South Africa in Africa: The Dilemmas of Multilateralism

Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 118-140

  Hamill, James ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

African State; Fair Trade; Foreign Policy; Multilateral Organisation; Security Council

Indexed keywords

EID: 78149379871     PISSN: 27313921     EISSN: 2731393X     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230503830_6     Document Type: Chapter

References (56)

1. See Taylor, I., Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); and Nel, P., Taylor I. and van der Westhuizen, J. (eds), South Africa’s Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The Limits of Reform (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
2. An attitude typified by the infamous remark of the former Nigerian Foreign Minister, Walter Ofonagoro, that Mandela was ‘the Black president of a White state’. See Vale, P. and Maseko, S., ‘South Africa and the African renaissance’, International Affairs, 74:2 (1998) p. 273.
3. An anonymous if ‘influential newspaper columnist’ cited in Lodge, T., Politics in South Africa: From Mandela To Mbeki (Oxford: James Currey, 2002) p. 229.
4. Gerrit Olivier, ‘Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?’, International Affairs, 79:4 (2003) p. 826.
5. Gumede, W. M., ‘Battling on behalf of Africa and the South’, Financial Mail, 26 May 2000.
6. Ibid. On the expectations of a more proactive South African role in Africa as a result of Mbeki’s statements and the post-Somalia reluctance of the US to be actively engaged, see Taylor, I. and Williams, P., ‘South African foreign policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: From African Renaissance to vagabondage politique’, African Affairs, 100:399 (2001) p. 266.
7. Olivier, ‘Is Thabo Mbeki’, p. 827. On the intractability of African conflict and the obstacles standing in the way of any grand transformative agendas for the continent see J. E. Spence ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Vision and Reality’ in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (ed.), Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South African Foreign Policy 1994–2004 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004).
8. Gaye, A., ‘What African Renaissance?’ Newsweek, 15 June 1998.
9. Evans, G., ‘The End of the Rainbow’, The World Today, 55:1 (1999) p. 12.
10. Asmal, K., ‘South Africa in Africa: A South African Perspective’ in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart? (London: Zed Books, 1995) p. 31.
11. Cited in ‘South African Business Moves North’, International Herald Tribune (New York, 19 February 2002).
12. ‘The African Renaissance and the World’, Speech by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the United Nations University, 9 April 1998.
13. This theme is given more extensive treatment in Hamill, J., ‘A Disguised Surrender? South Africa’s Negotiated Settlement and the Politics of Conflict Resolution’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 14:3 (2003) esp. pp. 19–26.
14. For the most extensive treatment of this new malignant phenomenon see Taylor and Williams, ‘South African foreign policy’.
15. On the Brahimi Commission see ‘UN tries to curb peace disasters’, Guardian (London, 9 September 2000).
16. On Rwanda, see ‘Rwanda: presidential elections’, Keesing’s Record of World Events, 49:7/8 (July–August 2003) pp. 45544. On the many imperfections of the Cameroon poll, see ‘Cameroon votes for leader’, BBC News, 11 October 2004.
17. For a wider discussion of the concept, see Zakaria, F., ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 76:6 (1997) pp. 22–43.
18. Deegan, H., ‘Voting More Often’, The World Today, 60 (April 2004) p. 23. Of course an obvious problem in this respect is that whilst the 1999 and 2004 elections in South Africa have been impeccably conducted, they too have effectively served to anoint ‘existing political elites and dominant parties’. This may make Pretoria less than critical of similar trends elsewhere, particularly where such elites have their roots in liberation politics and where democratic standards have been much less rigorous, Zimbabwe being an obvious case in point.
19. Olivier, ‘Is Thabo Mbeki’, p. 816.
20. See ‘Mbeki says UN needs revamping’, Business Day, 21 September 1999.
21. Evans, ‘The End of the Rainbow’, p. 71.
22. Ahead of the 2004 G-8 Summit, Mbeki called upon the US to assist the continent as a whole, rather than specifically targeted states. See ‘Help the Whole of Africa, Says Mbeki’, Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg) 10 June 2004. Mbeki views fair trade, increased investment and developmental assistance as the quid pro quo for the reforms in economic policy and good government required by the NEPAD.
23. See ‘Mbeki urges rich nations to help Africa’, Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg, 24 May 2000) and ‘Batting on behalf of Africa and the South’, Financial Mail (Johannesburg, 26 May 2000). On South Africa’s wider role in attempting to stimulate investment in Africa, see ‘OECD launches African investment initiative’ Sunday Times (Johannesburg, 19 November 2003).
24. Cited in ‘End Seas of Poverty, Says Mbeki’, Independent (London, 27 August 2002).
25. See Attwood, J. B., and Lyman, P., ‘G-8 Partnership with Africa: Relevant To All’, The World Today, 60:6 (2004) pp.26–7.
26. This debate will ultimately turn upon US interpretations of the ‘war on terrorism’ and whether it is defined in narrowly militaristic terms or is sufficiently nuanced to accommodate a broader developmental agenda. The latter offers Africa some hope of engaging US interest whereas the former offers little beyond security cooperation with a few strategically positioned states, those with substantial oil reserves or large Muslim populations. For further discussion, see Lyman, P. N. and Morrison, S. J., ‘The Terrorist Threat in Africa’, Foreign Affairs, 83:1 (2004) pp. 75–86.
27. ‘Help the Whole of Africa, Says Mbeki’, Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg, 10 June 2004).
28. See Taylor, Stuck in Middle GEAR.
29. On the development of South African thinking on its involvement in peace operations in Africa, see Malan, M., ‘Keeping the Peace in Africa: A Renaissance Role for South Africa?’ Indicator South Africa (Winter 1998). Malan argues in favour of a strong peace role to raise South Africa’s diplomatic profile and to help stabilise the continent.
30. On the hostile South African reception for the US ACRI see ‘SA joins with Nigeria to slam Clinton’s crisis force policy’, SouthScan, 13:5 (6 March 1998) – another indication that the image of South Africa as a US proxy in Africa has a very flimsy factual basis. On the ACRI project as a whole see Omach, P., ‘The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests’, African Affairs, 99:394 (2000) pp. 73–95.
31. ‘Africa sets up intervention force’, Financial Times (London, 1 March 2004) and ‘An African Peacekeeping Force: How to Put the House in Order’, The Economist (13 March 2004).
32. ‘Peacekeeping in Africa: Into the Breach’, The Economist (19 June 2004).
33. See, for example, Soares, J. C. B., ‘United Nations and Global Security: Yes to Multilateralism’, The World Today, 60:8/9 (2004) pp. 26–7.
34. Alden, C.and le Pere, G. South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy – from Reconciliation to Revival? (Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003) p. 69.
35. Ibid., pp. 56–7. For example, South Africa has 6 per cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population but accounts for 44 per cent of its GDP and 42 per cent of total exports. See Ahwireng-Obeng, F. and McGowan, P. J., ‘Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa’ in Jim Broderick et al (eds), South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy (London: Palgrave, 2001), p. 63.
36. See Hamill, J. and Lee, D., ‘A Middle Power Paradox? South African Diplomacy in the Post-Apartheid Era’ International Relations, 15:3 (2001) p. 48.
37. See Taylor, I., ‘South Africa, the G20, the G20 and the IBSA Dialogue Forum: Implications for Future Global Governance’, UN University conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 19–21 May 2004.
38. See ‘The Rise of the New Power Bloc’, Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg, 16 July 2003).
39. See ‘Room at the Top Table?’, The Economist, 2 October 2004.
40. For discussion of this phenomenon with regard to the SADC see Alden and le Pere, South Africa’s, p. 54.
41. See for example Taylor, I., ‘Africa’s leaders and the crisis in Zimbabwe’, Contemporary Review, 280:1637 (2002); Hamill, J., ‘South Africa and Zimbabwe: A Little Local Difficulty’, The World Today, 57:6 (2001) pp. 11–13; James Hamill, ‘African Development: Despots or Aid?’, The World Today, 58:6 (2002) pp. 17–19; and Ian Taylor ‘The New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the Zimbabwe Elections: Implications and Prospects for the Future’, African Affairs, 101:404 (2002) pp. 403–412.
42. See Ian Taylor ‘Is NEPAD Just a Toothless Blueprint?’, Zimbabwe Independent (Harare, 8 November 2002).
43. Ian Taylor, ‘The failure of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development’, Contemporary Review, 282:1648 (2003) p. 285.
44. Ibid., 284.
45. For a fuller treatment of the entirely rational hostility of African elites to democracy and good governance, see Ian Taylor ‘NEPAD ignores the fundamental politics of Africa’, Contemporary Review, 285:1662 (2004) pp. 29–32.
46. Adam Habib and Nthakeng Selinyane, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of an African Century’, in Sidiropoulos (ed.), Apartheid Past, pp. 57–8.
47. Ibid., p. 50.
48. On South Africa’s diplomatic interventions in the DRC and Burundi, see ‘Come, let’s be friends’, The Economist, 10 May 2003; ‘Mbeki: the midwife of the DRC peace deal’, Mail and Guardian ( Johannesburg, 17 December 2002).
49. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos and Tim Hughes ‘Between Democrtaic Governance and Sovereignty: The Challenge of South Africa’s Africa Policy’, in Siridopolous (ed.), Apartheid Past, p. 64.
50. ‘Come, let’s be friends’, The Economist, 10 May 2003. On the same theme see Habib and Selinyane, ‘South Africa’s foreign policy’, p. 56 note 10.
51. Siridopoulos and Hughes, ‘Between Democratic Governance’, p. 64.
52. Ibid., p. 66.
53. Olivier, ‘Is Thabo Mbeki’, 823.
54. Mbeki cited in ibid., 817. The contradictions between democratic rhetoric and multilateral consensus politics are also explored in Alden and le Pere, South Africa’s, p. 54, and with regard to Zimbabwe in Iden Wetherell, ‘What happened to principles?’, Mail and Guardian, ( Johannesburg, 4 October 2002).
55. Habib and Selinyane, ‘South Africa’s foreign policy’, p. 55.
56. Spence, ‘South Africa’s foreign policy’, p. 46.