The BCN challenge to compatibilist free will and personal responsibility

Neuroethics

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 121-133

  Sie, Maureen ^a   Wouters, Arno ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Acting for reasons; Compatibilism; Determinism; Free will; Personal responsibility; Reasons responsiveness

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIOR; COGNITION; CONSCIOUSNESS; DENIAL; MENTAL HEALTH; METAPHYSICS; MORALITY; MOTIVATION; NEUROSCIENCE; PHILOSOPHY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; RESPONSIBILITY; REVIEW; SCIENTIST;

EID: 77955659570     PISSN: 18745490     EISSN: 18745504     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12152-009-9054-8     Document Type: Review

References (36)

1. Brooks, David. 2007. The morality line. The New York Times, 19 April 2007.
2. Horgan, John. 2002. More than good intentions: Holding fast to faith in free will. New York Times, 31 December 2002.
3. Wolfe, Tom. 1996. Sorry, but your soul just died. Forbes Magazine 158(13): 210 e.v.
4. Dennett, Daniel C. 2003. Freedom evolves. New York: Viking.
5. Roskies, Adina. 2006. Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(9): 419-423.
6. Libet, Benjamin, C.A. Gleason, E.W. Wright, and D.K. Pearl. 1983. Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106 (3): 623-642.
7. Wegner, Daniel M. 2002. The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge: MIT Press.
8. Mele, Alfred R. 2009. Effective intentions: The power of conscious will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
9. Fischer, JohnMartin, and Mark Ravizza. 1999. Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Wallace, R.Jay. 1994. Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
11. Wolf, Susan. 1981. The importance of free will. Mind 90 (359): 386-405.
12. Kane, Robert. 1996. The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Sie, Maureen, and Arno G. Wouters. 2008. The real challenge to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12(1): 3-4.
14. Strawson, Peter F. 1962. Freedom and resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48: 1-25.
15. Sie, Maureen. 1998. Goodwill, determinism and justification. In Human action, deliberation and causation, ed. J. Bransen, and S. Cuypers, 113-129. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
16. Wolf, Susan. 1990. Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17. Watson, Garry. 1987. Responsibility and the limits of evil; variations on a Strawsonian theme. In Responsibility, character, and the emotions, ed. F. Schoeman, 256-286. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18. Nagel, Thomas. 1979. Moral luck. In Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press.
19. Russell, Paul. 1992. Strawson's way of naturalizing responsibility. Ethics 102: 287-302.
20. Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66(23): 829-839.
21. Frankfurt, Harry G. 1976. Identification and externality. In The identities of persons, ed. Amélie O. Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press.
22. Frankfurt, Harry G. 1987. Identification and wholeheartedness. In Responsibility, character, and the emotions, ed. F.D. Schoeman. New York: Cambridge University Press.
23. Sie, Maureen. 2005. Justifying blame. Why free will matters and why it does not. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
24. Gazzaniga, Michael S., and Joseph E. LeDoux. 1978. The integrated mind. New York: Plenum.
25. Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy D. Wilson. 1977. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84(3): 231-259.
26. Wegner, Daniel M., and Thalia Wheatley. 1999. Apparent mental causation: Sources of experience of the will. American Psychologist 54(7): 480-492.
27. Pronin, Emily, Daniel M. Wegner, Kimberly McCarthy, and Sylvia Rodriguez. 2006. Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91(2): 218-231.
28. Damasio, Anthonio R. 1994. Descartes' error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: G.P. Putman's Sons.
29. Bargh, John A., and Tanya L. Chartrand. 1999. The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist 54(7): 462-479.
30. Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 108(4): 814-834.
31. Greene, Joshua, and Jonathan Haidt. 2002. How (and where) does moral judgment work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6(12): 517-523.
32. Darley, John M., and C. Daniel Batson. 1973. From Jerusalem to Jericho: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27(1): 100-108.
33. Doris, John M. 2002. Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34. Wheatley, Thalia, and Jonathan Haidt. 2005. Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe. Psychological Science 16(10): 780-784.
35. Schnall, Simone, Jonathan Haidt, Gerald L. Clore, and Alexander H. Jordan. 2008. Disgust as embodied moral judgment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34 (8): 1096-1109.
36. Sie, Maureen. 2006. Ordinary wrongdoing and responsibility worth wanting. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1(2): 67-82.