Save the poor, shoot some bankers

Public Choice

Volumn 145, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 331-337

  Zetland, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Aid; Asymmetric information; Intrinsic motivation; Principal agent; Public choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649325139     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9708-4     Document Type: Editorial

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