Internal critique: A logic is not a theory of reasoning and a theory of reasoning is not a logic

Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning

Volumn 1, Issue C, 2002, Pages 171-186

  Harman, Gilbert ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956672596     PISSN: 15702464     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1570-2464(02)80006-4     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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2. BonJour L. Problems of induction. In: Dancy J., and Sosa E. (Eds). A Companion to Epistemology (1992), Basil Blackwell, Oxford 391-395
3. Bratman M. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
4. Chisholm R. The Foundations of Knowing (1982), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN
5. Foley R. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality (1987), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
6. Franklin B. Private Correspondence volume I (1817), Colburn, London
7. Goldman A. Epistemology and Cognition (1986), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
8. Goodman N. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. 2nd edition (1965), Bobs-Merrill, Indianapolis, IN
9. Hempel C.G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (1965), Free Press, New York
10. Von Neumann J., and Morgernstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
11. Sober E. Reconstructing the Past (1988), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
12. Stalnaker R. Inquiry (1984), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA