Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries

Journal of Infrastructure Systems

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 334-342

  Marques, Rui Cunha ^a   Berg, Sanford ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LISBON   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bidding documents; Contract design; Infrastructures; Monitoring; Regulation by contract; Risk

Indexed keywords

BIDDING DOCUMENTS; CONTRACT DESIGN; INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRY; INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES; INFRASTRUCTURES; POLICY MAKERS; PRIVATE PARTNERS; PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS; PUBLIC TENDER; REGULATION BY CONTRACT;

DESIGN; DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

INFRASTRUCTURE; MONITORING; POLICY MAKING; PROJECT DESIGN; PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP;

EID: 78449254878     PISSN: 10760342     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000029     Document Type: Article

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