The rise and fall of computational functionalism

Hilary Putnam

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 220-250

  Shagrir, Oron ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

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EID: 77957893467     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614187.009     Document Type: Chapter

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