The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice

German Law Journal

Volumn 10, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 537-560

  Itzcovich, Giulio ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 77956118913     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200001218     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (72)

1. 1 Without claim to completeness, see R.M. Chevallier, Methods and Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, 2 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 21, 21–35 (1964–1965)
2. P. Pescatore, Les objectifs de la Communauté européenne comme principes d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice, in 2 MISCELLANEA W. J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH 325–63 (1972)
3. H. Kutscher, Alcune tesi sui metodi d’interpretazione del diritto comunitario dal punto di vista d’un giudice, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO EUROPEO 283–314 (1976)
4. id. at 3–24 (1977)
5. C.J. Hamson, METHODS OF INTERPRETATION – A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RESULTS, JUDICIAL AND ACADEMIC CONFERENCE, 27‐28 SEPTEMBER 1976 (1976)
6. A. Bredimas, METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND COMMUNITY LAW (1978)
7. J. Bengoetxea, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE (1993) [hereinafter LEGAL REASONING]
8. David A.O. Edward, The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the Work of the European Court of Justice, in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW (D.L. Carey Miller & R. Zimmermann eds., 1997)
9. D.L. Carey Miller & R. Zimmerman, THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW: ABERDEEN QUINCENTENARY ESSAYS 309–20 (1997)
10. A. Arnull, Interpretation and Precedent in European Community Law, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE ENGLISH COURTS 115–36 (M. Andenas & F. Jacobs eds., 1998)
11. A. Albors‐Llorens, The European Court of Justice, More than a Teleological Court, in 2 CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK IN EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 373–99
12. T. Koopmans, The Theory of Interpretation and the Court of Justice, in 1 LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY – JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 45–58 (D. O’Keeffe & A. Bavasso eds., 2000)
13. H.G. Schermers & D.F. Waelbroeck, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 10 (2001)
14. J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick & L. Moral Soriano, Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 43–85 (G. De Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2001)
15. J. Joussen, L’interpretazione (teleologica) del diritto comunitario, in RIVISTA CRITICA DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO 491–537 (2001)
16. M. Lasser, Anticipating Three Models of Judicial Control, Debate and Legitimacy: The European Court of Justice, the Cour de cassation and the United States Supreme Court, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 1/03 (2003), http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030101.html
17. M. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004)
18. O. Pollicino, Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the Context of the Principle of Equality Between Judicial Activism and Self‐restraint, 5 GERM. L.J. 283 (2004)
19. A. ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 515 (2006)
20. M. Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism, EUR. J. LEGAL STUDIES (2007), http://www.ejls.eu/2/25UK.pdf; E. RUSSO, L’INTERPRETAZIONE DEI TESTI NORMATIVI COMUNITARI (2008).
21. 2 See Case C‐148/78, Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629, in which the ECJ makes recourse to the typical common law doctrine of estoppel. See generally G.F. Mancini & D.T. Keeling, Language, Culture and Politics in the Life of the European Court of Justice, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 397 (1995).
22. 3 See J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick, L. Moral Soriano, supra note 1, at 48 (“[T]here is no special case of European legal reasoning, nor anything particularly European about the way the ECJ proceeds to justify its decisions.”).
23. 4 Case C‐106/89, Marleasing v. Comercial Internacional de Alimentación, 1990 E.C.R. I‐4135 (broadening the scope of the requirement of consistent interpretation originally devised by ECJ); Case C‐14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein‐Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891.
24. 5 But see G. Betlem, The Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation – Managing Legal Uncertainty, 22 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 397 (2002)
25. M. Amstutz, In‐Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning, 11 EUR. L.J. 766 (2005); M. Klamert, Judicial Implementation of Directives and Anticipatory Indirect Effect: Connecting the Dots, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1251 (2006).
26. 6 The Charter of Nice has played such an auxiliary role in some judgments of the ECJ. For instance, on family reunification see Case C‐540/03, Parliament v Council, 2006 E.C.R. I‐5769 (“While the Charter is not a legally binding instrument, the Community legislature did, however, acknowledge its importance.”) and Joint Cases C-402/05 & C‐415/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation, Judgment of 3 September 2008 (regarding the freezing of funds of persons suspected of terrorism).
27. 7 See TUTELA DEI DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI E COSTITUZIONALISMO MULTILIVELLO (A. D’Atena & P. Grossi eds., 2004)
28. LA TUTELA MULTILIVELLO DEI DIRITTI: PUNTI DI CRISI, PROBLEMI APERTI, MOMENTI DI STABILIZZAZIONE (P. Bilancia & E. De Marco eds., 2004); ASPETTI E PROBLEMI DEL COSTITUZIONALISMO MULTILIVELLO (P. Bilancia & F.G. Pizzetti eds., 2004).
29. 10 Vienna Convention, art. 31(3).
30. 11 F. von Liszt & M. Fleischmann, DAS VÖLKERRECHT SYSTEMATISCH DARGESTELLT (1925).
31. 18 The distinction between interpretation and application has originally been drawn by the ECJ. See Joint Cases C-28/62, C‐29/62 & C‐30/62, Da Costa en Schaake v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 61 (“When it gives an interpretation of the Treaty in a specific action pending before a national court, the Court [of Justice] limits itself to deducing the meaning of the Community rules from the wording and spirit of the Treaty, it being left to the national court to apply in the particular case the rules which are thus interpreted.”).
32. 19 See Case C‐13/61, De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Bosch, 1962 E.C.R. 89 (“Since the meaning of the words ‘the interpretation of the Treaty’ in Article 177 may itself raise a question of interpretation, the National court is free to put its request in a simple and direct form, leaving to the Court of Justice to rule on that question only within the limits of its jurisdiction.”).
33. 20 See Case C‐283/81, Cilfit v. Ministero della Sanità, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.
34. 21 R. Guastini, L’INTERPRETAZIONE DEI DOCUMENTI NORMATIVI 36 (2004)
35. R. Guastini, DALLE FONTI ALLE NORME 77, 80 (1990) (“[T]he uncertain boundaries between ‘light’ and ‘penumbra’ are the object of interpretative decisions . . . the penumbra is the outcome of the discretion of the interpreters.”). See also Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Soriano, supra note 1, at 55 (“The distinction between clear cases and hard cases is pragmatic. Cases are problematized or clarified depending on different circumstances.”).
36. 22 Most recently, see Italian Consiglio di Stato, Judgment of 08/08/2005, n. 4207, GIURISPRUDENZA COSTITUZIONALE 3391 (2005). By making reference to—and by misinterpreting—the Cilfit judgment of the ECJ, the Consiglio di Stato avoided to refer a preliminary question which was undoubtedly relevant. See G. Itzcovich, Fundamental Rights, Legal Disorder and Legitimacy: The Federfarma Case, Jean Monnet Working Paper, No. 12/08, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/081201.html. Among the most famous cases of omitted preliminary reference, see the Cohn‐Bendit case, French Conseil d'État, Judgment of 22/12/1978, n. 11604, 36 COMMON MKT L. REV. 701 (1979), in which the French Council of State openly challenged the ECJ, as it blocked a request from a lower French administrative court for an ECJ preliminary ruling, and it held that the Community directives cannot be relied upon by individuals in action for annulment of individual administrative decisions (a deportation order on the well‐known political activist Daniel Cohn‐Bendit).
37. 23 LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1, at 234
38. see also Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Soriano, supra note 1, at 58 (Table 3.1.).
39. 24 During the so called “constitutionalization” of EC Treaties, the ECJ departed from literal interpretation in all its leading cases, such as Case C‐26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 3
40. Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 1141
41. Case C‐29/69, Stauder v. Stadt Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419
42. Case C‐11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr‐ und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125
43. Case C‐41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337
44. Case C‐120/78, Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 ECR 6.4.9. (“Cassis de Dijon”). On this case law, some references supra at note 13.
45. 25 See, e.g., H. Rasmussen, supra note 13; H. Rasmussen, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1998)
46. TH REPORT, 218 (1995)
47. T.C. Hartley, supra note 13
48. J. Coppel, A. O’Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 669 (1992).
49. 26 Case C‐61/65, Vaassen‐Göbbles v. Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf, 1966 E.C.R. 377.
50. 27 Case C‐246/80, Broekmeulen v. Huisarts Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2311.
51. 28 Joint Cases C‐9/97 & C‐118/97, Jokela, 1998 E.C.R. I‐6267.
52. 29 Case C‐296/95, The Queen v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, ex parte EMU Tabac and others, 1998 E.C.R. I‐1605 (“All the language versions must, in principle, be recognised as having the same weight and this cannot vary according to the size of the population of the Member States using the language in question.”).
53. 30 Joint Cases C‐283/94, C‐291/94 & C‐292/94, Denkavit Internationaal and others v. Bundesamt für Finanzen, 1996 E.C.R. I‐5063 (“It follows from the wording of that provision, and in particular from the use of the present tense . . . in all language versions except the Danish, that . . . .”); see also Case C‐30/77, Régina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. 1999 (“A comparison of the different language versions of the provisions in question show that with the exception of the Italian text all the other versions use different terms in each of the two article, with the result that no legal consequences can be based on the terminology used.”); Case C‐372/88, Milk Marketing Board v. Cricket St Thomas, 1990 E.C.R. I‐1345 (“[T]he English version . . . cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation of that provision, or be made to override the other language versions in this regard. Such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement for the uniform application of Community law.”); Case C-56/06, Euro Tex Textilverwertung, 2007 E.C.R. I‐4859 (“Consequently, as the Commission argued, the interpretation . . . is not contrary to any language version of that protocol, whereas the interpretation suggested by Euro Tex—involving distinguishing between simple and complex matching operations—is inconsistent, at the very least, with the language versions mentioned in the preceding paragraph.”).
54. 31 Case C‐30/77, Régina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. 1999. Well‐established case‐law: see, for instance, Case C‐236/97 Skatteministeriet v. Aktieselskabet Forsikringsselskabet Codan, 1998, E.C.R. I‐8679
55. Case C‐420/98 W.N., 2000 E.C.R. I‐2847; Case C‐56/06, Euro Tex Textilverwertung, 2007 E.C.R. I‐4859.
56. 32 On ECJ and balancing judgments, see Bengoetxea, MacCormick & Soriano, supra note 1, at 64
57. G. Itzcovich, L’integrazione europea tra principi e interessi. Giudici nazionali e Corte di giustizia nella “guerra delle banana”, MATERIALI PER UNA STORIA DELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA 385–424 (2004).
58. 33 See C.N. Kakouris, L’utilisation de la méthode comparative par la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE COURTS 97–111 (U. Drobnig & S. van Erp eds., 1999)
59. M. Kiikeri, COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN LAW (2001); K. Lanaerts, Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 873 (2003).
60. 34 Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, as modified by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: “The Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States with due regard to the explanations prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter and updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention.” See also Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. II‐112, para. 7, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1.
61. 35 Case C‐15/60, Simon v. Court of Justice, 1961 E.C.R. 225 (“In the absence of working documents clearly expressing the intention of the draftsmen of a provision, the Court can base itself only on the scope of the wording as it is and give it a meaning based on a literal and logical interpretation.”); Case C‐292/89, Queen v. Antonissen, 1991 E.C.R. I‐745 (“A declaration recorded in the Council minutes at the time of the adoption of a provision of secondary legislation cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting that provision where no reference is made to the content of the declaration in the wording of the provision in question and the declaration therefore has no legal significance.”); Joint Cases C‐283/94, C‐291/94 & C‐292/94, Denkavit Internationaal and others v. Bundesamt für Finanzen, 1996 E.C.R. I‐5063 (“Expressions of intent on the part of Member States in the Council . . . have no legal status if they are not actually expressed in the legislation. Legislation is addressed to those affected by it. They must, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, be able to rely on what it contains.”).
62. 36 LEGAL REASONING, supra note 1.
63. 37 A further argument in support of teleological argumentation has been recently provided by Maduro, supra note 1, at 8: “Reasoning through telos will be an increased necessity in the context of a pluralistic legal order.” Note the usual dogmatic, conceptualist structure of the argumentation, which derives a normative consequence (the opportunity of teleological reasoning) from a theoretical reconstruction of the legal nature of the Community (a pluralistic legal order).
64. 38 C.F. Ophüls, Die europäische Gemeinschaftsverträge als Planungsverfassungen, in 1 PLANUNG 229 (J.H. Keiser ed., 1965)
65. see also P. Reuter, Aspects de la Communauté économique européenne, REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN 161 (1958) (“traité‐cadre”)
66. P. Reuter, Juridical and Institutional Aspects of the European Regional Communities, 26 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 381, 382 (1961) (“What appears is the framework for a treaty”)
67. id. at 389 (“a framework, a carte blanche”)
68. id. at 397 (“a skeletal agreement”)
69. W. Hallstein, The EEC Commission: A New Factor in International Life, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 727 (1965) (“outline‐treaty”).
70. 39 See Section C, supra. It is not surprising that the assumption of the constitutional nature of EC Treaties has been common among Community scholars since the beginning of the experience of European integration. See, e.g., C.F. Ophüls, Juristische Grundgedanken des Schumanplans, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFTS 290 (1951)
71. Reuter, Aspects de la Communauté économique européenne, supra note 38, at 163
72. R. Monaco, Caratteri istituzionali della Comunità economica europea, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 11 (1958). See also Case C-294/83, Les Verts v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339 (“It must first be emphasized in this regard that the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional Charter, the Treaty.”).