Harmonizing essential facilities

Antitrust Law Journal

Volumn 76, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 741-768

  Waller, Spencer Weber ^a   Tasch, William ^a  

^a LOYOLA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 77955700213     PISSN: 00036056     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (167)

1. The European Union applies its version of the essential facilities doctrine as part of the broader provisions of Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (now Article 102 TFEU). Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 (effective Dec. 1, 2009). For ease of reference, we will continue to use the prior numbering.
2. Article 82 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position and covers a variety of practices that would not fall within the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This essay will not discuss EU or Member State development of Article 82 beyond the context of the essential facilities doctrine itself.
3. This essay draws on a body of literature that uses infrastructure in a technical economic sense to indicate certain resources for which it is efficient to manage access in an open, non-discriminatory manner based on the downstream spillovers diat are generated through a regime of open access. Infrastructure theory was developed by Professor Brett Frischmann and applied to antitrust issues by Professor Waller in previous work. Infrastructure theory is summarized in Part V of this article and set forth in further detail in Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008).
4. Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 359 (2008).
5. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
6. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005) [hereinafter An Economic Theory].
7. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 404 (1912).
8. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1945).
9. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973).
10. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 261-62 (2003) (collecting cases).
11. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit reversed liability on certain other theories and remanded for a new trial on damages. Id. at 1174. The case subsequently settled.
12. See Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, supra note 2, at 378.
13. Compare Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST LJ. 841 (1990).
14. Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. LJ. 395, 397-403 (1986).
15. Richard J. Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA 12,749 (1996).
16. Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1243.
17. Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the "Essential Facilities"Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1.
18. Abbott B. Lipsky & Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999).
19. Paul D. Marquandt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson & Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST LJ. 847 (2003).
20. David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 771 (1996).
21. Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433 (1987).
22. David J. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist's Ditty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "Essential Facilities," 74 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1988).
23. with Daniel E. Troy, Note, Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1983).
24. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 124-31 (2d ed. 2006).
25. Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and "Essential Facilities": .From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557 (2009).
26. Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (2002).
27. James R. Ratner, Should There Be an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 327 (1988).
28. Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177 (2002).
29. See Frischmann & Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, supra note 2.
30. Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, supra note 2, at 378.
31. Frischmann & Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 2.
32. Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note 2.
33. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410-11 (2004) (discussing commentary).
34. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 101-04 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amc- final-report.pdf.
35. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 127-29 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm.
36. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 127-29 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm.
37. The report was the outcome of what were originally joint hearings on single firm conduct by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC refused to sign onto the report, and upon its release a majority of theCommissioners joined in a stinging critique of it. Statement of [FTC] Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch on the Issuance of Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice 1 (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmt.pdf ("At almost every turn, the Department would place a thumb on the scales in favor of firms with monopoly or near-monopoly power and against other equally significant stakeholders."). The essential facilities doctrine was not specifically discussed in that FTC critique.
38. Id. The report was subsequently disavowed by the new head of the Antitrust Division in the Obama Administration. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era, Remarks Prepared for the United States Chamber of Commerce 5-14 (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ public/speeches/245777.htm.
39. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1117, 1119-20 (2009).
40. See, e.g., Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1113-14 (D. Colo. 2004).
41. See Case IV/34.174-B&I Line PLC v. Sealink Harbours Ltd. & Sealink Stena Ltd., 5 C.M.L.R. 255 (1992).
42. Case COMP/IV/34.689-Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, Comm'n Decision, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8.
43. Case COMP/94/119/EC-Port of Rodby, Comm'n Decision, 1994 O.J. (L 55) 52.
44. Case COMP/IV/32.490-Eurotunnel, Comm'n Decision, 1994 O.J. (L 354) 66.
45. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Publ'ns Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, ¶ 50 (Eur. Ct. Justice) (Magill).
46. Case COMP/C-3/37.792-Microsoft Corp., Comm'n Decision, Art.5 (Mar. 24, 2004) (summary at 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ competition/anti-trust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf, ajfd, Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601 (Ct. First Instance).
47. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791 (Eur. Ct. Justice).
48. European Comm'n, DG Competition, Guidance on the Commission's Official Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings ¶ 77 (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance.pdf.
49. Id. ¶ 78.
50. Id. ¶ 80.
51. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW HANDBOOK: ACCESS TO FACILITIES (2008/2009 ed.), available at http://mailing.concurrences.com/e-Comp-ECCLH-25. cfm? WL=2727 (discussing the cases from Austria, Belgium, Cypress, Czech Republic, France, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
52. Louisa Penny, Dominance: Excessive Pricing, Access to Data and Essential Facilities. Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing Board, 17 ENT. L. REV. 128, 130 (2006).
53. Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing Bd. Ltd., [2005] EWHC (Ch) 3015 (Eng.).
54. Unlike in the Atagillczse, the defendant did not enjoy any intellectual property rights over the data in question. Id.
55. Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing Bd. Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 38, [108] (Eng.).
56. Software Cellular Network Ltd. v. T-Mobile (UK) Ltd., [2007] EWHC (Ch) 1790, ¶ 58 (Eng.). T-Mobile has a relatively low market share in the United Kingdom, but the court pointed out that interconnection with each phone provider was critical to a prospective telecommunications provider. Id. ¶¶ 21-24.
57. Id. ¶ 40 (citing Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena Sealink Ports & Stena Sealink Line, 4 C.M.L.R. 84 (1995)).
58. Derek Ridyard, Essential Facitilies and the Obligation to Supply Competitors Under the UK and EC Competition Law, 17 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 438, 443-44 (1996).
59. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., [2003] No. CA98/07/2003, Case CP/1761/02,¶ 29 (OFT) (U.K.) (citations omitted).
60. Id. ¶ 33. UK regulators have used the essential facilities doctrine in a cautious, but relatively uncontroversial manner in their attempts to inject competition in the transmission of natural, gas and electricity. Press Release, Gas & Elec. Markets Auth., Case Closure Statement, Following an Investigation Into Non-Compliance by EDF Energy Networks (LPN) pic, EDF Energy Networks (EPN) pic and EDF Energy Networks (SPN) pic with Standard Licence Condition 4C of Their Electricity Distribution Licences (July 13, 2007). The UK regulators have been far more reluctant to use the essential facilities doctrine to require access to data in regulated industries. For more on UK refusal-to-deal law.
61. see OECD, COMPETITION COMMITTEE, POLICY ROUNDTABI.ES: REFUSALS TO DEAL 189-92 (2007) [hereinafter OECD RTD ROUNDTABIX], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/35/43644518.pdf.
62. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints of Competition],June 30, 2005 RGBl. I at 499, § 19(4), ¶ 4 (F.R.G.) ("the abusive exploitation of a dominant position by one or several undertakings shall be prohibited").
63. Id § 19(4). For a critique of the application of this provision to excessive pricing claims in die German electricity market.
64. see Martin F. Hellwig, Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network Industries 9 (Max Planck Inst, for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint 2008/29, July 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract-id=1275285.
65. Florian Wagner-von Papp, The German Federal Court of Justice Clarifies That Access to an Essential Facility Does Not Require a Dominant Position in the Up- or Downstream Market in the Electricity Sector (Arealnetze), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 488 (June 28, 2005) (summarizing die German court's decision in Arealnetze). For more on Germany's approach to unilateral refusals to deal, see OECD RTD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 30, at 139-44.
66. GWB, supra note 31, § 20(1) (F.R.G.).
67. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] July 13, 2004, 170 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 299 (F.R.G) (English translation available at 36 INT'I. REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 742 (2005)).
68. Irish Competition Act, 2002, § 5 (Act No. 14/2002) (Ir.), available at http://www. irishstatutebook.ie/2002/en/act/pub/0014/sec0005.html#partii- sec5.
69. See Competition Auth. v. O'Regan, [2007] 4 IR 737 (Ir.), ¶ 5.
70. Competition Auth. v. O'Regan, [2004] I.E.H.C. 330 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), rev'd on other grounds, [2007] IR 737 (Ir.).
71. O'Regan, [2004] I.E.H.C. 330, at 146, 148 (citing RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 670 (5th ed. 2003)), available at http://www.baiiii.org/ie/ cases/IEHC/2004/330.html (for a paginated version of the O'Regan High Court decision, select "printable RTF version" at the URL provided and view in "print preview" to see page numbering).
72. Id. at 148.
73. Id. Ireland's law on refusals to deal was outlined in the OECD Roundtable on Refusals to Deal. OECD RTD ROUNDTABI.E, supra note 30, at 149-52.
74. See, e.g., Victor Chimienti, The Abuse of Dominance in the New Albanian Competition Act, 26 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 151, 160 (2005).
75. Robert Pelikán & Jan Prevrátil, The Czech Office for the Protection of Competition Declares that the Refusal of Access to a Bus Station to Competing Bus Line Operators Does Not Amount to an Abuse of Dominant Position (AS Service), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 534 (Nov. 25, 2005) (summarizing AS Service).
76. Jan Prevratil, The Czech Office for the Protection of Competition Maintains that the Refusal of Access to a Non-Essential Facility-a Bus Station-May Amount to an Abuse of Dominant Position (CSAD Liberec), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 23195 (May 16, 2006). The Competition Authority also held that a city-owned operator of the municipal cemetery violated the essential facilities doctrine when it refused to rent the on-site funeral chapel to a competing funeral service provider.
77. Robert Pelikán, The Czech Office for the Protection of Competition Confirms the Abuse of Dominant Position by the Operator of a Municipal Cemetery by Refusing to Grant Access to a Funeral Chapel (TSP/PSM), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 23199 (Dec. 13, 2005) (summarizing TSP/PSM).
78. Axel Redlinger & Heinrich Kuhnert, The Austrian Supreme Court Finds, on the Basis of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, that a Distributor Abused Its Dominant Position on the Market for Film Distribution by Refusing to Supply Competitors (Constantin-Film), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 23200 (Apr. 4, 2005) (summarizing Constantin-Film).
79. Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791 (Eur. Ct. Justice).
80. Antigoni Lykotrafiti, The Cyprus Competition Authority Fines the Telecommunications Incumbent and a Subscriber Channel for a Restrictive Cooperation Agreement on the DSL Market (CYTA/LTV), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 13241 (Aug. 4, 2006).
81. Anastasios Antoniou, The Cypriot NCA Holds the Telecommunications Incumbent to Have Abused Its Dominant Position in the SMS Market (Thunderworx/Cyprus Telecommunications Authority), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 23182 (Dec. 21, 2008).
82. Vaido Pöldoja, The Estonian Competition Board Brought Proceedings to an End Against the Tallinn Port and Established Discriminatory Pricing for Access to an Essential Facility (Termoil), e- Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 16445 (June 7, 2002).
83. Ioannis Lianos, The Greek Competition Commission Refuses to Adopt Interim Measures Against a Refusal to Access to a Motor Vehicle Distribution Network, The Insolvency of the Distributor Being Considered as a Valid Commercial justification, Which Is Not Sanctioned by EC Reg. No. 1400/2002 (Auto Service/Technocar), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 433 (May 18, 2004).
84. Philippe-Emmanuel Partsch & Vincent Wellens, The Luxemborg Competition Council Renders Its First Ever Decision and Negatively Applies the Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Sector of Distribution of Domestic Heating Fuel While Holding that Trade Between Member Slates Is Not Affected (Rock Fernand Distributions/Tanklux), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 23190 (Apr. 23, 2007).
85. Sarunas Keserauskas, The Lithuanian Competition Authority Fines the Slate-Controlled Airport for Abusing Its Dominance by Restricting Access to the Airport Facilities (Vilnius Airport/RSS), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 14177 (June 7, 2007).
86. Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. IIIA (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol-act/tpal974149/.
87. see also NAT'L COMPETITION COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007, at 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/AR0607.pdf.
88. NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, at xiv (2007),available at http://www.ncc.gov.au/images/uploads/AR0506-001.pdf (describing operation and application of the National Access Regime in Australia).
89. Brenda Marshall, Pricing Third Party Access to Essential Infrastructure: Principles and Prac tice, 24 AUSTL. RESOURCES & ENERCY L.J. 172 (2005).
90. See, e.g., Queensland Wire Indus. Proprietary Ltd. v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., (1989) 167 C.L.R. 177, ¶ 30 (Austl.) (finding abuse of market power under the Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.) where a dominant steel products producer refused to sell a certain rural fence component to a downstream compedtor); NT Power Generation Proprietary Ltd. v. Power & Water Auth., (2004) 219 C.L.R. 90, H 112-121, 150, 153 (Austl.) (finding that die Australian Power and Water Authority had violated Section 46by refusing to allow a competitor to access its electricity distribution system, and explicidy declining to apply Trinko).
91. Brenda Marshall & Rachel Mulheron, Access to Essential Facilities Under Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986: Lessons from Australian Competition Law, 9 CANTERBURY L. REV. 248, 248-52 (2003). Historically, New Zealand courts applied the Rule of Prime Necessity as a common law restriction on excessive pricing (id. at 251-52) but since 1999 they have held that the rule is displaced in essential facility situations by the Commerce Act. Id.
92. see also Vector Ltd. v. Transpower New Zealand Ltd., [1999] 3 N.Z.L.R. 646,¶ 64 (CA.) (holding that the Doctrine of Prime Necessity was pre-empted by Section 36 of the Commerce Act for purposes of access to electricity distribution infrastructure). Unlike Australia, New Zealand has not enacted statutory access regimes (Marshall & Mulheron, supra, at 248), though a number of industries have voluntarily adopted rules for access on the threat that regulation would be adopted if necessary. Id. at 248 n.6.
93. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.).
94. Commerce Act 1986, 36 (N.Z.). New Zealand has not yet adopted certain subsequent amendments to the Australian TPA.
95. Australian and New Zealand courts have analyzed "abuse" using the "counterfactual test," i.e., a firm does not abuse a dominant position if it would have taken the same action in a competitive market. Mark Berry, Review, Competition Law, 2005 N.Z. L. REV. 267, 268-69 (2005).
96. Telecom Corp. of N.Z. v. Clear Commc'ns Ltd., [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385, 403 (P.C.) (N.Z.) (adopting counterfactual test, finding "[i]f the terms [the defendant was] seeking to extract were no higher than those which a hypothetical firm would seek in a perfecdy contestable market, [the defendant] was not using its dominant position"). The counterfactual test has been the focus of some controversy. The most modern cases tend to suggest a more nuanced approach for certain situations.
97. See Berry, supra, at 268-69.
98. see, e.g., Union Shipping NZ Ltd. v. Port Nelson Ltd., [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 662, 706-07, 711 (H.C.) (N.Z.).
99. Telecom, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 402 (reasoning that "[i]f a person has used his dominant position it is hard to imagine a case in which he would have done so otherwise than for the purpose of producing an anti-competitive effect; there will be no need to use the dominant position in the process of ordinary competition"). THE LAWS OF NEW ZEALAND: COMPETITION § 120 (2008).
100. For cases finding a right of access, see Auckland Reg'l Auth. v. Mut. Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd., [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 647, 651, 679-680 (H.C.) (N.Z.) (finding airport had duty to rent space to rental car company).
101. Union Shipping, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 706-07, 711 (enforcing right to access the only wharf in a particular region). In Telecom, the Privy Council (New Zealand's highest court until 2004) found that Section 36 only ensures a modicum of competition and is not intended to allow the courts to eliminate a dominant firm's monopoly profits. [1995] 1 N.L.Z.R, at 407.
102. Union Shipping, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 705-06.
103. See, e.g., id. at 704-06 (collecting important U.S. essential facilities cases and analyzing the doctrine as applied in the United States).
104. Telecom, [1995] N.Z.L.R. at 402-03 (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986)).
105. Auckland Regional Authority, [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 679-80 (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
106. THE LAWS OF NEW ZEALAND, supra note 60, § 12.
107. see also Fisher & Paykel Ltd. v. Commerce Comm'n, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. 731, 756 (N.Z.) ("[T]here is a wealth of Australian precedent on which New Zealand Courts have drawn and should continue to draw. The close relationship between the New Zealand Act and the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, the goal of harmonisation of commercial statutes and an increasingly shared interpretation of commercial law in both common law and statutory areas, makes reliance on Australian precedent almost inevitable.").
108. See, e.g., Union Shipping, [1990] 2 N.Z.L.R. at 701 (analyzing Queensland Wire Indus. Proprietary Ltd. v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., (1989) 167 C.L.R. 177 (Austl.)).
109. Telecom, 1 N.Z.L.R. at 403 (citing Queensland Wire).
110. Competition Act 89 of 1998, § 8(b) (S. Afr.). Section 8 applies only to dominant firms as defined under the Act. DW Integrators CC v. SAS Institute (Pty) Ltd., [2000] ZACT 16, ¶ 23 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.0rg//cgi-bin/disp.pl/za/cases/ZACT/2000/16.pdf.
111. Competition Act 89 of 1998, § 8(b) (S. Afr.).
112. Glaxo Wellcome (Pty) Ltd. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Wholesalers, [2002] ZACAC 3, 1 29 (Comp. App. Ct.) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/ cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZACAC/2002/3.html&query=glaxo.
113. Competition Act 89 of 1998, § l(vi) (S. Afr.).
114. Glaxo, [2002] ZACAC 3,I 53.
115. Id. 1 57.
116. Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 8(d) (S. Afr).
117. Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988, 42 LSI 135 (1987-88), § 29 (Isr.). Section 29 encompasses tying and bundling as well. Israel Antitrust Auth., Israel Antitrust Authority Answers to Questionnaire Prepared for the International Competition Network's Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies 1 (2008).
118. See id. at 2 ("Section 29A, inspired by Article 82 of the EC Treaty, was enacted in 1996 to supplement § 29.").
119. MICHAL GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMAIX MARKET ECONOMIES (2003).
120. Id. at 140.
121. Id. at 140-41.
122. Competition Bureau, Updated Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions (Sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act) 39 [hereinafter Competition Bureau 2009 Draft Guidelines] (draft Jan. 2009), available at http://www.competition bureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Draft-Abuse-of- Dominance-Guidelines-eng-16012009.pdf/$FILE/Draft-Abuse-of-Dominance- Guidelines-eng-16012009.pdf.
123. Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi to Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 2, no. (9), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/ legislation/ama/amended-ama.pdf.
124. Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, JFTC Public Notice No. 15, Designation for Unfair Trade Practices 1 (1982).
125. Id. ¶ 2.
126. Japan Fair Trade Comm'n, Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices Under the Antimonopoly Act (1991), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/distribution.pdf.
127. Id. at 9.
128. Id. at 10.
129. MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 150-51 (1993) (citing In re Osaka Burashi Kogyo Kumiai, 7 SHINKETSUSHU 99 (JFTC Sept. 20 1955)).
130. HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN 111-13 (1994,).
131. See also Eriko Watanabe, Regulation on Setting Technology Standards Under the Antimonopoly Law of Japan, 1 WASH. U. GLOHAL STUD. L. REV. 263, 272 n.21 (2002) ("According to the essential facilities doctrine discussed in Japan but not yet discussed in court precedents or JFTC decisions, if plural firms are going to set technology standards jointly, and if refusing access to third parties to the technology potentially could exclude competitors, then the plural firms must provide open access to third parties in the resulting technologies.").
132. EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 456 (2007). For more on Japanese refusal-to-deal law, see OECD RTD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 30, at 153-58.
133. Patrick Massey & Tony Shortall, Competition and Regulation in Public Utility Industries 14 (Competition Auth. (Ir.), Disc. Paper No. 7, 1999), available at http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/Discussion-Paper-7.pdf.
134. Under this regime, there is a government-imposed mediation process wherein the parties negotiate for four months. If no agreement is reached, the parties submit final, sealed bids, and the arbitrator chooses the more reasonable of the two. Id.
135. Remy Fekete, The Turkish Competition Board Fines 5 M Euro an Abuse of Dominant Position by Applying the &"Essential Facility&" Doctrine in the Energy Distribution Sector (Enerjisa and Toros/CEAS), e-Competitions (Inst, of Competition Law) No. 23178 (Feb. 8, 2007) (summarizing Enerjisa and Toros/CEAS).
136. Rachel Morarjee & Andrey Panov, Russia's Stock Market Slumps to 2-Year Low, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2008, available at http://virtualcollector. blogspot.com/2008/09/russias-stock-market-slumps-to-2-year.html.
137. See, e.g., US HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 131 (Rosemary Foot, S. Neil MacFarlane & Michael Mastanduno eds., 2003) (explaining that during drafting negotiations for the WTO, &"fear of the loss of sovereignty had prompted some in the U.S. Congress to seek &mellip; a so called 'three-strikes agreement,&" which would allow the United States to withdraw upon the third finding in five years by U.S. circuit court judges that the WTO acted unreasonably against the interests of the United States).
138. Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 344-45 (1997).
139. See John C. Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 461 n.81 (2003).
140. Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179 (1999) (inherent problem of chauvinism in programs like CEELI).
141. Mickey Davis, Harmonization, BOSTON REV., June-Aug 1993, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR18.3/davis.html (raising concern that CEELI program &"amounts to imperialism of a subtle-and dangerous- sort&").
142. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2008 TRANSITION REPORT 17-19 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.Org/antitrust/at-comments/2008/11-08/ comments-obamabiden.pdf.
143. Id. at 17. Demonstrating less concern for U.S. global antitrust hegemony, the American Antitrust Institute instead proposes evaluating other countries' regimes in an attemptto further improve and streamline U.S. policy. This is particularly true for areas like cartel enforcement, where regimes like Korea and the United Kingdom have created innovative strategies to root out and prosecute anticompetitive behavior that could also be successful in the United States. AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (Albert A. Foer ed., 2008).
144. INT'L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM. TO THE ATT'Y GEN. AND THE ASSISTANT ATT'Y GEN. FOR ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST Drv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm.
145. Id. at 281 (included in ch. 6), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ icpac/chapter 6.pdf.
146. See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
147. The acquis communitaire consists of the elements of EU law that new Member States must accept in addition to the formal treaty provisions which include the acts of the Community institutions, such as the European Commission, as well as the complete case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.
148. See generally PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 4 (2d ed. 1999).
149. Agreement on the European Economic Area, arts. 53-60, Mar. 17,1993,1994 O.J. (L 1)3.
150. See, e.g., Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the State of Israel, of the Other Part, arts. 36-38, Nov. 20, 1995, 2000 O.J. (L 147) 3.
151. Jamie E. Fernandez, Antitrust Regulation in Latin America, 30 INT'L LAW. 521 (1996) (summarizing competition law changes in Brazil, Argentina, Columbia, and Chile modeled after EU law).
152. Daniel Pruzin, WTO, EU Outlines Goals for WTO Talks on Services, IP, Competition Policy, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 968 (June 9, 1999).
153. Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 383 (2007).
154. Enforcement: WTO Will Not Be Conducting Competition Policy Negotiations, 87 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 151 (Aug. 6, 2004).
155. About the International Competition Network, http://www. internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.aspx.
156. The International Competition Network-Document Library, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/library/ working-group.
157. Areeda, supra note 7.
158. Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China-Scaling the Walls of Government Restraint, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173 (2008).
159. Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 120-24 (2000).
160. Symposium, The Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law Reform, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 409, 423-24 (1994).
161. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. At a 2007 OECD Roundtable focusing on refusals to deal, it was clear to at least one delegate that nearly every country's competition authority recognized some limitation on refusals to deal. OECD RTD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 30, at 238.
162. Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, supra note 2.
163. Frischmann & Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, supra note 2.
164. Frischmann & Lemley, Spillovers, supra note 2; Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note 2. This section draws on the earlier work of both Professors Waller and Frischmann (with permission of Frischmann).
165. Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, supra note 2, at 371 (derived from the arguments set forth in Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note 2, and Frischmann & Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, supra note 2).
166. Frischmann, An Economic Theory, supra note 2, at 956.
167. See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 557 (1994).