Social choice theory

Handbook of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 3, Issue C, 1986, Pages 1073-1181

  Sen, Amartya ^a  

^a ALL SOULS COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956861814     PISSN: 15734382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4382(86)03004-7     Document Type: Review

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