Moral psychology must not be based on faith and hope: Commentary on narvaez (2010)

Perspectives on Psychological Science

Volumn 5, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 182-184

  Haidt, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Intuitionism; Moral psychology; Rationalism

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649877438     PISSN: 17456916     EISSN: 17456924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1745691610362352     Document Type: Article

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