On the effectiveness of multi-variant program execution for vulnerability detection and prevention

6th International Workshop on Security Measurements and Metrics, MetriSec 2010

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Jackson, Todd ^a   Salamat, Babak ^a   Wagner, Gregor ^a   Wimmer, Christian ^a   Franz, Michael ^a  

^a Irvine   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENTRY POINT; INSTRUCTION-SET RANDOMIZATION; N VERSION PROGRAMMING; PROGRAM EXECUTION; RUNTIME OVERHEADS; SYSTEM CALLS; VULNERABILITY DETECTION;

EID: 78649429703     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1853919.1853929     Document Type: Conference Paper

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