Taxpayer disclosure and penalty laws

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 243-272

  Beck, Paul J ^a   Davis, Jon S ^b   Jung, Woon Oh ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c Seoul National University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958461914     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00038     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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15. SCOTCHMER, S. (1989b) The effect of tax advisors on tax compliance; in Taxpayer Compliance: Social Sciences Perspectives, Vol. 2, J. ROTH and J. SCHOLZ, eds. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 182-199.