Complex systems view of educational policy research

Science

Volumn 330, Issue 6000, 2010, Pages 38-39

  Maroulis, S ^a,b   Guimera R ^a,c   Petry, H ^a   Stringer, M J ^a   Gomez, L M ^d   Amaral, L A N ^a   Wilensky, U ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Kellogg School of Management   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EDUCATION POLICY; EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT; INTEGRATED APPROACH; KNOWLEDGE; NETWORK ANALYSIS; NUMERICAL MODEL; RESEARCH WORK;

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT; EDUCATION; EDUCATION RESEARCH; POLICY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESEARCH; REVIEW; TEACHER;

EID: 77957330459     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1195153     Document Type: Review

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36. The authors acknowledge the support of the NSF and the Searle Foundation.