Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 261-274

  Arguedas, Carmen ^a   Camacho, Eva ^b   Zofío, José Luis ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITAT JAUME I   (Spain)

Author keywords

Environmental policy; Monitoring; Non compliance; Technology adoption

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANT MECHANISMS; ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY; MONITORING; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGIES; EMISSION STANDARD; ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INVESTMENT INCENTIVES; NON-COMPLIANCE; POLLUTION ABATEMENT; TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION;

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

EID: 77956616748     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9375-4     Document Type: Article

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