Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?

Synthese

Volumn 177, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 247-260

  Bickle, John ^a  

^a MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Metascience; Molecular neuroscience; Multiple realization argument; Psychoneural reductionism

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650041378     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9843-y     Document Type: Article

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