Moving beyond the subset model of realization: The problem of qualitative distinctness in the metaphysics of science

Synthese

Volumn 177, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 165-192

  Gillett, Carl ^a  

^a Northern Illinois University   (United States)

Author keywords

Composition; Kim; Physicalism; Realization; Shoemaker

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650044039     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9840-1     Document Type: Article

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