Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood

Erkenntnis

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 427-447

  Callender, Craig ^a   Cohen, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956292657     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-010-9241-3     Document Type: Article

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