Survey: Leakage resilience and the bounded retrieval model

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5973 LNCS, Issue , 2010, Pages 1-18

  Alwen, Joël ^a   Dodis, Yevgeniy ^a   Wichs, Daniel ^a  

^a POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABSOLUTE VALUES; DESIGN OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES; LEAKAGE MODEL; LEAKAGE-RESILIENCE; PUBLIC KEYS; RETRIEVAL MODELS; SECRET KEY; SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK; TECHNIQUES USED;

CRYPTOGRAPHY; INFORMATION THEORY; NETWORK SECURITY;

SURVEYS;

EID: 78149275873     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-14496-7_1     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (65)

1. Abdalla, M., An, J.H., Bellare, M., Namprempre, C.: From identification to signatures via the fiat-shamir transform: Minimizing assumptions for security and forward-security. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 418-433. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
2. Alwen, J., Dodis, Y., Naor, M., Segev, G., Walfish, S., Wichs, D.: Public-key encryption in the bounded-retrival model (2009), http://eprint.iacr. org/2009/512
3. Aumann, Y., Ding, Y.Z., Rabin, M.O.: Everlasting security in the bounded storage model. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 48(6), 1668-1680 (2002) (Pubitemid 34763564)
4. Alwen, J., Dodis, Y., Wichs, D.: Leakage-resilient public-key cryptography in the bounded-retrieval model. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 36-54. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
5. Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Simultaneous hardcore bits and cryptography against memory attacks. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
6. Aumann, Y., Rabin, M.O.: Information theoretically secure communication in the limited storage space model. Wiener [Wie99], pp. 65-79 (1999)
7. Bennett, C.H., Brassard, G., Crépeau, C., Maurer, U.M.: Generalized privacy amplification. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 41(6), 1915-1923 (1995)
8. Bennett, C.H., Brassard, G., Robert, J.-M.: Privacy amplification by public discussion. SIAM J. Comput. 17(2), 210-229 (1988)
9. Boneh, D., DeMillo, R.A., Lipton, R.J.: On the importance of checking cryptographic protocols for faults (extended abstract). In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 37-51. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
10. Bellovin, S.M., Merritt, M.: Augmented encrypted key exchange: A password-based protocol secure against dictionary attacks and password file compromise. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 244-250 (1993)
11. Boyko, V., MacKenzie, P.D., Patel, S.: Provably secure password-authenticated key exchange using diffie-hellman. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 156-171. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
12. Boneh, D. (ed.): CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
13. Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139-155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
14. Brickell, E.F. (ed.): CRYPTO 1992. LNCS, vol. 740. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
15. Biham, E., Shamir, A.: Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In: Jr. [Jr.97], pp. 513-525 (1997)
16. Cash, D., Ding, Y.Z., Dodis, Y., Lee, W., Lipton, R.J., Walfish, S.: Intrusion-resilient key exchange in the bounded retrieval model. In: Vadhan, S.P. (ed.) TCC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4392, pp. 479-498. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
17. Canetti, R., Dodis, Y., Halevi, S., Kushilevitz, E., Sahai, A.: Exposure-resilient functions and all-or-nothing transforms. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 453-469. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
18. Cramer, R., Damgård, I., Schoenmakers, B.: Proofs of partial knowledge and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1994. LNCS, vol. 839, pp. 174-187. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
19. Di Crescenzo, G., Lipton, R.J., Walfish, S.: Perfectly secure password protocols in the bounded retrieval model. In: Halevi, Rabin (eds.) [HR06], pp. 225-244 (2006)
20. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Universal hash proofs and a paradigm for adaptive chosen ciphertext secure public-key encryption. In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 45-64. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
21. Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. SIAM J. Comput. 33(1), 167-226 (2004)
22. Dodis, Y., Goldwasser, S., Kalai, Y., Peikert, C., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Public-key encryption schemes with auxiliary inputs (2009)
23. Dodis, Y., Kalai, Y.T., Lovett, S.: On cryptography with auxiliary input. In: STOC, pp. 621-630 (2009)
24. Dodis, Y., Katz, J., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Robust fuzzy extractors and authenticated key agreement from close secrets. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 232-250. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
25. Dodis, Y., Ostrovsky, R., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. SIAM J. Comput. 38(1), 97-139 (2008)
26. Dziembowski, S., Pietrzak, K.: Intrusion-resilient secret sharing. In: FOCS, pp. 227-237. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2007)
27. Dziembowski, S., Pietrzak, K.: Leakage-resilient cryptography. In: FOCS, pp. 293-302. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2008)
28. Dodis, Y., Sahai, A., Smith, A.: On perfect and adaptive security in exposure-resilient cryptography. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 301-324. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
29. Dodis, Y., Wichs, D.: Non-malleable extractors and symmetric key cryptography from weak secrets. In: STOC (2009), Full version, http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/503
30. Dziembowski, S.: Intrusion-resilience via the bounded-storage model. In: Halevi, Rabin (eds.) [HR06], pp. 207-224 (2006)
31. Faust, S., Kiltz, E., Pietrzak, K., Rothblum, G.: Leakage-resilient signatures (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/282
32. Faust, S., Reyzin, L., Tromer, E.: Protecting circuits from computationally-bounded leakage. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/379 (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/
33. Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186-194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)
34. Feige, U., Shamir, A.: Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds. In: Brassard, G. (ed.) CRYPTO 1989. LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 526-544. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
35. Goldreich, O., Lindell, Y.: Session-key generation using human passwords only. J. Cryptology 19(3), 241-340 (2006) (Pubitemid 43911784)
36. Gandolfi, K., Mourtel, C., Olivier, F.: Electromagnetic analysis: Concrete results. In: Koç, Ç.K., Naccache, D., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2001. LNCS, vol. 2162, pp. 251-261. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
37. Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: Proofs that yield nothing but their validity for all languages in np have zero-knowledge proof systems. J. ACM 38(3), 691-729 (1991)
38. Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.): TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 1-20. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
39. Alex Halderman, J., Schoen, S.D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paul, W., Calandrino, J.A., Feldman, A.J., Appelbaum, J., Felten, E.W.: Lest we remember: Cold boot attacks on encryption keys. In: van Oorschot, P.C. (ed.) USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 45-60. USENIX Association (2008)
40. Ishai, Y., Prabhakaran, M., Sahai, A., Wagner, D.: Private circuits ii: Keeping secrets in tamperable circuits. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4004, pp. 308-327. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
41. Ishai, Y., Sahai, A., Wagner, D.: Private circuits: Securing hardware against probing attacks. In: Boneh [Bon03], pp. 463-481 (2003)
42. Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.): CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 1-15. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
43. Kocher, P.C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener [Wie99], pp. 388-397 (1999)
44. Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In: Koblitz, N. (ed.) CRYPTO 1996. LNCS, vol. 1109, pp. 104-113. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
45. Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: Efficient password-authenticated key exchange using human-memorable passwords. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 475-494. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
46. Kiltz, E., Pietrzak, K., Stam, M., Yung, M.: A new randomness extraction paradigm for hybrid encryption. In: Ghilardi, S. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 590-609. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
47. Kanukurthi, B., Reyzin, L.: Key agreement from close secrets over unsecured channels. In: Joux, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479. Springer, Heidelberg (2009), Full version, http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/494
48. Katz, J., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Signature schemes with bounded leakage resilience. In: Matsui, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5912. Springer, Heidelberg (2009), http://www.mit.edu/ vinodv/papers/asiacrypt09/KV-Sigs.pdf
49. Lamport, L.: Constructing digital signatures from a one-way function. Technical report, SRI International (October 1979)
50. Lu, C.-J.: Hyper-encryption against space-bounded adversaries from on-line strong extractors. In: Yung, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2002. LNCS, vol. 2442, pp. 257-271. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
51. Maurer, U.M.: Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher. J. Cryptology 5(1), 53-66 (1992)
52. Maurer, U.M.: Protocols for secret key agreement by public discussion based on common information. In: Brickell [Bri93], pp. 461-470 (1993)
53. Micali, S., Reyzin, L.: Physically observable cryptography (extended abstract). In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 278-296. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
54. Maurer, U.M., Wolf, S.: Privacy amplification secure against active adversaries. In: Jr. [Jr.97], pp. 307-321 (1997)
55. Naor, M., Segev, G.: Public-key cryptosystems resilient to key leakage. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 18-35. Springer, Heidelberg (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/105
56. Naor, M., Yung, M.: Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic applications. In: STOC, pp. 33-43. ACM, New York (1989)
57. Nisan, N., Zuckerman, D.: Randomness is linear in space. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 52(1), 43-52 (1996)
58. Okamoto, T.: Provably secure and practical identification schemes and corresponding signature schemes. In: Brickell[Bri93], pp. 31-53 (1993)
59. Pietrzak, K.: A leakage-resilient mode of operation. In: Eurocrypt 2009, Cologne, Germany, pp. 462-482 (2009)
60. Quisquater, J.-J., Samyde, D.: Electromagnetic analysis (ema): Measures and counter-measures for smart cards. In: Attali, S., Jensen, T. (eds.) E-smart 2001. LNCS, vol. 2140, pp. 200-210. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
61. Regev, O.: On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. In: Gabow, H.N., Fagin, R. (eds.) STOC, pp. 84-93. ACM, New York (2005)
62. Rompel, J.: One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure signatures. In: STOC, pp. 387-394. ACM, New York (1990)
63. Renner, R., Wolf, S.: Unconditional authenticity and privacy from an arbitrarily weak secret. In: Boneh[Bon03], pp. 78-95 (2003)
64. Vadhan, S.P.: Constructing locally computable extractors and cryptosystems in the bounded-storage model. J. Cryptology 17(1), 43-77 (2004)
65. Wiener, M. (ed.): CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)