The normative impact of comparative ethics: Human rights

Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 72-100

  Hansen, Chad ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

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EID: 77957937117     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511606960.005     Document Type: Chapter

References (50)

1. One early philosophical study had an “anthropological” character and clearly illustrates the distinction. Richard Brandt studied Hopi ethics. Richard B. Brandt, Hopi Ethics: A Theoretical Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). His method approximated “field work,” but Brandt’s interests were in the principles that intellectual leaders of the Hopi used in justifying their different doctrines and behaviors.
2. The contrast between narrow and wide “reflective equilibrium” motivates this observation. We understand moral reflection as the attempt to harmonize our “considered judgments,” but not only our moral judgments. The entire range of beliefs about human nature, society, and the world can be evaluated for coherence. On reflective equilibrium, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971)
3. Margaret Holmgren, “The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 19, no. 1 (1989), pp. 43-60
4. Richard B. Brandt, “The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium,” Ethics, vol. 100, no. 1 (1990), pp. 259-78.
5. Explaining contrast or similarities in actual moral attitudes need not be the main interest of a philosophical study. A philosopher may be as interested in how similar moral attitudes can emerge from a culture with different conceptual structure and background philosophical doctrines.
6. I have little to say here about comparative moral psychology aside from evaluating the coherence of psychological theories and normative attitudes. That is, I do not speculate, here, about the possible truth of rival theories of moral psychology. This might be relevant for claims that Chinese ethics may work better for Chinese people as a distinct psychological type. It is conceivable that different nationalities might have different psychologies, or even that a theory’s wide acceptance of a moral psychology might become a “selffulfilling prophecy.” Modern Europeans, shaped by institutions constructed on the assumption that we are psychological egoists, may become more “selfish” than Chinese. However, the empirical grounds for such a claim remain weak.
7. Henry Rosemont, Jr., “Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique” in Leroy S. Rouner ed., Human Rights and theWorld’s Religions (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1988), pp. 167-82.
8. Rosemont suggests that China may be such a case. He draws on Fingarette’s analysis of Confucian ethics as lacking a concept of choice and that differences in Chinese views on human behavior cannot underwrite issues about moral relativity. Rosemont’s argument is interesting, in part, for his suggesting that the alternative is possibly better than a morality. I comment indirectly on this argument in Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 81-3.
9. Probably less because it attaches to the term than because, as Saussure and Derrida remind us, meaning is a function of difference. It is because we normally contrast morality with conventions and religious rules. Conversely, we normally refer to utilitarianism as a moral theory even when we think it wrong. In any case, philosophers will have less interest in (place less value on) communities that advance only revelation, instinct or traditional authority as standards for evaluative judgments.
10. Hansen, Chad., pp. 140-3; Chad Hansen, “Should the Ancient Masters Value Reason?” in Henry Rosemont, Jr. ed., Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to A. C. Graham (La Salle, IL: Open Court. 1991), pp. 179-209
11. Chad Hansen, “Individualism in Chinese Thought” in Donald J. Munro ed., Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp. 35-56.
12. I am guided here by Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). He elucidates the claim that an ethical judgment is rational as expressing and endorsing a system of norms from which it follows.
13. This is only one of the puzzles facing naïve appeals to tradition of this sort. Another would be that the Chinese critic of human rights could not justify his critical attitude. He implicitly allows thatWestern tradition is different so he must judge that it is right for Westerners to advocate human rights and to push them on Asian societies as well. That is what, he supposes, Western moral tradition tells them to do.
14. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
15. This need not be because they are mystical like Plato’s good. A more likely explanation is because the system of standards will form a coherent scheme. The justification of any standard will depend on its coherence with the others in the community’s overall system. There will be rival ways of achieving this coherence, and they will inform and shape moral disagreement and debate in the community.
16. Thomas Nagel, The LastWord (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
17. Notice that Rosemont’s thesis that we should not regard Chinese normative thinking as a morality may block this line of thought. If it is not moral thinking but some other kind of normative activity, then we need not conclude that the resultant norm systems are in conflict. The conflict comes from the assumption that both traditions are formally autonomous and thus think of moral judgments as other than merely traditional and as applying universally. These conditions would then motivate respect, but not necessarily any ideal of a synthesis.
18. Westerners may still be cynical about Chinese morality where they sense familiar appeals. For example, the argument that we should restrict liberty for administrative or economic advantage is so familiar in Western political discourse they need find it no more impressive in the mouth of a Chinese ruler.
19. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (London: World Library, 1863), chapter 2.
20. Many familiar premises used in moral argument could be rebutted by comparativists (e.g., assertions that such and such moral attitudes are “universally acknowledged”).
21. Certain features of translation might also contribute to the difficulty in presenting certain moral views. See Roger Ames, “Rites as Rights: The Confucian Alternative” in Leroy S. Rouner ed., Human Rights and the World’s Religions (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1988), pp. 199-214.
22. I do not mean to suggest that the difference would not have normative implications. The differences arise from narrow as well as wide reflective equilibrium. The shape of a Chinese “utilitarian” conception of individual liberty may differ from a Western one.
23. One may worry that giving arguments showing that classical thought is consistent with human rights gives reformers a response to the unfortunate rhetorical context but also implicitly endorses and strengthens it. Should we on principle insist only on the normative irrelevance of descriptive classical thought-which may give the (mistaken) impression that conservatives win the point? Some Chinese conservatives even hint that Mozi, the nearest contemporary of Confucius and a strong critic, was a “Western” thinker.
24. Rosemont, pp. 167-82. Most of the contributions mainly address Confucianism. Rosemont limits his claims to Confucius himself and does so with a clearer awareness of their relevance. He treats it as an interesting intellectual enterprise. Would there be a way to show Confucius (or one of his disciples) that his conception was wrong and that it should include elements of human rights? I think Rosemont knows that it is strictly irrelevant to the normative issue itself-for which he offers separate argument.
25. The question, however, loses most of its philosophical interest when personalized or relativized to an individual. It would be too easy to find a philosopher in both traditions whose thought was inimical to individual rights. One might easily doubt that Confucius counted as a moral philosopher in the sense of a thinker who reflected on and questioned his own standards of judgment. Many have expressed such skepticism, so in the absence of evidence of such higher-level reflection, Confucius’ actual beliefs and tendencies to believe are of interest mainly to those with a religious attachment to Confucianism. Confucius’ views may have been the result of his psychological peculiarities or his ignorance or inattention to lines of thought that were available in his contemporary culture. See Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 1988., pp. 112-15.
26. And, of course, no less. One may reflectively judge that Aquinas’ moral position is correct or the best available. See the discussion in Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1988). But to make the case hold, the defender of Confucian ethics has to make a case, as MacIntyre does, not merely appeal to Confucianism’s Chineseness. Whether the case is a good one or not is a matter of norms, not history or tradition.
27. Scholars seldom defend this assumption in print, but when I have put the point to my comparative colleagues, they offer various ways of preserving it. Some imply that the political decision itself shows the “naturalness” or “fit” of Confucianism for the Chinese “mind.” Others claim that the fact that it could be imposed and “work” demonstrates this and finally that the fact that it was imposed and worked effected a gradual (hereditary) change so that Chinese minds are now effectively shaped by that decision. 25.
28. Earlier, I would have excluded Xunzi (298-238 b.c.e.) from this negative judgment of theoretical sophistication. I do still think there are some signs of theoretical strength and originality; however, his position as a whole now strikes me as either uncomprehending or disingenuous. my discussion in Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 1988., pp. 307-43. I thank an anonymous referee of this volume for reminding me to address the widespread perception that my interpretation of Confucians is “uncharitable.” I certainly acknowledge that such is a common view of my account, and I do explicitly set out to tell a story from a perspective that is different from the usual Confucian perspective on the classical period. My negative evaluation of Confucian thinking may be controversial on various grounds, but I think it is a confusion to describe it as “uncharitable” without substantial further argument.
29. First, I explicitly disavow the strict principle of charity in favor of the principle of humanity. I argue extensively for this choice in my work and the grounds include that selecting translation manuals that maximize the “truth” of the consequent belief systems invites us to confuse understanding with agreement. Critics should, in fairness (in charity?) at least note that before making such a charge. Even were I to appeal to charity in interpretation, I think this criticism confuses my open expression of disagreement and other negative judgments as the sign of failure of interpretive charity. Charity lies in making the best sense of a community’s discourse, not in limning incoherent or simple-minded accounts of it with fulsome praise.
30. Further, I explicitly argue in my work such interpretive principles should apply to the whole discourse community, not to a single book, writer, or school. I explicitly argue that if the cost of giving a charitable reading to Confucians is that one must make naïve simpletons of all their native critics then the principles weigh against that interpretation. Even given that limitation, I would dispute that my analysis of Confucians themselves makes less rational sense of their doctrine than do the traditional alternatives. I find their explanations of Confucianism do not make sense despite the frequent use of adjectives like “brilliant” and “penetrating” or the introduction of their alleged doctrines with verbs like “sees that” and “understands that.” I am happy to invite neutral observers to judge whether I have contributed more or less to making Confucian theorizing more intelligible in its context than do these treatments that include such praise.
31. My separate judgment that Confucians fail to provide adequate answers to their native contemporary critics is a case where I am answerable only to my own philosophical integrity. I am happy similarly to invite readers also to consult their best philosophical judgment and draw their own conclusions. However, these judgments are largely independent of the question of the theoretical value of my interpretative innovations.
32. Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 1988., pp. 95-152, especially 95-8.
33. The “simply” is important because Xunzi did have access to and used several arguments for tradition. Some of the deeper bases of his argument included intuition, evaluation of name use, and pragmatic considerations.
34. He does not, however, accept a purely procedural account of democratic legitimacy. The targeted selection was the wisest and best, and the implicit method was more like popular acclaim than voting. The democratic feature was intertwined with a natural meritocracy. Both points suggest Mohist inspiration (as does Mencius’ doctrine of benevolence). The Mohists probably elected their leaders democratically.
35. Bryan VanNorden, “What Should Western Philosophy Learn from Chinese Philosophy?” in Philip J. Ivanhoe ed., Chinese Language, Thought and Culture: Nivison and His Critics (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), pp. 224-49.
36. Van Norden cites names and works but does not provide any arguments. The authorities he cites for the view that Western philosophy is in crisis include no obvious comparativists.
37. Van Norden cites other thinkers (e.g., Hall and Ames) who also concentrate on Confucianism.
38. This is, obviously, an interpretive claim with which Van Norden may well disagree. Still, it seems such interpretive issues must be settled before we can give any normative force to the claim. I argue for the claim that only Mencius seems to adopt a straightforward virtue ethics in my article in the same volume. Chad Hansen, “Duty and Virtue” in Philip J. Ivanhoe ed., Chinese Language, Thought and Culture: Nivison and His Critics (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), pp. 173-92.
39. Im Manyul, “Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius,” Philosophy East andWest, vol. 49, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1-27, argues against the standard reading of Mencius as a virtue ethicist at least if one takes Aristotle as a paradigm.
40. Daniel Bell, “A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism,” Society, vol. 32, no. 5 (1995), pp. 38-44
41. Daniel Bell, “The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections on an East West Dialogue,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3 (1996), pp. 641-68
42. Daniel Bell, “A Communitarian Critique of Authoritarianism,” Political Theory, vol. 25, no. 1 (1997), pp. 6-33
43. Daniel Bell, “What Does Confucius Add to Human Rights?” Times Literary Supplement (January 1, 1999), pp. 6-13.
44. Some have argued that Daoism provides a basis for the liberal value of equal respect. David Wong, “Taoism and the Problem of Equal Respect,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 11 (1984), pp. 165-83.
45. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1985), p. 142.
46. I respond in Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, pp. 132-3. I doubt that Mohists were egoists-either psychological or ethical. I do, however, think that they were moral reformers who thought that we collectively can reflect on how to change our moral dao.
47. Even this, notice, assumes the cultural dominance of Confucianism is a product of its natural appeal as opposed to political imposition of an orthodox morality as a condition of employment. If we have reason to suspect the latter, then the prominence of communitarian attitudes in China will be utterly irrelevant.
48. Bell, “The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights,”
49. Philip Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
50. John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: Capricorn Books, 1939), p. 6.