Network models in economics

Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science

Volumn 8, Issue C, 1995, Pages 713-765

  Sharkey, William W ^a  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957081340     PISSN: 09270507     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0927-0507(05)80113-6     Document Type: Review

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