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5
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0002974656
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The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge to Action
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ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press
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John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge to Action, in The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), vol. 4, p. 19.
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(1984)
The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953
, vol.4
, pp. 19
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Dewey, J.1
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6
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0040794107
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The Fixation of Belief'
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Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds), Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press
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C. S. Peirce, 'The Fixation of Belief', in Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (eds) The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 1 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 114-115.
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(1992)
The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings
, vol.1
, pp. 114-115
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Peirce, C.S.1
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7
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0008808077
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This point has been pressed by Hilary Putnam in his, Oxford: Blackwell
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This point has been pressed by Hilary Putnam in his Pragmatism: An Open Question (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 21.
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(1995)
Pragmatism: An Open Question
, pp. 21
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17
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78049363313
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Note
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In Truth, Politics, Morality,Misak argues that this was because Peirce was a non-cognitivist in ethics, holding that ethical questions are not truth-apt but are rather simply a matter of social convention. She subsequently revised this position, suggesting that he should be taken to be just as committed to truth in science as in ethics.
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18
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84928857999
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Vital Matters
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Cheryl Misak (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
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See her paper 'C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters', in Cheryl Misak (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Peirce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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(2004)
The Cambridge Companion to Peirce
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Peirce, C.S.1
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19
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0344111083
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The point is developed in ch. 5 in the revised edition of Misak's, expanded paperback edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press
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The point is developed in ch. 5 in the revised edition of Misak's Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth, expanded paperback edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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(2004)
Truth and The End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth
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34
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84861993379
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Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics
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A concern that Talisse himself brought against communitarians such as, 2
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A concern that Talisse himself brought against communitarians such as Michael Sandel., Robert B. Talisse, 'Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics', Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18(1) (2004): 1-8 (2)
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(2004)
Journal of Speculative Philosophy
, vol.18
, Issue.1
, pp. 1-8
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Sandel, M.1
Robert, B.2
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42
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Note
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"'Reasonableness" as the [Peircean] deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one's views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one's fellow deliberators.'
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43
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34247667182
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Deliberativist Responses to Activist Challenges: A Continuation of Young's dialectic
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(428); original emphasis
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Robert B. Talisse, 'Deliberativist Responses to Activist Challenges: a Continuation of Young's dialectic', Philosophy and Social Criticism 31(4) (2005): 423-444 (428); original emphasis.
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(2005)
Philosophy and Social Criticism
, vol.31
, Issue.4
, pp. 423-444
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Talisse, R.B.1
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47
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78049388889
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Unfinished Correspondence with a Darwinian Heavyweight'
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London: Phoenix
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Richard Dawkins, 'Unfinished Correspondence with a Darwinian Heavyweight', in his A Devil's Chaplain: Selected Essays (London: Phoenix, 2004), p. 259.
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(2004)
A Devil's Chaplain: Selected Essays
, pp. 259
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Dawkins, R.1
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48
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78049363672
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To borrow loosely from Popper, we might say the openness to self-criticism and the "falsification" of even our basic judgements embodies a peculiarly liberal attitude
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Although critical of liberalism, Talisse can in this way be seen to retain liberal assumptions. For as Stephen Macedo has suggested, Oxford: Clarendon Press
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Although critical of liberalism, Talisse can in this way be seen to retain liberal assumptions. For as Stephen Macedo has suggested, 'To borrow loosely from Popper, we might say the openness to self-criticism and the "falsification" of even our basic judgements embodies a peculiarly liberal attitude'. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 226.
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(1990)
Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community In Liberal Constitutionalism
, pp. 226
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Macedo, S.1
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49
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78049353428
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Note
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Macedo's word 'peculiarly' neatly implies both 'distinctive' and 'strange': many people would find it odd to make a virtue of being willing to disown one's convictions as readily as Talisse and Misak propose.
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Note
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Examples of 'extreme' but true beliefs include belief in the immorality of racism, sexism and homophobia. Further, what one takes to be extreme is a function of one's sense of what is sensible or reasonable. Thus for example, a theme of the so-called Intelligent Design Movement is that, in combining creationism with evolution, it is more reasonable than the 'extremism' of evolutionary theory which allows for no notion of the existence of God. However, extreme or not, this has no bearing on the truth of evolution and the lack of scientific evidence for Intelligent Design.
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54
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Oxford: Oxford World Classics, I leave aside the issue of how far this represents Mill's considered view of truth
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John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 1998), p. 41. I leave aside the issue of how far this represents Mill's considered view of truth.
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(1998)
On Liberty
, pp. 41
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Mill, J.S.1
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78049357575
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Note
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This is further evidenced by the fact that different communities of inquiry tend not to address each other. One reason for this is that the degree of specialization means that competence in one area typically precludes competence in other areas. And, even when two areas overlap -for example, science and the philosophy of science - the result is sometimes mutual antipathy.
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Deliberative Democracy and Two Models of Pragmatism
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301
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Matthew Festenstein, 'Deliberative Democracy and Two Models of Pragmatism', European Journal of Social Theory 7(3): 291-306 (301).
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European Journal of Social Theory
, vol.7
, Issue.3
, pp. 291-306
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Festenstein, M.1
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60
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0040208555
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A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy
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1686
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Hilary Putnam, 'A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy', Southern California Law Review 63(6) (1990): 1671-1697 (1686).
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(1990)
Southern California Law Review
, vol.63
, Issue.6
, pp. 1671-1697
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Putnam, H.1
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61
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0142132582
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Talisse gives the example of Thrasymachus who, because he was uninterested in truth and sought only power, could today safely be ignored as a deliberative partner
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Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p. 149. Talisse gives the example of Thrasymachus who, because he was uninterested in truth and sought only power, could today safely be ignored as a deliberative partner.
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Truth, Politics, Morality
, pp. 149
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Misak1
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63
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78049409215
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Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom
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501
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Stanley Fish, 'Holocaust Denial and Academic Freedom', Valparaiso University Law Review 35 (2001): 499-524 (501).
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(2001)
Valparaiso University Law Review
, vol.35
, pp. 499-524
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Fish, S.1
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64
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78049353754
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Note
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This is Fish's position. Immediately after the passage I have quoted, he writes: 'This does not mean that there is nothing to choose between them - I have already declared my choice and in unequivocal terms - but that the choice cannot be made on the basis of who uses evidence and who doesn't (that's just a version of name-calling).'
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Note
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Cited in William R. Caspary, Dewey on Democracy (London: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 13. Talisse's criticisms of Dewey stem in large part from his objections to the excesses of Deweyans such as Larry Hickman and Thomas Alexander. But as I have indicated, a more sober Deweyan view might be presented along the lines proposed by Festenstein and Putnam.
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(2000)
Dewey On Democracy
, pp. 13
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Caspary, W.R.1
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