International rules and institutions for trade policy

Handbook of International Economics

Volumn 3, Issue C, 1995, Pages 1495-1551

  Staiger, Robert W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956813804     PISSN: 15734404     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-4404(05)80009-7     Document Type: Review

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