Learning by doing vs. learning from others in a principal-agent model

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 34, Issue 10, 2010, Pages 1967-1992

  Arifovic, Jasmina ^a   Karaivanov, Alexander ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Learning; Moral hazard; Principal agent model

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957199886     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2010.04.007     Document Type: Article

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