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Volumn 57, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 194-217

The social and legal bases of managerial authority

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EID: 77958499250     PISSN: 11612770     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/eh.057.0194     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (11)

References (107)
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