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Volumn 107, Issue 34, 2010, Pages 14978-14982

Erratum: Behavioral dynamics and influence in networked coloring and consensus (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2010) 107, 34, (14978-14982) DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1001280107);Behavioral dynamics and influence in networked coloring and consensus

Author keywords

Behavioral game theory; Network science; Social networks

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; COLOR; CONSENSUS; CORRELATION ANALYSIS; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; METHODOLOGY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESEARCH; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL NETWORK; COMPUTER INTERFACE; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; SOCIAL SUPPORT;

EID: 77957015639     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1104351108     Document Type: Erratum
Times cited : (95)

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    • Behavioral experiments on biased voting in networks
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.