Consumer counter-advertising law and corporate social responsibility

Buffalo Law Review

Volumn 58, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 977-1004

  Salazar V , Alberto R ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

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EID: 78649842410     PISSN: 00239356     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
2. R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 2002 SCC 14 (Can.).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 476.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 477-78.
8. Id. at 478.
9. Id. at 489.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 488.
12. Id. at 484.
13. Id. at 485.
14. Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
17. See Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 233 (1993) (referring to the problem of lack of resources).
18. See, e.g., Kim D. Raine, Determinants of Healthy Eating in Canada: An Overview and Synthesis, 96 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 3) S8, S10-11 (2005) ("Increasingly, the food industry targets marketing messages at young children, perhaps in recognition of their vulnerability to such messages associated with underdeveloped critical consumer conscience.");
19. Andrea Freeman, Comment, Fast Food: Oppression Through Poor Nutrition, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2221, 2237-38 (2007) ("Fast food companies have devoted considerable resources to developing marketing strategies aimed specifically at African Americans and Latinos, and it appears that the investment reaps a significant reward.").
20. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 919, 945-46 (2000) (claiming that the most effective means in the United States for countering the chill of libel suits against ordinary citizens who use the Internet as a medium of expression is the opinion privilege, namely, the privilege for statements that do not imply assertions of objective facts).
21. See R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Beverages (W.) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, 172-73, 2002 SCC 8 (Can.);
22. U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. Kmart Can. Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083, 1103 (Can.) ("The distribution of leaflets and posters is typically less expensive and more readily available than other forms of expression. As a result, they are particularly important means of providing information and seeking support by the vulnerable and less powerful members of society.");
23. Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 764 (Can.) ("In holding, in RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.....that secondary picketing was a form of expression within the meaning of s[ection] 2(b) the Court recognized that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression extended to expression that could not be characterized as political expression in the traditional sense but, if anything, was in the nature of expression having an economic purpose.");
24. Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1998] 39 O.R.3d 620, 648 (Ont.) ("[T]here is no reason, in logic or in policy, for restraining a consumer boycott.").
25. R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 603 (Can.).
26. See, e.g., WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, 421, 2008 SCC 40 (Can.);
27. Pepsi-Cola Can., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 167;
28. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 603.
29. Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1171 (Can.).
30. Pepsi-Cola Can., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 167.
31. See, e.g., B.C.G.E.U. v. B.C. (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 247-48 (Can.);
32. Daishowa, 39 O.R.3d at 647;
33. see also Chris Tollefson, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Developing a Canadian Response, 73 CAN. BAR REV. 200, 228-29 (1994) (arguing that the Charter may apply to SLAPPs given their public nature).
34. Daishowa, O.R.3d at 621.
35. Id. at 625.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 626-27.
38. Id. at 627.
39. Id. at 632-33.
40. Id. at 649.
41. Id. at 647-48 ("[T]here is no reason, in logic or in policy, for restraining a consumer boycott.");
42. see also R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 574 (Can.).
43. Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1998] 39 O.R.3d 620, 647 (Ont.)
44. Id. at 649.
45. R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Beverages (W.) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, 170-72, 2002 SCC 8 (Can.).
46. Id. at 173.
47. R. v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 484, 2002 SCC 14 (Can.);
48. cf. Home Equity Dev. Inc. v. Crow, 01/4472, [2002] B.C.J No. 1805 QUICKLAW, at paras. 13-14 (B.C.S.C July 30, 2002) folding that the burden is on the applicant in a PPPA action to show that the plaintiffs suit was improper if the plaintiff established a prima facie defamation claim).
49. The European Court of Human Rights has recently reiterated this defamation limit on consumers' expressions. See Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom, 2005-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 36.
50. Daishowa, 39 O.R.3d at 659, 663.
51. U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. Kmart Can. Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083, 1113 (Can.).
52. Id.
53. Daishowa Inc. v. Friends of the Lubicon, [1998] 39 O.R.3d 620, 650 (Ont.) (discussing the tort of interference with economic interest).
54. Cusson v. Quan, [2007] 86 O.R.3d 241, 251 (Ont.).
55. Id. at 251-52.
56. Id. at 252.
57. Id. at 252-53.
58. However, the court also notes that "the common law does recognize that in certain situations, protection of reputation must yield to open and free discussion. These occasions attract the protection of either absolute or qualified privilege. Words spoken in Parliament and in the courts attract absolute privilege." Id.
59. WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, 437-38, 2008 SCC 40 (Can.).
60. Id. at 421.
61. Id. at 443.
62. Id. at 455.
63. Id. at 453.
64. Id. at 466 (LeBel, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 474.
66. Matthew Shogilev, Thawed but Still Chilled: Freedom of Expression in the Aftermath of Simpson v. Mair, THE COURT, July 16, 2008, http://www.thecourt.ca/ 2008/07/16/thawed-but-still-chilled-freedom-of-expression-in-the-aftermath-of- simpson-v-mair/.
67. While some Canadian courts have emphasized the use of SLAPP suits against governmental participation, SLAPP suits should also encompass suits that limit consumers' right to commercial speech. See Fraser v. Saanich [1999] 32 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 143, 151-52 (B.C.) ("A SLAPP suit is a claim for monetary damages against individuals who have dealt with a governmental body on an issue of public interest or concern. It is a meritless action filed by a plaintiff whose primary goal is not to win the case but rather to silence or intimidate citizens who have participated in proceedings regarding public policy or public decision making.").
68. U.S. courts have clearly adopted a definition that encompasses SLAPP suits that can "effectively limit citizens' First Amendment rights to free speech." See Kentner v. Timothy R. Downey Ins., Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 844, 845-46 (S.D. Ind. 2006);
69. Dickens v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877, 882 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2004).
70. SUSAN LOTT, PUB. INTEREST ADVOCACY CTR., CORPORATE RETALIATION AGAINST CONSUMERS: THE STATUS OF STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPPS) IN CANADA 13-36 (2004), http://www.piac.ca/consumers/corporate- retaliation-against-consumers.
71. 2001 S.B.C., eh. 32 (B.C.) (repealed 2001).
72. Id.
73. See e.g. Home Equity Dev. Inc. v. Crow, 01/4472, [2002] B.C.J. No. 1805 QUICKLAW, at paras. 64, 69 (B.C.S.C July 30, 2002).
74. Id. at paras. 70-71.
75. See Home Equity Dev. Inc. v. Crow, 01/4472, [2004] B.C.J. No. 177 QUICKLAW, at para. 182 (B.C.S.C. Feb. 3, 2004).
76. During the past three decades, the legal community has documented hundreds of cases in which corporations misused the courts by filing Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs. See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 400 n.18, 403 (1993);
77. Sharlene A. McEvoy, "The Big Chill": Business Use of the Tort of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 503, 503-04 (1990);
78. D. Mark Jackson, Note, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPS: Revisiting New York Times v. Sullivan, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 491 (2001) (arguing that defamation suits brought by corporations should be subject to liability as SLAPP actions).
79. LOTT, supra note 56, at 27-30.
80. See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (discussing the Repap New Brunswick lawsuit).
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at 28.
83. Id.
84. This type of legislation has been widely adopted in the last decade. See, e.g., Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action: Bringing and Defending Anti- SLAPP Motions to Strike or Dismiss, 22 CAUSES ACTION 2d 317 (2003) (highlighting U.S. states that have promulgated anti-SLAPP statutes);
85. see also California Anti-SLAPP Project, Other States: Statutes and Cases, http://www.casp.net/menstate.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
86. Grant v. TorStar, 2009 S.C.C. 61, 32932, [2009] S.C.J. No. 61 QUICKLAW (Dec. 22, 2009).
87. Id. at paras. 95, 98, 101, 105-06, 128.
88. Id. at para. 126.
89. Id. at para. 96 (citation omitted).
90. R v. Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 484, 2002 SCC 14 (Can.).
91. Grant, at para. 98 (QUICKLAW).
92. Jennifer Meredith Liebman, Defamed by a Blogger: Legal Protections, Self-Regulation and Other Failures, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 343, 365 (noting that, in some cases, victims of online defamation have greater resources to pursue legal action than defendant bloggers).
93. Similar concerns have been raised with respect to freedom of expression in the United States. See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2617 (2008) ("[O]ne might plausibly argue that the current state of affairs is imbalanced in favor of corporate speech even without expansive First Amendment protection for commercial speech simply on the basis of the disparity of resources available.").
94. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized this general problem with the common law of defamation before Grant. See WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, 437, 2008 SCC 40 (Can.) ("There is concern that matters of public interest go unreported because publishers fear the ballooning cost and disruption of defending a defamation action.").
95. Grant, at para. 97 (QUICKLAW).
96. Id. at paras. 122-23, 128.
97. Since 1982, when the Charter came into effect, the Supreme Court of Canada has detailed the extent of this constitutional protection in several important cases. See R. v Guignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, 482-85 (Can.);
98. RJRMacDonald Inc. v. Can. (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 326 (Can.);
99. Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 241 (Can.);
100. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 967 (Can.);
101. Ford v. Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 764-67 (Can.). The constitutional protection of commercial expression in Canada, however, is controversial and has been questioned from different perspectives.
102. See, e.g., ROGER A. SHINER. FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION (2004).
103. Eugénie Brouillet, Free Speech, Reputation, and the Canadian Balance, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 33, 54 (2005).
104. RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Can. (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.);
105. Boehringer Ingelheim (Can.) Ltd. v. Pharmacia Can. Inc., 00-CV-201798, [2001] O.J. 1911 QUICKLAW, at para. 81 (O.S.C.J. May 22, 2001);
106. Purolator Courier Ltd. v. United Parcel Ser. Can. Ltd., 94-CU-81492, [1995] O.J. 876 QUICKLAW, at para. 62 (Ont. Gen. Div. Apr. 3, 1995).
107. See generally Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 330 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving Suzuki's litigation against Consumer Reports for publishing a report regarding Suzuki's roll-over statistics);
108. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert, dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (involving litigation against Nike in light of media reports critical of Nike's labor practices).
109. Grant, at para. 106 (QUICKLAW).
110. R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Can. Beverages (W.) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, 172, 2002 SCC 8 (Can.).
111. See Brenden E. Kendall et al., Consumer Activism and Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 241, 248 (Steve May et al. eds., 2007).
112. See, e.g., Raine, supra note 18, at S11.
113. Lawrence O. Gostin, Law as a Tool to Facilitate Healthier Lifestyles and Prevent Obesity, 297 JAMA 87, 89 (2007) (arguing that counter-advertising can promote good nutrition and physical activity);
114. Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161-62 (2003);
115. see also Consumer Justice Ctr. v. Trimedica Int'l., Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 191, 193, 195-97 (Ct. App. 2003).
116. Trenton G. Smith, The McDonald's Equilibrium: Advertising, Empty Calories, and the Endogenous Determination of Dietary Preferences, 23 SOC. CHOICE WELFARE 383,407-08 (2004).
117. STANDING COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, 39TH PARLIAMENT, 1ST SESS., HEALTHY WEIGHTS FOR HEALTHY KIDS, at 1-3 (Can. House of Commons 2007), http://www.ccfn.ca/pdfs/ HealthyWeightsForHealthyKids.pdf.
118. Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom 2005-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
119. Id. at 9, 13.
120. Id. at 13-14.
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 38-39.
124. Id. at 39.
125. Id. at 32.
126. Douglas W. Vick & Kevin Campbell, Public Protests, Private Lawsuits, and the Market: The Investor Response to the McLibel Case, 28 J. L. & Soc'Y 204, 234 n.100 (2001).