Bernard, Legitimising EU Law: Is the Social Dialogue the Way Forward? Some Reflections Around the UEAPME Case, in SOCIAL LAW & POLICY IN AN EVOLVING EUROPEAN UNION 279 (Joe Shaw ed., 2000).
127. Commission of the European Communities, Communication Concerning the Application of the Agreement on Social Policy, COM (1993) 600 final (Dec. 14, 1993).
128. Id. ¶ 24.
129. Case T-135/96, Union Europeéan (UEAPME) v. Council of the European Union, 1998 E.C.R. II-2335, ¶ 102.
130. CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 190 (2002);
131. Joanne Scott & David Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 18 (2002).
132. See, e.g., COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT: EVALUATION OF THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION AND SOCIAL INCLUSION 21-27 (2006), available at http://www.lex.unict.it/ eurolabor/en/documentation/com/2006/sec(2006)-345en.pdf.
133. European Parliament Resolution, On Analysis of the Open Coordination Procedure in the Field of Employment and Social Affairs and Future Prospects, 2002/2233 (INI), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=OJ:C:2004:068E:0601:0604:EN:PDF.
134. Id. at 7.
135. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION, DRAFT REPORT ON INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF SOFT LAW INSTRUMENTS, A6-0259/2007 (Final), Eur. Pari. Doc. (June 28, 2007).
136. Id. ¶ X.
137. Id. ¶ Y.
138. Id. ¶ 17.
139. See Committee on Legal Affairs, European Parliament Resolution on Institutional and Legal Implications of the Use of "Soft Law" Instruments, at 3, Sept. 2007, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/DownloadSP.do? id=13809&num-rep=6798 &language=en (Commission's response).
140. See id. at 2.
141. For a classic account of this battle, see Kieran S.C Bradley, The European Parliament and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?, 3 EUR. L.J. 230 (1997).
142. Renaud Dehousse, Comitology: Who Watches the Watchmen?, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 798, 804 (2003).
143. On the presence of deliberative or problem-solving, rather than strategic mentalities in such committees, see Christian Joerges & Jürgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273 (1997).
144. It is notable that, since the inception of the contemporary co-decision procedure at Nice, have precisely occurred as a consequence of disagreements over the choice of implementing committee (and thus level of parliamentary oversight). See Gregor Schusterschitz & Sabine Kotz, The Comitology Reform of 2006: Increasing the Powers of the European Parliament Without Changing the Treaties, 3 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 68, 70-74 (2008).
145. In practice, the Parliament forced the Council's hand through escalating financial, legal, and political penalties. For a summary, see Bradley, supra note 97, at 231-50.
146. Council Decision 468/EC, Laying Down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission, 199 O.J. (L 184) 23.
147. Id. at Preamble, ¶ 10.
148. Council Decision 512/EC Amending Decision 1999/468/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 200) 11. (2006/512/EC).
149. Id. at Art. 5a.
150. Id. at Art. 5a, § 4(e).
151. Id. at Art. 5a, §§ 5-6.
152. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 6.
153. See Zeitlin, supra note 54, at 488.
154. See Joerges & Neyer, supra note 99.
155. A commensurable argument is given by Myrto Tsakatika: [I]nsofar as the governing agent taken as a whole is accountable to the representatives of the demos for all policy areas and the linkages between them, all matters with a public dimension, including omissions and even planning for the future, not only work completed. The consequence of such comprehensiveness is that it requires trade-offs between values to be negotiated publicly allowing citizens to make up their minds about which among these trade-offs are acceptable. They can and do hold the government to account for the acceptability of the trade-offs rather than for the minutiae of policies.
156. Myrto Tsakatika, A Parliamentary Dimension for EU Soft Governance, 29 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 549, 557 (2007).
157. See, e.g., Dawson supra note 35, at 63-69;
158. Offe, supra note 48.
159. This may be of particular significance given frequent accusation that OMC procedures serve to exclude local participants. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 5; Eilidh MacPhail, Sub-National Authorities and the Open Method of Coordination: A New Opportunity or the Same Old Community?, 2 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 58 (2006).
160. In support of this suggestion in particular, see Buchs, supra note 4, at 781-82;
161. Hatzopoulos, supra note 60, at 340-41.
162. Francesco Duina & Tapio Raunio, The Open Method of Coordination and National Parliaments: Further Marginalization or New Opportunities?, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 489 (2007).
163. European Comm'n, A Renewed Commitment to Social Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, at 5, COM (2008) 418 final (July 2, 2008).
164. See Duina & Raunio, supra note 115, at 496.
165. On the activities and remit of the group, see European Parliament, Common Policies: The Lisbon Strategy, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/ expert/displayFtu.do?id=74&ftuId=FTU 4.1.html&language=en (last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
166. See Working Group XI, supra note 29, at ¶¶ 42-43.
167. See, e.g., the Convention's Working Group on Economic Governance states: There is a large measure of support within the Group for including, for the sake of clarity, the basic objectives, procedures and limits of the open coordination method, where the European Parliament and the European Commission should also have a role to play, in the Constitutional Treaty, but in a manner which does not undermine the flexibility of the method (which is one of its main advantages) and which does not have the effect of replacing or circumventing "Community" procedures or policies. It is recommended that it should include a provision allowing for a wide-ranging consultation process, in particular with the social partners. However some members of the Group consider that the informal character of the open coordination method should be better preserved by keeping it outside the Treaty. Working Group VI, supra note 29, §IV(3).
168. On this initial observation, see Mauro Cappaletti et al., Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience - A General Introduction, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 3, 29-35 (Joseph Weiler et al. eds., 1986).
169. On more current critiques along these lines, see Richard Bellamy, The Democratic Constitution: Why Europe Should Avoid American Style Judicia Review, 7 EUR. POL. SCI. 9 (2007);
170. Richard Bellamy, Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation and Democracy in the EU, 12 EUR. L.J. 725 (2006);
171. Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravscik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 533 (2006).
172. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 195(1), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33.
173. EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 34 (2007).
174. Id. at 19.
175. See European Ombudsman, Draft Recommendation to the Commission in Complaint 3208/2006 GG, http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/draft recommendation.faces/en/540/html.bookmark.
176. P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, European Ombusdman, Sixth Seminar of the National Ombudsmen of EU Member States and Candidate Countries: Legality and Good Administration: Is There a Difference? (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.ombudsman. europa.eu/speeches/en/2007-10-15.htm (citation omitted).
177. Id. at §3.
178. Id. at §4.
179. See Paul Magnette, Between Parliamentary Control and the Rule of Law: The Political Role of the Ombudsman in the European Union, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 677 (2003).
180. It is notable that this remains the most significant heading for inadmissibility-some 74 percent of inadmissible cases were dismissed for this reason in 2007. EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, supra note 123, at 34.
181. Statewatch "Wins" Complaint Against the European Commission Over Its Failure to Maintain a Proper Public Register of Documents, STATEWATCH NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/jan/07sw-ombs- comregister-complaint.htm. 132.
182. European Commission, Comitology Register, http://ec.europa.eu/ transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm(last visited Mar. 11, 2010).
183. European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing his Inquiry into Complaint 3208/2006/GG Against the European Commission, ¶¶ 15-16 (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/ decision.faces/en/3728/ html.bookmark.
184. Id. ¶ 20.
185. See Press Release, European Ombudsman, Ombudsman Criticises Commission for Inadequate Register of Documents (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.statewatch.org/ news/2009/jan/eu-sw-ombudsman-complaint-comregister.pdf (reaffirming its initial criticism).
186. Resolution of the European Parliament on Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents (Implementation of Regulation 1049/2001), 2007/2154(INI), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type= TA&reference=P6-TA-2009-0022&language=EN.
187. For the Commission's present proposal, see Comm'n of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents, at 2, 10, COM (2008) 229 final (Apr. 30, 2008).