The military operation of the EU in Chad and the central African Republic: Good policy, bad politics

International Peacekeeping

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 395-407

  Dijkstra, Hylke ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 78650743296     PISSN: 13533312     EISSN: 1743906X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2010.500150     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. UN Security Council Resolution 1778, article 6(a).
2. EUFOR, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Paris: Mont Valérien, 2009.
3. In 2003 the EU had carried out the much smaller and shorter Operation Artemis, to prepare the ground for the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As a result, bridging operations were mentioned as one of the models for EU-UN cooperation in European Council, Presidency Report on EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration, Brussels, 2004.
4. Thierry Tardy, 'EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising Relationship in a Constrained Environment', in Martin Ortega (ed.), The EU and the UN: Partners in Effective Multilateralism, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2005, pp.49-68.
5. European Council, A Secure European in a Better World [European Security Strategy], Brussels, 2003. For a more sceptical view
6. Bruno Charbonneau, 'What Is So Special about the EU? EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa', International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.4, pp.546-561.
7. Bjoern Seibert, 'African Adventure? Assessing the EU's Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic', Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program Working Paper, Nov. 2007.
8. Critics argue that EUFOR was not impartial because it gave the Chadian government the possibility to regroup. Charbonneau (see n.4 above);
9. Patrick Berg, 'EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French Interests', in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds), The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009, pp.57-69.
10. But President Déby's repeated annoyance with EUFOR for allowing anti-government rebels free passage and conversations between the French force commander and the French government on the conduct of the operation suggest that EUFOR was impartial (interviews with national, Council Secretariat and Commission officials in Brussels, autumn 2009, early 2010).
11. European Council (see n.3 above), para.10.
12. Martin Palouš, 'EU Presidency Statement on the Situation in Chad, the Central African Republic and the Subregion', UN Security Council, 24 April 2009; interviews with officials in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
13. The Lisbon Treaty may make day-to-day relations between the EU and the UN easier through a more prominent EU presence in New York, but it is unlikely to resolve the problems of a political nature.
14. Alexander Mattelaer, 'The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA', Working Paper No.5, Institute for European Studies, 2008;
15. Seibert (see n.5 above); Berg (see n.6 above);
16. Damien Helly, 'EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA)', in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds), European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009), Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, pp.339-352.
17. Oxfam, 'Mission Incomplete: Why Civilians Remain at Risk in Eastern Chad', Briefing Paper No.119, Oxfam, 2008.
18. International Crisis Group, 'Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework', Africa Report, No.144, 2008;
19. International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 'Chad: IDPs in the East Facing Continuing Violence and Hardship', 21 Dec. 2009.
20. UN Security Council, 'Minutes of 5478th Meeting of the UN Security Council', 29 June 2006.
21. UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2007/488, 10 Aug. 2007.
22. For French foreign policy in Chad
23. Bruno Charbonneau, 'France', in David Black and Paul Williams (eds), The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, London: Routledge, 2010, pp.213-231.
24. 'Darfur is Kouchner's First "Guest" at Quai d'Orsay', Liberation, (Paris) 21 May 2007.
25. Interviews with Council Secretariat officials in Brussels, Dec. 2009, Jan 2010.
26. Interview in Brussels, 2010. The General Secretariat of the Council is the main body responsible in the EU for early military planning.
27. Hylke Dijkstra, 'The Council Secretariat's Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy', European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol.13, No.2, 2008, pp.149-166.
28. Hylke Dijkstra, 'Explaining Variation in the Role of the EU Council Secretariat in First and Second Pillar Policy-Making', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.17, No.4, 2010, pp.527-544.
29. UN (see n.13 above), paras.23, 25.
30. Interview with national officials in Brussels, Nov. 2009, Feb 2010; the adoption of the Operational Plan is the last stage of the planning process, after which the operation is directly launched.
31. Mattelaer (see n.10 above); interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Dec. 2009.
32. René Rouquet and Ruhi Acikgöz, 'The European Union Mission in Chad: EUFOR Tchad/RCA', Explanatory Memorandum of the Assembly of the WEU, 6 May 2008, para.72.
33. Mattelaer (see n.10 above); interview with national official in Brussels, Feb. 2010.
34. Interview with national official in Brussels, Feb. 2010.
35. Interviews with Council Secretariat, European Commission and UN officials in Brussels and telecons, Jan. 2010.
36. Interview with Council Secretariat official, Dec. 2009.
37. Interview with Council Secretariat official, Jan. 2010.
38. Option One was to train Chadian troops to provide security, which conflicted with the EU's impartiality requirement. Option Two was to deploy gradually, which was impossible because of the rainy season. Option Three was to deploy at once. Option Four was to focus mainly on the CAR, which was not what the member states wanted. Option Three was thus adopted. Mattelaer (see n.10 above).
39. France had hoped to move some individual costs to common costs in order to reduce its financial burden.
40. Helly (see n.10 above).
41. Interview in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
42. UN Security Council Resolution 1778, article 10.
43. Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Dec. 2009.
44. Mattelaer (see n.10 above), p. 17.
45. Interview with national official in Brussels, Oct. 2009.
46. Telephone interview with Operation Headquarters official, Dec. 2009.
47. Interview with national official in Brussels, Nov. 2009.
48. Interview with Operation Headquarters official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
49. Telephone interview with Operation Headquarters official, Dec. 2009.
50. Oxfam (see n.10 above).
51. Helly (see n.10 above).
52. Berg (see n.6 above).
53. UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2008/760, 4 Dec. 2008.
54. UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2009/199, 14 April 2009.
55. In an article in Le Figaro, 16 June 2008, cited by Oxfam (see n.10 above), pp.24-25.
56. Telephone interview with Operation Headquarters official, Dec. 2009.
57. Berg (see n.6 above).
58. EUFOR declared the elements deployed as fully operational, but they never actually reached full operating capability because the force generation process was never completed as a result of a lack of enablers.
59. UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic', UN doc., S/2008/601, 12 Sept. 2008.
60. Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
61. Javier Solana, 'Intervention de Javier SOLANA sur EUFOR Tchad/RCA', UN Security Council, 24 Sept. 2008 (author's trans.).
62. Articles 8, 10.
63. UN, 'Report of the Secretary-General' (see n.43 above).
64. UN Security Council, 'Minutes of 6042nd Meeting of the UN Security Council', 12 Dec. 2008.
65. Interview in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
66. Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Dec. 2009.
67. Interview in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
68. The possibility of rehatting was explicitly mentioned in earlier documents on EU-UN cooperation (see n.3 above).
69. Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
70. Interview with national official in Brussels, Oct. 2009
71. Interview with Council Secretariat official in Brussels, Jan. 2010.
72. Luis Simón, 'Command and Control? Planning for EU military Operations', Occasional Paper No.81, EU Institute for Security Studies, Jan. 2010, p.36.
73. Mattelaer (see n.10 above), pp.15-16, quotes an official from a neutral EU state as saying 'by and large, we believe the French are honest about this and trying to do the right thing'.