Basic solution concepts and computational issues

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 3-28

  Tardos, Éva ^a   Vazirani, Vijay V ^b  

^a Department of Molecular Biology and Genetics   (United States)

^b Georgia Institute of Technology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; CRIME;

BASIC SOLUTIONS; COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES; PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME; PRISONERS' DILEMMA;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 78049381293     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.003     Document Type: Chapter

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4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991.
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7. D. Monderer and L. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior 14:124–143, 1996.
8. J. Nash. Noncooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54:289–295, 1951.
9. M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.