The analysis of union behavior

Handbook of Labor Economics

Volumn 2, Issue C, 1986, Pages 1039-1089

  Farber, Henry S ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956855815     PISSN: 15734463     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4463(86)02008-4     Document Type: Review

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