Standards and the regulation of environmental risk

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 219-246

  Hueth, Brent ^a   Melkonyan, Tigran ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Environmental regulation; Standards

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957139613     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-008-9082-z     Document Type: Article

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