Reasons for teamwork

Legal Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 495-509

  Gardner, John ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 78249239423     PISSN: 13523252     EISSN: 14698048     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1352325202084045h     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. On reasons to try and reasons to succeed, see my Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY (Peter Cane and John Gardner, eds., 2001). On acting for an undefeated reason, see my Justifications and Reasons in HARM AND CULPABILITY (Andrew Simester and A.T.H. Smith, eds., 1996).
2. Christopher Kutz, The Collective Work of Citizenship, in this issue of LEGAL THEORY.
3. Ian McEwan, ENDURING LOVE (London, 1997).
4. McEwan, ENDURING LOVE note 3, at 10. McEwan's text says “communality,” but since “commonality of purpose” is a stock expression, I have treated this as a typo.
5. Thomas Nagel, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 53ff (New York, 1991).
6. In other words there is here a pocket of deontology in the first sense identified by John Rawls in A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Cambridge, MA, 1971), at 30: The good is not specified independently of the right.
7. Kutz, The good is not specified independently of the right. note 2, at 3.
8. John Rawls, The good is not specified independently of the right. note 8, at 526-529.
9. David Gauthier, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 330 (Oxford, 1986).
10. Indeed, Rawls and Gauthier assert it: Rawls, MORALS BY AGREEMENT note 8, at 528; Gauthier, MORALS BY AGREEMENT note 13, at 338.
11. Kutz, Indeed, Rawls and Gauthier assert it: Rawls note 2, at 7.
12. Kutz, Indeed, Rawls and Gauthier assert it: Rawls note 2, at 23.