Modeling and analyzing security in the presence of compromising adversaries

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6345 LNCS, Issue , 2010, Pages 340-356

  Basin, David ^a   Cremers, Cas ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; NETWORK SECURITY;

ADVERSARY MODELING; CASE-STUDIES; KEY-COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION; MANUAL ANALYSIS; PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY; PROTOCOL EXECUTION; PROTOCOL VERIFICATION; SECURITY NOTION; SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS; VERIFICATION TOOLS;

COMPUTERS;

EID: 78049402611     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_21     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (33)

1. Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., Fournet, C.: Just Fast Keying in the Pi calculus. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 10(3), 1-59 (2007)
2. Basin, D., Cremers, C.: Degrees of security: Protocol guarantees in the face of compromising adversaries. In: 19th EACSL Annual Conferences on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2010). Advanced Research in Computing and Software Science, Springer, Heidelberg (2010) (to appear)
3. Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139-155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
4. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity authentication and key distribution. In: Stinson, D. R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232-249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)
5. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case. In: STOC 1995, pp. 57-66. ACM Press, New York (1995)
6. Blanchet, B.: A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 140-154 (May 2006)
7. Bresson, E., Manulis, M.: Securing group key exchange against strong corruptions. In: ASIACCS, pp. 249-260. ACM, New York (2008)
8. Bresson, E., Manulis, M., Schwenk, J.: On security models and compilers for group key exchange protocols. In: Miyaji, A., Kikuchi, H., Rannenberg, K. (eds.) IWSEC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4752, pp. 292-307. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
9. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453-474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
10. Choo, K.-K., Boyd, C., Hitchcock, Y.: Examining indistinguishability- based proof models for key establishment proofs. In: Roy, B. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3788, pp. 624-643. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
11. Choo, K.-K., Boyd, C., Hitchcock, Y., Maitland, G.: On session identifiers in provably secure protocols. In: Blundo, C., Cimato, S. (eds.) SCN 2004. LNCS, vol. 3352, pp. 351-366. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
12. Clark, J., Jacob, J.: A survey of authentication protocol literature (1997), http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/clark97survey.html
13. Cremers, C.: Scyther tool with compromising adversaries extension. Includes protocol description files and test scripts, http://people.inf.ethz.ch/ cremersc/scyther/
14. Cremers, C.: The Scyther Tool: Verification, falsification, and analysis of security protocols. In: Gupta, A., Malik, S. (eds.) CAV 2008. LNCS, vol. 5123, pp. 414-418. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
15. Cremers, C.: Unbounded verification, falsification, and characterization of security protocols by pattern refinement. In: CCS'08: Proc. of the 15th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 119-128. ACM, New York (2008)
16. Cremers, C.: Session-state reveal is stronger than ephemeral key reveal: Attacking the NAXOS authenticated key exchange protocol. In: Abdalla, M., et al. (eds.) ACNS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5536, pp. 20-33. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
17. Günther, C.: An identity-based key-exchange protocol. In: Quisquater, J.-J., Vandewalle, J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1989. LNCS, vol. 434, pp. 29-37. Springer, Heidelberg (1990)
18. Gupta, P., Shmatikov, V.: Towards computationally sound symbolic analysis of key exchange protocols. In: Proc. FMSE 2005, pp. 23-32. ACM, New York (2005)
19. Gupta, P., Shmatikov, V.: Key confirmation and adaptive corruptions in the protocol security logic. In: FCS-ARSPA 2006, pp. 113-142 (2006)
20. Guttman, J. D.: Key compromise, strand spaces, and the authentication tests. In: 17th Annual Conference on Mathematical Foundations of Programming Semantics. Invited lecture, ENTCS, vol. 45, pp. 1-21 (2001)
21. Just, M., Vaudenay, S.: Authenticated multi-party key agreement. In: Kim, K.-c., Matsumoto, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1163, pp. 36-49. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
22. Katz, J., Yung, M.: Scalable protocols for authenticated group key exchange. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 110-125. Springer, Heidelberg (2003) (Pubitemid 137636938)
23. H. Krawczyk. HMQV.: A high-performance secure Diffie-Hellman protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/176 (2005), http://eprint.iacr.org/ (retrieved on April 14, 2009)
24. Krawczyk, H.: HMQV: A high-performance secure Diffie-Hellman protocol. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 546-566. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
25. LaMacchia, B., Lauter, K., Mityagin, A.: Stronger security of authenticated key exchange. In: Susilo, W., Liu, J. K., Mu, Y. (eds.) ProvSec 2007. LNCS, vol. 4784, pp. 1-16. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
26. Lauter, K., Mityagin, A.: Security analysis of KEA authenticated key exchange protocol. In: Yung, M., et al. (eds.) PKC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3958, pp. 378-394. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
27. Law, L., Menezes, A., Qu, M., Solinas, J., Vanstone, S.: An efficient protocol for authenticated key agreement. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 28, 119-134 (2003)
28. Lowe, G.: Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds.) TACAS 1996. LNCS, vol. 1055, pp. 147-166. Springer, Heidelberg (1996) (Pubitemid 126050413)
29. Menezes, A., Ustaoglu, B.: Comparing the pre-and post-specified peer models for key agreement. In: Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Seberry, J. (eds.) ACISP 2008. LNCS, vol. 5107, pp. 53-68. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
30. Menezes, A., van Oorschot, P., Vanstone, S.: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Boca Raton (October 1996)
31. Paulson, L.: Relations between secrets: Two formal analyses of the Yahalom protocol. Journal of Computer Security 9(3), 197-216 (2001)
32. Shoup, V.: On formal models for secure key exchange (version 4), (November 1999); revision of IBM Research Report RZ 3120 (April 1999)
33. Ustaoglu, B.: Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H) MQV and NAXOS. Des. Codes Cryptography 46(3), 329-342 (2008)