A psychologically based model of voter turnout

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 12, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 979-1002

  Li, Ming ^a   Majumdar, Dipjyoti ^a  

^a Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956426176     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01482.x     Document Type: Article

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