Mechanisms and explanatory realization relations

Synthese

Volumn 177, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 193-212

  Polger, Thomas W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

Dependence; Explanation; Gillet; Mechanism; Realization

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650040995     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-010-9841-0     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Aizawa K., Gillett C. (2009) The (multiple) realization of psychological and other properties in the sciences. Mind & Language 24: 181-208.
2. Baker L. (2000) Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
3. Bechtel W., Richardson R. (1993) Discovering complexity: Decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
4. Block N. (1978) Troubles with functionalism. In: Savage C. W. (eds) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, pp 261-325.
5. Chang K. (2006) Explaining ice: The answers are slippery. The New York Times 21: D1.
6. Craver C. (2001) Role functions, mechanisms and hierarchy. Philosophy of Science 68: 31-55.
7. Craver C. (2002) Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory. Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 69(3): S83-S97.
8. Craver C. (2007) Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
9. Craver C., Darden L. (2001) Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory. In: Machamer P. K., Grush R., McLaughlin P. (eds) Theory and method in the neurosciences. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp 112-137.
10. Endicott R. (2005) Multiple realizability. In: Borchert D. (eds) The encyclopedia of philosophy, 2nd ed. Macmillan, New York, pp 427-432.
11. Gillett C. (2002) The dimensions of realization: A critique of the standard view. Analysis 64(4): 316-323.
12. Gillett C. (2003) The metaphysics of realization, multiple realizability, and the special sciences. The Journal of Philosophy 100(11): 591-603.
13. Gillett C. (2007) Understanding the new reductionism: The metaphysics of science and compositional reduction. The Journal of Philosophy CIV(4): 193-216.
14. Glennan S. (1996) Mechanisms and the nature of causation. Erkenntnis 44: 49-71.
15. Glennan S. (2002) Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 69: S342-S353.
16. Keaton, D. (2010). Realization and causal role-playing: An essay on the mind/body problem. Dissertation, University of Cincinnati.
17. Keaton, D. (forthcoming-a). Kim's supervenience argument and the nature of total realizers. European Journal of Philosophy.
18. Keaton, D. (forthcoming-b). Two kinds of role property. Philosophia.
19. Kim J. (1998) Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
20. Lewis D. (1994) Lewis, David: Reduction of mind. In: Guttenplan S. (eds) A companion to the philosophy of mind. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, pp 412-431.
21. Lewis D. (1999) Papers in metaphysics and epistemology. Cambridge University Press, New York.
22. Machamer P., Darden L., Craver C. (2000) Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 57: 1-25.
23. Melnyk A. (2003) A physicalist manifesto: Thoroughly modern materialism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
24. Piccinini G. (2009) Computationalism in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy Compass 4(3): 515-532.
25. Piccinini, G. (forthcoming). The mind as neural software? Understanding functionalism, computationalism, and computational functionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
26. Poland J. (1994) Physicalism. Oxford University Press, New York.
27. Polger T. (2004) Natural minds. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
28. Polger T. (2006) Some metaphysical anxieties of reductionism. In: Schouten M., Looren de Jong H. (eds) The matter of the mind: Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience and reduction. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, pp 51-75.
29. Polger T. (2007) Realization and the metaphysics of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(2): 233-259.
30. Polger T., Shapiro L. (2008) Understanding the dimensions of realization. Journal of Philosophy CV(4): 213-222.
31. Psillos, S. (forthcoming). The idea of mechanism. In P. McKay, F. Russo, & J. Williamson (Eds.), Causation in the sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32. Shapiro L. (2000) Multiple realizations. The Journal of Philosophy 97: 635-654.
33. Shapiro L. (2004) The mind incarnate. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
34. Shoemaker S. (1981) Some varieties of functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12(1): 83-118.
35. Shoemaker S. (2001) Realization and mental causation. In: Gillett C., Loewer B. (eds) Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp 74-98.
36. Shoemaker S. (2007) Physical realization. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
37. Thomasson A. (1999) Fiction and metaphysics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
38. van Inwagen P. (1990) Material beings. Cornell University Press, Ithica.
39. Wilson R., Craver C. (2007) Realization. In: Thagard P. (eds) Handbook of the philosophy of science, Vol. 12, Philosophy of psychology and cognitive science pp 81-104. The Netherlands: Elsevier.
40. Wimsatt W. et al (1974) Reductive explanation: A functional account. In: Cohen R. (eds) PSA proceedings 1974. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 671-710.
41. Wimsatt W. et al (1976) Reductionism, levels of organization and the mind-body problem. In: Globus G. (eds) Consciousness and the brain. Plenum, New York, pp 199-267.
42. Wimsatt W. (1986) Forms of aggregativity. In: Donagan A., Perovich A. N., Wedin M. V. (eds) Human nature and natural knowledge. D. Reidel, Boston, pp 259-291.
43. Wimsatt W. (1997) Aggregativity: Reductive heuristics for finding emergence. Philosophy of Science (Supplement) 2: S372-S384.