Does money matter in the ECB strategy? New evidence based on ECB communication

International Journal of Finance and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 16-31

  Berger, Helge ^a,b   De Haan, Jakob ^b,c,e   Sturm, Jan Egbert ^b,d  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^d KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^e The Netherlands Bank   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Central bank communication; ECB; Monetary policy; Role of money

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; ESTIMATION METHOD; INTEREST RATE; MONETARY POLICY; POLICY ANALYSIS;

EID: 78650232770     PISSN: 10769307     EISSN: 10991158     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.412     Document Type: Article

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