Modeling of bilevel games and incentives for sustainable critical infrastructure system;Lošimų teorijos taikymas modeliuojant būtinąją darnaus vystymosi infrastruktūrą

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 365-379

  Miao, Xin ^a   Yu, Bo ^a   Xi, Bao ^a   Tang, Yan hong ^a  

^a HARBIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (China)

Author keywords

Bilevel games; Bilevel incentive compatibility; Critical infrastructure; Game evolution; Mathematical model; Sustainable development

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958561759     PISSN: 20294913     EISSN: 20294921     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3846/tede.2010.23     Document Type: Article

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