Designing robust water planning institutions in remote regions: A case of Georgina and Diamantina catchment in Australia

Water Policy

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 357-368

  Larson, Silva ^a  

^a CSIRO   (Australia)

Author keywords

Desert; Design principles; IAD; Institutional analysis; Remote regions; Robust institutions; Water planning

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957563006     PISSN: 13667017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2166/wp.2009.266     Document Type: Article

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